Evolution of United States Navy Amphibious Landing Doctrine During World War II

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EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES NAVY AMPHIBIOUS LANDING DOCTRINE
DURING WORLD WAR II

by

Jaedon A. Foreman

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the
University Honors Program

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The University of South Dakota
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The members of the Honors Thesis Committee appointed to examine the thesis of Jaedon A. Foreman find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

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Leaving World War I and heading into World War II the United States Navy had to prepare for an unforeseen future on the open seas. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the United States was thrust into World War II and needed an effective amphibious landing doctrine to be able to counter adversary advances. This thesis covers the evolution of landing doctrine from the beginning to the end of World War II while highlighting the impacts that Operations Torch, Husky, Shingle, and Overlord had on the Navy's landing doctrine after the war.

KEYWORDS: Doctrine, Amphibious, Landing, World War II, Navy
## TABLE OF CONTENTS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heading into World War II</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Operations on Hostile Shores</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Action of the Army and the Navy</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landings Leading Up to War Instructions 1944</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Instructions 1944</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works Cited</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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I would also like to thank the United States Navy History and Heritage Command for their extensive resources in conducting this thesis. The availability of these resources online helped to draft the thesis in a timely manner.
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the following:

My great-grandfathers: Chief Torpedoman’s Mate Donald D. Squires and PFC Glenn L. Shropshire who served in the United States Navy in the pacific and Army in France on D-Day respectively during World War II and provided a proud history of service to reflect upon and carry forward.

My grandfathers: Chief Torpedoman’s Mate Michael D. Squires and Seaman Wayne Foreman who served on the USS James C. Owens and the USS Forrestal respectively during the war in Vietnam and instilled in me the family tradition of naval service.

My uncle Boatswains Mate Master Chief Clyde Squires who has taught me about effective leadership and serving my shipmates with honor in the United States Navy.

My mom and dad Rachel and Troy for always pushing me to achieve goals that I never dreamed possible.

Finally, my wife Allison for supporting me through the long hours of work on this paper. I could not have done it without her support.
**Introduction**

In any organization, efficient and adequate management and operating procedures are vital to success. For the military, these goals are achieved through doctrine. Military doctrine outlines standard procedures for training, readiness, and combat. It provides guidance for harmonious conduct by its subcomponent commands. Throughout history, military doctrine has had to adapt to changing technology, a changing geopolitical climate, and constant evaluation. This thesis will evaluate the United States Navy’s amphibious landing doctrine before, during, and in the months leading to the end of World War II. Although there is residual decision-making left to be made at the tactical level of warfare, there is significance in comprehending the functionality of doctrine at the strategic level of war.

**Doctrine**

For the United States Department of Defense, procedures are laid out in doctrine. While doctrine is instructional and authoritative somewhat like an order, its application requires a level of judgment relative to the situation.¹ Doctrine may be deviated from at the commander's discretion. Doctrine, like warfare, may be broken up into three segments: strategic, operational, and tactical. The easiest way of viewing these types of doctrine is as if they were a part of a tree, a doctrine tree. At the top, you have the all-encompassing strategic level doctrine. Strategic level doctrine covers national policy and independent theatre strategy. This level of doctrine focuses on utilizing national resources for theatre level success of military operations and is directed by the President of the United States with assistance from the National Security Council (NSC).² Once

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¹ (CJCSI n.d.)
² (CJCS 2013)
Strategic level doctrine is established, the Secretary of Defense relays this to combatant commanders and joint force commanders who develop operational level doctrine, the next tier down on the doctrine tree. While not present during World War II, Operational level doctrine is set by each combatant commander or joint force commander with the goal of acting in accordance with and satisfying strategic doctrine. The focus of operational level doctrine is to “develop strategies, campaigns, and operations and employ military forces”. Operational level doctrine combines strategy and tactics to create operational objectives necessary to meet strategic goals. Finally, the tactical level doctrine covers the location and utilization of forces. This level of doctrine is where actual battles, skirmishes, and engagements occur. Figure 1 shows the relationship of the different levels of warfare which are the basis for different levels of doctrine. Doctrine is laid out through government publications like the *National Defense Strategy* (NDS) and the *National Security Strategy* (NSS). The *National Defense Strategy* outlines the Department of Defense objectives while the *National Security Strategy* examines the United States’ more broad strategy of securing the nation through all means of the government. The NSS states that “our fundamental responsibility is to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life”. Some strategies like the NDS have classified full versions and unclassified summaries. Strategies like the NSS are broad and open-source, non-classified materials for public dissemination. In the unclassified release of the NDS, the Department of Defense shows what it is currently shaping its strategic doctrine towards by saying “Inter-state strategic competition, not

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3 (CJCS 2013)  
4 (Trump 2017)
terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” The NDS and the NSS are vital precursors to doctrine and can show where top military leaders want our doctrine to go. Leading up to, and during World War II, the foreshadowing of doctrine was not as publicly available as it is today.

**Heading into World War II**

Prior to American entry into World War I, the United States Navy embarked on a massive naval order of battle expansion. Approved by Congress in 1916, the Naval Expansion Act of 1916 allowed for ten battleships, six battle cruisers, ten scout cruisers, fifty destroyers, and sixty-seven submarines to be built within the following three years. Based on the theory of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Naval Expansion Act of 1916 gained support through the United States’ goal of a thriving nation through extensive

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5 (Trump 2017)
6 (Halpern 2014)
commercial sea lanes which required a strong naval presence for protection. President Woodrow Wilson believed that if the United States were to pursue naval expansion, that it may undercut his efforts at obtaining a peaceful end to World War I. It was only after German submarines began killing Americans that President Wilson realized the need for the United States Navy to be ready to defend the nation and its people. This massive buildup of ships prior to the war had created purpose for the First International Conference on Limitations of Naval Armaments, also called the Washington Conference, after the war. Starting on November 11th, 1921, this conference hosted by the United States included representatives from eight nations including China, France, Japan, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, and Great Britain; it ended with the establishment of a five-nation power treaty (Five-Power Treaty) between the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy on February 6th, 1922. During the conference, these nations agreed to one of the first arms reduction treaties in modern history. Led by United States Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, the agreement also included provisions of limiting tonnage of capital ships and aircraft carriers, the United States, Great Britain, and France to scrap finite amounts of ships (1.9 million tons), set a strict ratio of capital ships (ships weighing over 10,000 tons) and set more strict rules for surface warfare for the Five Powers, and set a status quo for naval fortifications in the western Pacific ocean. The agreements made by the United States during the First International Conference on Limitations of Naval Armaments would shape its naval strategy leading up to its entrance into World War II.

7 (Kirschbaum 2008)  
8 (Blazich Jr. 2016)  
9 (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia 2019)
Japan had threatened to terminate the agreement it had made during the Washington Conference and demanded to be treated equally with the United States and Great Britain with respect to the buildup of capital ships. When this request was rejected by the other Five-Power nations in 1936, Japan provided its official notice of their intent to permanently terminate the Five-Power Treaty.\textsuperscript{10} Also, in 1936 at the Second London Naval Treaty, Japan and Italy refused to sign a modified version of the original treaty signed at the Washington Conference.\textsuperscript{11} With Japan and Italy breaking away from the naval agreements, western powers had to begin to prepare for an unforeseen future on the open seas.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{image}
\caption{The United States Delegation to the conference, photographed on the steps of the State-War-Navy Building, Pennsylvania Ave. At 17th St., Washington, D.C., in November 1921. Among those present are: Admiral Robert E. Coontz, USN Chief (National Museum of the U.S. Navy 2019)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{10} (E. Editors 2019)  
\textsuperscript{11} (National Museum of the U.S. Navy 2019)
Leading up to World War II, the Japanese military was split into two separate entities: the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). Japan had foreseen China, Russia, and the United States as their three main enemies for the fast-approaching war; the IJA would primarily handle the war with China and Russia while the IJN would primarily manage the war with the United States. After conducting their final round of war games on October 4th and 5th and with the final plan approved on the 22nd, the Japanese were ready to launch the attack on Pearl Harbor. At 0755 a.m. on December 7th, 1941 Japan launched its raid on Pearl Harbor killing over 2,300 Americans and launching the United States into World War II.

Now that the United States was thrust into World War II, the United States Navy needed to be ready to fight at all levels. To be ready to effectively fight and win the Second World War, key United States military leaders realized that amphibious operations would be vital to Allied success in the War. The United States Navy and Army needed a thorough and effective amphibious landing doctrine for the war. The United States Marine Corps utilized the Navy’s *Landing Operations Doctrine, 1938* to generate their field manual titled *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores*. Furthermore, the United States Army copied this instruction laid out by the Marine Corps to have its own amphibious doctrine. This thesis will examine and analyze the changes to United States Amphibious Doctrine through World War II from the view of landings before the war in *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* (FM 31-5) to the viewpoint during the war in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* (FTP-155), and finally with the adoption of *War

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12 (Caravaggio 2014)
13 (War Department 1941)
*Instructions 1944* (FTP-143) by Chief of Naval Operations Ernie King closer to the end of the war.

**Landing Operations on Hostile Shores**

The United States Navy’s *Landing Operations Doctrine* was published by the Office of Naval Operations on May 2\(^{nd}\), 1941. *Landing Operations Doctrine* supersedes the United States Navy’s *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* of 1935 and is a guide for Navy and Marine forces whose mission is to conduct land operations against adversaries.\(^{14}\) The United States Army was able to transform *Landing Operations Doctrine* into their own publication on June 2\(^{nd}\), 1941. The resulting publication, *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* focuses on guiding strictly Army forces during amphibious landing operations on adversary territory.\(^{15}\) Divided into eleven subsections, *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* guides the war planner and fighter through each stage of the amphibious landing.

First, *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* defines the purpose of joint overseas expeditions as “combined Army and Navy forces dispatched to a theatre of operations by sea for the purpose of undertaking military operations ashore which may involve… the securing of a beachhead from which to project major land operations… seizure and securing of an area for use in connection with other military operations; or for use to carry out further operations… seizure and securing of an area in order to deny its use to the enemy, and the destruction of enemy installations and facilities”.\(^{16}\) This doctrine lays out four stages to successful overseas expeditions starting with the concentration and

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\(^{14}\) (War Department 1941)  
\(^{15}\) (War Department 1941)  
\(^{16}\) (War Department 1941)
specialized training phase, then the embarkation phase, the movement phase, and finishing with the landing phase. The concentration and specialized training phase trains landing forces in similarly situated environments as the desired adversary beachhead. The embarkation phase compiles all the applicable troops and their equipment and transports them to the desired pre-landing location. The movement phase occurs during the time when the troops depart the allied port and before the rendezvous at the desired adversary landing area. Finally, the landing phase is the expeditionary movement of troops onto the beachhead until landing forces are securely established on the adversary shore.

When conducting landing operations, numerous considerations must be made. *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* outlines the need to consider the nature of operations, special organization, and special equipment needed for a successful landing. These considerations led to the distinct and outlined plans for the landing force after the basic plan has been made with the aforementioned considerations. The plans for the landing force include planning of special training, troop movement from concentration centers to ports of embarkations, loading the transports, and finally the plan to debark with ship-to-shore movement and ashore operations. Each stage of the planning process requires centralization due to the complexity of oversea landing operations.

The amphibious landing is broken into three landing phases in *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores*. Landing phase one includes the seizure of terrain.

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17 (War Department 1941)  
18 (War Department 1941)  
19 (War Department 1941)  
20 (War Department 1941)  
21 (War Department 1941)
immediately in the rear of the beach, then when sufficient land has been secured, forces advance inland about 10,000 yards which secures the beach from enemy light artillery fire. Moving landing forces another 15,000 yards inland denying the enemy of medium artillery fire on the beach is the second landing phase. The third and final landing phase encompasses the entire use of land and air assets to secure the objective for which the landing was undertaken. The ultimate success of the tactical plan depends most heavily on the first landing phase. Demonstrations are a unique and complementary phase of the landing operation in which exhibitions of force are displayed in a way to divert enemy reserves from tending to the main landing operation. Knowing how to effectively place forces is dependent on the landing environment. Landing areas that possess favorable landing terrain are the most heavily fortified by the adversary. The converse is also true due to the nature of expeditionary movement in that the least landing-favorable beaches are not as fortified. In selecting the final location for the landing, the correct decision considers the needs of the force and their equipment while also mitigating the capabilities of the adversary at the location. Once the location for the landing has been selected, the next decision that must be made is the timing of the landing. Night landings typically ensure that tactical surprise is upheld, while daylight allows for the full employment of naval and air support. Initial landing forces are to normally be employed under the cover of night with the transport of the main landing force during dawn so that the main force experiences full naval and air support. In whole, *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* describes that the effective employment of the three landing phases in conjunction with

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22 (War Department 1941)  
23 (War Department 1941)  
24 (War Department 1941)  
25 (War Department 1941)
demonstrations, properly selected beach, and strategic timing will lead to a successful landing operation.

The final portion of *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* that is vital in understanding the United States' view on amphibious landings heading into the war is the ship-to-shore movement of forces onto the beachheads. Ship-to-shore movement involves the fire and movement coordinated with small boats transporting the troops onto shore. Leading with gunfire to both destroy and demoralize the enemy, the gunfire is to increase in severity until “masked by the assaulting infantry”.

The approaching landing infantry begins their approach to the beachhead in large columns but due to the increased risk of loss the closer the small boats get to shore; the deployed forces break down into smaller columns of small boats. The breakdown of the small boats into smaller columns allows for reserves to be properly positioned on the beach to capitalize on the success of previous waves. This breakdown continues through landing groups and through boat groups.

To ensure continuity of effective operations, the infantry and small boat units are split into two groupings: the landing group and the boat group. Landing groups are composed of and organized by a number, followed by the name of the principal organization. For example, Landing Group No. 1 (1st Bn 1st Inf, rein) is Landing Group Number 1 composed of the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, and their reinforcements. Landing groups are compiled as a table which includes all the forces in each landing group for all

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26 (War Department 1941)
27 (War Department 1941)
28 (War Department 1941)
29 (War Department 1941)
necessary landing groups. This table allocates the spaces on the small boat taken up by the personnel and equipment for each unit in each landing group.

Small boats grouped together with the mission of transporting landing forces from ship to shore are organized into boat groups. Each boat group is given a unique number identifier, Boat Group 1, and is led by a naval officer who is the boat group commander. When two or more boat groups require the command of a single officer, this organization of boat groups is called a boat flotilla. Boat divisions are composed of two or more small boats transporting landing groups to the beachhead. Boat divisions are called by their division and group number such as Boat Division No. 1, Boat Group No. 1. Boat groups move from sea to shore depending on the plan for the tactical employment of the infantry battalion which is also dependent on the terrain on the landing area. During the landing operations, reserve boat groups stand by in designated sea areas until called upon to deploy reinforced landing forces.

The Army’s field manual, which is the exact same as the Marine Corps doctrine, *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* was the foundation for United States amphibious landings heading into World War II. This doctrine focused on the importance of planning and strong force organization for successful landings. *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* outlined the importance of coordination between the United States Navy and the Army as a basis for further successful landings. In the years following *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* and during World War II, the United States Navy and the Army modified existing joint doctrine to better establish amphibious landing procedures.

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30 (War Department 1941)
31 (War Department 1941)
32 (War Department 1941)
The resulting updated doctrine, *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* of July 14th, 1941 outlined improved command, planning, and embarkation measures to guide the United States Army and Navy through the rest of the war.

**Joint Action of the Army and the Navy**

The goal of the newly revised *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* was to better coordinate action between the Army and the Navy to produce the most effective support which is vital to the success realized in war. Joint Action of the Army and the Navy established a clear and mutual understanding of the functions executed by each branch for attaining optimal coordination of effort during the operation.

*Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* outlines the general functions of the Army and the Navy together and separately in Chapter 1 of the publication. Together, the Army and the Navy defend the United States from foreign and domestic enemies. They jointly accomplish this by complementing each other’s foundational mission set. The Army focuses on land superiority while the Navy maintains sea superiority. In joint operations, the Army and the Navy must work together with one equivalent branch commander supporting the other branch commander in charge of the operation. During joint operations, the respective branches should refrain from establishing operational limitations on the other and should instead focus on collaboration resulting in operation success. The Army supports the Navy in terms of the establishment and defense of naval bases and by providing the adequate number of forces needed for joint overseas expeditions. The Navy complements Army operations through maintaining access and

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33 (Board 1935)
34 (Board 1935)
35 (Board 1935)
control of sea lanes vital to the national security interests of the nation as a whole. The control of these sea lanes maintained by the United States Navy allows for United States Army access to the entire world which in turn allows the Army to provide the Navy ports in these new nations.

Joint actions between the Army and the Navy require principled leadership and effective communication with the focus on victory. To determine the commander of such operations, the services determine, through joint operation planning, which branch has paramount interest;\textsuperscript{36} the service whose operations are of greater importance to the accomplishment of a joint mission. The commander of the joint force is vested with control of the operation and the responsibility for effectively coordinating and executing for victory.\textsuperscript{37} The commander can accomplish this through the exercise of unity of command or limited unity of command. Unity of command is established when one commander is provided the responsibility of the entire operation supplemented by support provided by the other service branch commensurate commander.\textsuperscript{38} This established commander can coordinate forces from both services for the operation. This is the major difference from limited unity of command where the joint operation commander does not have the ability to control the action of the opposite service.\textsuperscript{39}

Conducting joint overseas expeditions, including amphibious landings, regardless of the unity of command structure, requires clear communication and proper planning.

The joint operation planning process for amphibious landings is unique in that it requires oversight of both the Army and the Navy. When the decision is made to conduct

\textsuperscript{36} (Board 1935)
\textsuperscript{37} (Board 1935)
\textsuperscript{38} (E. King 1944)
\textsuperscript{39} (Board 1935)
such an operation, the authority arriving at this conclusion will issue a directive to the
commander of the combined force being utilized for the operation. The directive will be
detailed and include but not limited to the following:

1. Digest of available information of the enemy.
2. Information of any prior operations undertaken that might have an influence upon
   the proposed operation.
3. Information of any supporting operations contemplated.
4. The joint mission and, if required, the separate missions for the Army and the
   Navy.
5. The outline of the operations that probably will be required to accomplish the
   mission or missions, with designation of the initial theatre of operations.
6. The force assigned to carry out the operations with times and places of
   concentration and availability for embarkation.
7. The type of special equipment and supplies that may be needed.
8. The availability of sea transportation and the responsibility for its procurement
   and operation.
9. The method of coordination. The designation of the commander in chief under
   the method of unity of command; or the designation of the service in which
   paramount interest will be vested during each phase, with the designation of the
   respective commanders of the Navy and Navy forces.
10. Any further information or instructions that may be considered of importance in
    order to give the commander in chief or the respective commanders of the Army

40 (Board 1935)
41 (Board 1935)
and Navy forces the benefit of all studies made which might have a bearing on the success of the expedition.

It is of significant importance that the authority is as detailed and clear as possible when issuing the directive to the applicable commander. Once the directive is received by the selected commander of the joint force, this commander will issue an instruction further down the chain of command to the respective commanders of the Army and Navy forces required for the execution of the plan.42 The instruction passed down from the joint commander will include but is not limited to:43

1. Decision
2. Such additional assignments of the Army and Navy missions as appear to be necessary.
3. Operations to be undertaken, including both, join operations and such separate Army and Navy operations as are considered to be necessary to ensure the success of the expedition, together with the designation of the respective task forces required and their commanders.
4. Announcement of selected landing areas.
5. Times and places of embarkation, departure, and rendezvous.
6. Provision for joint training.
7. Provision for logistic support of the expedition.
8. Provision for communications (signal) between forces.
9. Announcement of the hour of landing. Often this may not be announced until shortly before the landing forces are ready to embark.

42 (Board 1935)
43 (Board 1935)
10. Alternative plans.

The above instructions will be provided to the appropriate commanders of both the specific Army and Navy forces needed to carry out the operation. With full detailed instructions, the third echelon of commanders will better be able to ready their forces and provide the requisite training needed for operational success. Once the third and final echelon of commanders has the requisite information on the operation, the forces begin the preparatory phase of the joint operation.44

First, the medium of sea transportation must be clearly established between the two branches. Unless otherwise stated by the plan or directive, the commander of the force having paramount interest will have the necessary transportation vehicle requested or built through the Navy or War Departments. Next, the port of embarkation is chosen, organized, and managed by agencies of the War Department. Then at the more tactical level, the Army forces reduce, as much as possible, the equipment they bring with them to the absolutely necessary items to conduct the operation. While reduction occurs, it is vital to operational success that this reduction does not, in turn, reduce force lethality and ability to obtain mission success. Special equipment needed by the joint force will be provided by the Navy. Special equipment, in this case, includes that which will be utilized to protect the Army forces on land; machine guns, barges, and landing craft for the Army’s artillery, tanks, and supplies. After such reduction plans are made, joint training occurs due to the inherent intricacies of landing large Army forces with little sea experience on a hostile shore and with Naval forces unfamiliarity of land operations.45

Embarkation planning occurs after training is completed and includes determining the

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44 (Board 1935)
45 (Board 1935)
exact number of personnel (officer, warrant officer, and enlisted) and equipment and their respective space needed to transport. Other aspects of the embarkation cannot be planned due to the ever-changing nature of amphibious landings. The final phase of the preparatory stage is the loading of the previously mentioned units. Loading is conducted using two main methods: (1): Commercial Loading and (2) Unit Loading. Commercial loading utilizes maximum ship space regardless of tactical employment of Army forces while unit loading considers the need for Army forces to be tactically employed. The decision on which loading method to be used depends on the objective and location of the joint operation. If the force is strictly being transported from one secured base to another secured base, then commercial loading will be utilized. Conversely, if the objective is to invade an enemy shoreline and tactical employment of Army forces is required, then unit loading will be used. After the method of transportation is decided, the Army and Navy forces begin the transit overseas.

Inherently, the Navy is responsible for the protection of all assets and lines of communication during sea transit. The naval commander of the joint operation will procure a convoy and escort for the transit. A selected naval officer will be placed in command of each component of the convoy. While the sea transit occurs, Army personnel aboard the Navy vessels cannot interfere with the conduction of safe convoy and escort for the transit. Upon successful transit to the area of operations, the Army forces are ready to deploy to the shore and conduct offensive operations.

Offensive amphibious landing operations conducted on enemy shores will utilize both Navy and Army aircraft support as much as possible. The Army has three successive

46 (Board 1935)
47 (Board 1935)
phases for the joint operation. The first phase includes acquiring terrain in the rear of the beach. When supplementary forces arrive, Army forces will then advance and secure additional portions of the shore to the extent that secures the beach from enemy short artillery fire (10,000 yards). Eliminating the enemy’s ability to launch medium-range artillery fire (15,000 yards) is the objective of the second phase. Waves of forces will be made by as frequently as needed given land and sea abilities and to achieve the required object. However, additional forces will not be employed to the point of detrimental dispersion. While the Army achieves its objective on land, the Navy provides support from the nearby sea.

During the landing operation, the Navy is responsible for ensuring that all Army personnel arrive on the coast as safe as possible. This includes employment of naval aviation assets, signals communications, and all other functions necessary to ensure the landing of Army forces on the coast. The Navy will organize its forces by the following subgroups:

1. The fire support group, consisting of combatant naval vessels which are assigned the following fire missions: Against enemy troops opposing the landing or against their probable positions; against reserves; against hostile machine guns and hostile artillery; and on hostile routes of advance or retreat. Effective results may further be obtained by close-in support of light vessels, such as destroyers, delivering direct fire

2. The air group, consisting of naval aircraft, for observations of gunfire of the fire support group and the Army’s artillery, for protection of the attack force against enemy air operations, for reconnaissance of enemy positions, for bombing enemy
objectives, and for liaison with the Army forces. Where practicable, observation
units should support each division's landings. It should be noted, however, that
the fleet air forces, in the theatre of operations, other than planes carried on
battleships and cruisers, are normally organized into a single task force, with the
mission of supporting the landing of the expeditionary force and the operations of
the attacking forces.

3. The mine group, consisting of mine-laying vessels and mine sweepers for the
purpose of sweeping the landing area clear of enemy mines and of laying
defensive mines to protect the vessels of the attack force from enemy submarines
and night torpedo attack.

4. The antisubmarine group, consisting of the vessels designated to protect against
the vessels of the attack force from attack by enemy submarines.

5. The transport group, consisting of the transports and all noncombatant vessels
carrying troops, equipment, and supplies.

6. The screening group, consisting of those vessels designated to locate and give
warning of the approach of enemy vessels attacking if possible. This group
usually includes the submarines accompanying the expedition.

7. Salvage group, consisting of such light craft as may be available for rescuing
personnel of distressed boats, hauling off grounded boats, and the recovery of
sunken equipment.

These subgroups will help obtain, secure, and maintain the landing area for the joint
operation. While the selection of the landing area is dependent on tactical considerations,
the Army and the Navy both have their respective viewpoints on the ideal landing area.
The Army views a beneficial landing area as an area which will permit both approach and landings from a broad front commensurate with the size of the landing force, afford sufficient amount of favorable beaches for landing, contain no natural obstacles hindering beach-advance but contain natural obstacles that provide flanking cover, afford for sufficient inland force maneuvering and beachhead establishment, and permit the landing of heavy equipment including artillery, supplies.\textsuperscript{48} Conversely, the Navy suggests selecting a landing area free from severe obstructions to navigation, not have a beach slope that could cause beaching of a vessel, and be sheltered from harsh sea conditions that could impede landing operations or their support.\textsuperscript{49} Between the Army and the Navy, the landing area is chosen based on a reasonable probability to achieve the underlying objective. The principle of paramount interest also applies here, and it is deemed by Joint Action of the Army and the Navy that paramount interest in the selection of the landing area will fall upon the Army due to their employment onshore is considered paramount.\textsuperscript{50} Accompanying the selection of the landing area is the selection of the hour of landing.

The decision made on the hour of landing also falls on the commander of the force having paramount interest. Consideration taken is to advantages of landing during dark or light conditions and for the possibility of the utilization of smoke. While landing during the dark offers tactical surprise and reduced expected troop loss, landing during the daylight affords more effective support to Army forces through aviation and naval assets. Regardless of the time chosen and from an Army standpoint, there must follow

\textsuperscript{48} (Board 1935)  
\textsuperscript{49} (Board 1935)  
\textsuperscript{50} (Board 1935)
sufficient daylight for Army forces to accomplish the objective of their first phase. From a Navy standpoint, the approach must be made in a manner that minimizes the risk of detection. This includes necessary mine-sweeping and laying operations to protect the landing of Army forces.

A key to a successful amphibious landing operation is the effective employment of aviation assets and naval gunfire support. Army air units will be deployed as early as possible with Navy air assets being used to complement and supplement their Army counterparts. Naval gunfire support to the landing Army units will be the only type of that kind provided in the beginning stages of the landing. Two methods are laid out in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* pertaining to the employment of naval gunfire in support of multiple Army ground forces. The first method established control over the naval gunfire to the highest-ranking commander of the Army ground forces, while the second method splits up the naval gunfire support amongst the Army ground forces. The choice between the two methods is made at the tactical level. Nevertheless, the organization of the Army forces on the landing area remains consistent.

Army force organization on the beach is vital to the success of the landing operation. The organization of forces on the beach is broken down into six categories. First, the beachmaster, a Navy officer, commands the area from the high-water mark seaward.\(^{51}\) Landing with the first wave of infantry, the beachmaster manages Army messages from shore to the supporting ships at sea. Second, the shore party commander, an Army officer, is appointed for each beach at which a landing is to be made.\(^{52}\) The shore commander takes command of all engineer and labor troops and their movement

\(^{51}\) (Board 1935)  
\(^{52}\) (Board 1935)
along with maneuver of equipment, supplies, and coordinates with the shore party commander. Third, due to the inherent confusion associated with the amphibious landing, military police forces are deployed to the beach to assist the shore party commander and to effectively place Army forces during times of irregular troop arrival. Fourth, the boat repair party repairs landing vessels that sustained casualties during the approach and landing of Army forces on the beach. Fifth and finally, medical service responsibility on the beachfront is split into two areas. The Army is responsible for bringing men from the battle line to the hostile shoreline where the Navy assumes responsibility from this hostile shoreline to the designated friendly shoreline.

Upon either successful completion or deemed failure, troop withdrawal may occur. It is vital the withdrawal occurs with a level of secrecy and with maintained air superiority. To the greatest extent possible, the withdrawal will stand by until favorable weather conditions are met as determined by the naval areological service. The final decision to withdrawal is made jointly by the Army and Navy commanders in control of the amphibious landing and approved by the authority having jurisdiction over the joint operation.

*Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* lays out a specific strategic doctrine for implementation in amphibious landing operations. While there is residual decision-making left to be made at the tactical level, it is vital that there is a clear standard set for amphibious landing commanders to consider during their planning. The United States Army and Navy utilized *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* to help modernize *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*.

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53 (Board 1935)
54 (Board 1935)
55 (Board 1935)
Action of the Army and the Navy, yet the Navy relied more upon their experiences conducting amphibious landings to draft the more modern landing instruction in War Instructions 1944.

**Landings Leading up to War Instructions 1944**

Shortly after Japan’s attack on the United States Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, Germany and Italy had declared war on the United States on December 11th, 1941. Germany, having experienced success through persistence early on in the war had defeated the British at Tobruk led by Nazi General Erwin Rommel on the 27th of November 1941. Needing to act fast, the Allies, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, developed a plan to lead an invasion in Northern Africa. The army general they chose to lead the invasion of North Africa was future Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and United States President, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Due to the unsuccessful Dieppe Raid in August of 1942, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed that an attack in North Africa would disrupt Vichy France’s control of the region and open the Mediterranean Sea for allied shipping lanes.

The landing, named Operation Torch would target and land in North Africa on three fronts: the western task force in Casablanca, the central task force in Oran, and the eastern task force in Algiers. Operation Torch included American and British military units consisting of their respective armies and navies. The eastern task force set for Algiers was the riskiest of the three fronts due to its proximity to other enemy bases and assets. The assault on Algiers suffered vast casualties from the Axis forces assets.

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56 (H. Editors 2019)  
57 (BBC 2005)  
58 (Grantham 2015)
stationed close to the landing site.\textsuperscript{59} Even though the Allied forces undertook severe losses, the city of Algiers still surrendered at 1800 on the day of the attack. Despite delay and disruption due to unexpected sandbars, the amphibious landing at Oran was also a quickly achieved operation. The landing at Safi began on November 8\textsuperscript{th} when French forces fired upon the American destroyer-transport ship \textit{Bernadou} during its approach to their harbor. According to the plan, land forces were on the beach at Safi by 1600 that same evening.\textsuperscript{60} While only operational for a few months, the carrier, \textit{Santee (CVE-29)}, provided the land troops with the necessary air support. By November 9\textsuperscript{th}, the American land forces had stifled the French air power and had themselves gone on the offensive destroying dozens of French air assets. The following day, the operation at Safi was such a success that some American forces were diverted north to assist in the battle for Casablanca.\textsuperscript{61} The Allied landings in North Africa had turned the tide for the Allies in the region. The Allies were now on the offensive and showing the German-led Axis forces that momentum was changing ever so slightly.

The landings during Operation Torch taught the United States important lessons for executing amphibious landings moving forward. As evidenced in the changes to U.S. amphibious landing doctrine, Operation Torch taught the United States that the full utilization of naval and air assets to support the beach-embarking land troops was a catalyst to the success of the landings. Joint considerations for the operational environment was also a key takeaway from Operation Torch. On one front there was an environmental obstacle in the form of a sandbar that briefly hindered the United States

\textsuperscript{59} (Lohse and Middaugh 2018)  
\textsuperscript{60} (Lohse and Middaugh 2018)  
\textsuperscript{61} (Lohse and Middaugh 2018)
Navy’s operational capabilities and on another front was the unfamiliarity of the adversary's capabilities. Moving forward the United States and its allies would take these key lessons from Operation Torch and ensure that future landings would not embrace the same difficulties.

Following the success of Operation Torch, the next step for the advance of Allied forces was to move forward onto Italy. The foundation for further operations in Italy was to be laid by Operation Husky with the natural landings site for the Allies being Sicily.\(^{62}\) While initially unsure of the strategic value of the operation, the Allies realized that the success of the operation would “divert and disperse Axis forces, and… significantly lessen the presence of enemy air assets in the western Mediterranean”.\(^{63}\) Official planning for Operation Husky began in February of 1943 and concluded with landing

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\(^{62}\) (Huxen 2017)

\(^{63}\) (Operation Husky: The Invasion of Sicily 2019)
rehearsals from the 22nd of June to the 4th of July. Further building upon the success of Operation Torch, the Allies used their new site at Oran as the staging port for Operation Husky. Following the mitigation of weather delays and operational hindrances, D-Day for Operation Husky commenced on July 10th, 1943 with the landing of “over 3,200 ships, craft, and boats made up the Allied naval forces, of which more than 1,700 comprised the Western Naval Task Force”. Early in the execution of Operation Husky the landing efforts were largely successful with the only main challenge coming from a German tank conducting a counter-attack within one 1,000 yards of Allied forces. This Axis offensive was efficiently secured through the naval gunfire support provided by Allied cruisers and destroyers. Further operational success by the Allied forces in Sicily allowed for the capital of Palermo to be occupied by U.S. Army personnel by the 22nd of July.

The lessons that not only the United States but other Allied nations learned during Operation Husky would prove important for the planning of further landing operations; especially Operation Overlord in France. The weather issues that delayed the landing forces during Operation Husky went to further highlight the importance of weather considerations in landing operations planning. Also, the United States realized training issues lead to extended operations in Sicily and with more training time the success would have been more quickly achieved. Moving forward the Allies realized that the

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64 (Vice Admiral Hewitt 1943)  
65 (Vice Admiral Hewitt 1943)  
66 (Vice Admiral Hewitt 1943)  
67 (Vice Admiral Hewitt 1943)  
68 (Operation Husky: The Invasion of Sicily 2019)  
69 (Huxen 2017)  
70 (Vice Admiral Hewitt 1943)
mitigation of these issues would allow them to be a more effective landing force for continued landing operations. These lessons learned by the United States Navy during Operation Husky built upon those learned during Operation Torch the prior November and made the Allied forces ready for further landing success.\(^{71}\)

The amphibious landing success experienced by Allied forces in North Africa and Sicily allowed for further Allied operations in mainland Italy. Operation Shingle was a planned amphibious assault landing in Italy at the town of Anzio. Anzio is a town on the western coast of Italy approximately 35 miles from Rome. The objective of Operation Shingle was to open the road to Rome to the Allies and drive the Nazi forces north of Rome.\(^{72}\) To accomplish this goal, the U.S. VI Corps led by Major General John P. Lucas would land in Anzio with naval support commanded by Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry. Consisting of 28 destroyers, 103 minor warships, and 241 landing crafts, the American amphibious force arrived off the coast of Anzio around midnight on January 22\(^{nd}\) with the assault on the beach starting two hours later.\(^{73}\) Calm seas at the time of the landing lead to efficient operations with the first loss coming eight hours after the commencement of the attack. The first loss was AM-106 PORTENT, a minesweeping ship that sank resulting in the loss of 18 men due to striking a mine. By the end of the first day, over 90% of the initially planned assault was on the beach at Anzio. The success came as a surprise due to issues arising from the preparatory phase of the amphibious landing.\(^{74}\) While the initial stages of the landing were a success, the time taken by Allied forces to concentrate their forces and consolidate the beach had allowed

\(^{71}\) (Operation Husky: The Invasion of Sicily 2019)
\(^{72}\) (Nicholas 2018)
\(^{73}\) (Nicholas 2018)
\(^{74}\) (Nicholas 2018)
the Germans to obtain reinforcements and pause the Allied advance through counter-attacks. This counter-attack pushed the Allies all the way back to the shoreline. However, due to naval artillery and gunfire support to the land units, the Allies were able to hold a strong position on the beach until May of 1944. Allied forces south of the amphibious landing penetrated the Gustav Line during Operation Diadem to help finally push the Germans north of Rome. Rome eventually fell on June 4th, 1944.

More than 23,000 British and American combat casualties with an estimated 4,400 deaths occurred during Operation Shingle. Of these 4,400 deaths, 160 were U.S. Navy personnel killed at Anzio. Although the landing took longer than expected and the casualties were greater than predicted, Operation Shingle led to a more experienced
amphibious assault force and provided lessons on troop placement and movement for future amphibious landings. The United States learned an even more important lesson on amphibious landings from Operation Shingle; the need for a structured beach and properly guided land forces to keep consistent pressure on the adversary. During Operation Shingle, the Axis land forces were able to regroup and conduct a counter-assault on the opposing landing forces due to the United States' inability to exhibit constant pressure. Had the United States been able to keep the forces on the beach organized and the pressure consistently applied on the adversary, the Axis land forces would not have had time to regroup and mount their counter-offensive. This lesson would prove to be of vital interest to the United States and their allies moving forward with the Normandy landing occurring just two days after the fall of Rome.

The Normandy landings, named Operation Overlord, was a planned amphibious landing on the French coast over the English Channel. Landings were to be made by the

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75 (Nicholas 2018)
76 (Nicholas 2018)
United States, Britain, and Canada on five different beaches. Utah and Omaha beaches would be attacked by the Americans, while Gold and Sword would be the responsibility of the British forces leaving the final beach, Juno, to the Canadians.

The operation, if successful, was an important strategic land objective for the Allied forces. The Allied forces needed access to the western front in Europe to stage further offensive objectives. The goal was to have the ability to maintain 26-30 divisions in the area with the deployment of an additional five divisions per month. Deemed Hitler’s *Festung Europa* (Europe Fortress), Western Europe would be a vital asset for further successful Allied operations. The naval component of Operation Overlord was called Operation Neptune and was led by the Royal Navy’s Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay. United States Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King formed a task force to command the cross-channel assault. Accompanying the stockpile of air units stationed in England, all 284 warships, including 5 battleships, 23 cruisers, and a plethora of destroyers/destroyer escorts lined up at the rendezvous point of ‘Piccadilly Circus’.79

The Allies had learned from the previous amphibious landings in Italy and North Africa that maintaining air superiority in the area of operations, weather, and proper naval gunfire support would be vital to mission success. The weather was of main consideration to tactical planners due to this operational emphasis on air superiority. Beach obstacles being exposed to low water was deemed an additional optimal

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77 (Supreme Headquarters 1944)
78 (Nasuti 2019)
79 (Nasuti 2019)
80 (Commission 2017) (Nicholas 2018)
circumstance and would occur during a spring tide. Originally scheduled for May 31st, 1944, the actual invasion did not occur until June 6th due to these weather requirements. Time of the day for the invasion was determined to satisfy the requirement in the amphibious operations doctrine, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, of permitting enough daylight to achieve the first phase of objectives. In a letter from the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Operation Overlord was set to have two phases. Phase 1 was instructed to be “… an assault landing on the NORMANDY beaches between the limits of QUINEVILLE in the WEST and CABOURG-LES-BAIRS in the EAST, to be followed by early capture and development of airfield sites and the capture of the port of CHERBOURG”. Following phase 1, phase 2 simply enlarged the captured area outlined in phase 1 to the ports of CHERBORG, LOIRE, and BRITTANY. To accomplish these phases, SHAEF inventoried the available naval and ground forces available for use in the operation. The ground forces were to consist of the First US Army Group, 21 Army Group, and requisite airborne and ranger forces as deemed necessary, while the naval forces consisted of the same units aforementioned. The final stage in planning set the main base for the invasion as the United Kingdom.

While most of the amphibious landing was planned out in accordance with amphibious doctrine, the Allied forces realized that the invasion was so intricate that it may involve deviations from the planning and doctrine.

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81 (F. King 1945)
82 (Supreme Headquarters 1944)
83 (Supreme Headquarters 1944)
84 (Supreme Headquarters 1944)
85 (Supreme Headquarters 1944)
86 ((Operations). 1944-1945)
Commencing in the early morning of June 6th, 1944, 24,000 airborne personnel from the U.S., Canada, and Britain were deployed to land in Normandy. At 0630 the amphibious landing on the coast of France had officially begun. While the waves of assault on Utah beach was conducted with slight deviation on schedule, the outcome of operations on Omaha Beach became increasingly grim. Allied forces, accompanied with successive waves of reinforcements, were constantly hammered by Nazi gunfire further up on the beach. Destroyer captains were instructed that only half of the ammunition carried by the destroyers were to be used during the invasion. After realizing that the situation at Omaha Beach was more severe than expected, destroyer captains decided to deviate from this instruction, and conduct an all-out assault on Nazi forces in support of the land troops. In an effort to create a more favorable operational environment, naval support fire was directed to provide close fire support to troops on the beach from screening possible enemy invasions. This support from the naval assets required they station so close to the shore that some of the ships were hit by bullets from German machine guns and rifles. These ships experienced damage to their hulls and superstructures. While this was a significant and positive turning point in the amphibious operation, it was also a deviation from the amphibious landing doctrine. Historian Craig Symonds spoke of this deviation as “what saved the day for the Allies…”.

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87 (Grantham 2015)
88 (Nasuti 2019)
89 (F. King 1945)
90 (Nasuti 2019)
91 (Grantham 2015)
Naval destroyers provided gunfire support destroying enemy gun positions and allowed Allied land forces to advance on the beach. In total, 132,500 allied forces were able to land ashore on D-Day and establish a strong Allied presence for future shipping of supplies. The follow-on supplies empowered the Allies to push the Germans back to the forest of Cerisy by June 11th. Resulting in the enemy being too far beyond the range of Allied ships. Reaching the Seine River in Paris in August of 1944 marked the end of the amphibious landing operation. Operation Overlord was a success and led to further Allied operations in Europe. Almost 11 weeks after the invasion, the Allies liberated Paris and continued to move in on the Germans. Following the liberation of Paris, the Germans had to now split their land forces between the eastern front (United States, Britain, and Canada) and the western front (Russia). With forces being spread thin and the losses increasing by the day, the Germans surrendered to the Allied forces on May 7th, 1945.

Operation Overlord is arguably the land equivalent to the Battle of Midway; the turning point for land operations in World War 2 that ultimately led to the Allied victory over the Nazis. Operation Overlord proved that with sufficient planning, effective force employment, and adequate attention placed upon the operational environment, that the United States and its allies could change the course of any war or conflict with its amphibious forces. Allied Forces learned that aspects relating to amphibious doctrine like launching the invasion with adequate daylight remaining to complete first phase objectives and full implementation of forces were vital to operational success. They also

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92 (F. King 1945)
93 (Grantham 2015)
94 (Grantham 2015)
95 (Grantham 2015)
learned that doctrine and planning is not always something that has to be followed down to the number or letter. While the invasion was a short-term success in helping to win the war for the Allies, it was a long-term success in that it led to the further success of amphibious landings.

The lessons the United States learned through Operation Torch, Shingle, and Overlord were significant in achieving subsequent success. Moving forward toward the end of the war, the United States sought to cement the lessons learned in Normandy, North Africa, and Italy and ensure amphibious landing success in future conflicts. The United States Navy took these lessons and used them to optimize their landing doctrine moving forward through *War Instructions 1944*.

**War Instructions 1944**

*War Instructions 1944* is the resulting doctrine from the aforementioned landings that outlined standard operating procedures and operations for “ships, fleets, and encounters with the enemy”. War Instructions 1944 was the subsequent issuance of doctrine published by the Chief of Naval Operations following *War Instructions 1934*. The 1944 version was approved by Chief of Naval Operations E.J. King and was pushed out to the fleet on November 1st, 1944.

*War Instructions 1944* describes the goal of naval command as “the unity of effort toward a common objective”. The commander, in this case, the highest-ranking in the chain of command, may decentralize (delegate) his authority to appropriately trained and adequate subordinates. Decentralizing authority does not relieve the commander of his responsibility, it merely passes on the duty of execution. The proper exercise of naval

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96 (E. King 1944)
97 (E. King 1944)
command occurs when a directive to carry out a task is issued by the commander to officers of the immediately preceding echelon. This directive must be commensurate with the directed officer’s authority and responsibility. If carried out with mutual understanding and the subordinate officer carries out the directive as the commander would have otherwise, then unity of effort has resulted. Unity of effort is essential to effective naval command.98

Six general doctrines of action were set in *War Instructions 1944* to govern naval operations during the war. First, commanders were instructed to ensure that their subordinate commands understood and concentrated on the objectives at hand and subsequently focused all efforts on achieving the set objective. Secondly, provide subordinate units with the materials necessary to utilize maximum force for achieving the objective. Third, conceal weakness and retain the offensive spirit of the unit. Fourth, when attacking the enemy focus on disorganizing them through retaining offensive initiative. Fifth, once initial success has been realized, extend the success to annihilate the enemy. Finally, utilize the element of surprise when attacking the enemy and ensure that you and your units are not surprised by the enemy. The commander will only know what resources are needed by his subordinate units if these units understand the mission and convey to the commander what resources they need to achieve the objective. Once the commander provides adequate resources to his units, the units are apt for battle and it is then back to the commander to set the spirit of his men during periods of success and failure. When succeeding, it is the commander’s duty to extend the victory and fully annihilate the enemy while utilizing the element of surprise.

98 (E. King 1944)
All these general doctrines of actions are derived from lessons the United States Navy learned through Operation Overlord, Torch, and Shingle. Operation Torch taught the Navy the importance of utilizing maximum force to achieve the objective. Operation Overlord showed the Navy the need to utilize the element of surprise, retaining offensive initiative, and having a properly equipped force.

The United States Navy learned the importance of a well-darkened ship during Operation Overlord. Successfully carrying out Operation Overlord required both the Army and the Navy to utilize the element of surprise through conducting operations during the night. Landing troops during periods of darkness allowed for optimal implementation of the element of surprise which was dependent on a darkened ship. If a ship was not properly darkened, then the Army and Navy would not have experienced the element of surprise that was instrumental in the success with Operation Overlord.

An essential foundation for conducting amphibious landings is scouting operations. Scouting operations utilize the maximum employment of aircraft and radar. During World War II, the Department of the Navy believed that all scouting operations could be conducted with aircraft.\(^99\) Although aviation assets were heavily utilized by the Navy during World War II, cases of extreme weather, major distance from bases or surface assets, harsh sea conditions, and far distances from the enemy require the employment of alternative collection assets.\(^100\) Regardless of assets utilized for scouting operations, there are three phases followed for effective results.

The first phase is search operation. Search operations are initiated by an officer who designates the area, units to be utilized, and the commander in charge. To conduct the

\(^{99}\) (E. King 1944)  
^{100}\) (E. King 1944)
search operation, the initiating officer identifies the search area and assigns each scout in the search operation with specific tasks. The commander in charge of the search is provided information from the scouts to which he provides to the initiating officer as frequently and necessary and as possible. The information provided from the commander in charge of the search to the initiating officer may include but is not limited to enemy contacts, friendly casualties significantly affecting the operation, and time-sensitive information requirements. The next step of scouting operations is contact scouting which encompasses both tactical scouting and tracking. In contrast to search operations, a “scout” in contact scouting refers to an aviation asset instead of a human asset. Unless the main object of the search is to contact the enemy, the scout is to not concentrate on making the first contact. If the scout does contact an adversary force, then the scout must focus on collecting information on the unit and reporting the contact to the commander. Surface scouts (ships) who contact enemy vessels or scouts shall only engage the enemy if vital to continue the operation. If attempting to pass through enemy units to locate an objective or continue scouting operations, friendly surface vessels should attempt to do so without making contact with the enemy. When aviation assets are the feasible means of locating an objective or developing contacts, they shall be effectively employed. Thirdly, tracking occurs when the adversary is located but is not within the striking area of an adequate force. Once the objective of a scouting operation has been located and identified, the senior officer takes the necessary measure to maintain the track of the contact. This tracking is maintained until an adequate unit is within range to strike. The goal of tracking is to maintain and monitor the location of enemy forces a

101 (E. King 1944)
102 (E. King 1944)
minimum of once per day. The utilization of sonar mitigates the effects of the intricacies and dangers of ocean navigation. Finally, tactical scouting provides detailed information on the enemy through close-quarters collection. This detailed information is provided to the officer in tactical command by the commander (senior officer of the scouts) for tactical decision making and planning prior to principal force engagement. Tactical scouting is continued on through the engagement with the transition from surface vessels to aviation assets and complimented by flank forces and submarines. Scouting is a vital evolution directly associated with the planning and execution of naval operations during World War II.

Leading up to Operation Overlord, the United States Navy undertook extensive scouting operations to attempt to paint a full picture of the landing operational environment. These scouting operations were vital to the success of Operation Overlord because it allowed the United States and other Allied forces to better plan and execute the Normandy landing. This emphasized role of scouting was due to the shortcomings of Operation Torch where the United States failed to account for all aspects of the operational environment to include the physical environment and also the adversary’s capabilities. Scouting operations allowed the United States to better ascertain the capabilities of the adversary forces on the beachhead and be better equipped to combat these capabilities. Moving forward with War Instructions 1944, the United States wanted to be sure that scouting operations were utilized to their fullest extent so that landing forces would be adequately equipped, and the landing would be expeditious.
Conclusion

*War Instructions 1944* was the culmination of the United States’ amphibious doctrine in World War II. With *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* heavily influencing *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, the United States went through most of World War II following these pieces of amphibious landing doctrine. After various lessons learned through Operations Torch, Shingle, and Overlord, the United States realized that they may have found a formula for amphibious success. Wanting to create an all-encompassing doctrine to capitalize on these lessons through *War Instructions 1944*, the United States created an experienced-based doctrine that would set their amphibious force up for sustained success. The amphibious landing doctrine for the United States throughout World War II had adapted in an effective way that leads to the United States ending the war with the world's top amphibious landing force.
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