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**CO-OPTING ALLIANCE WITH EFFICIENT GREASE THEORY: AN  
OBSERVATIONAL DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF CORRUPTION AND  
TRUST NEXUS IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN WEST AFRICA**

Yarh Komolo

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**CO-OPTING ALLIANCE WITH EFFICIENT GREASE THEORY: AN  
OBSERVATIONAL DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF CORRUPTION AND TRUST NEXUS IN  
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN WEST AFRICA**

By

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A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of  
the Requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

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Department of Political Science

Political Science Program  
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The University of South Dakota  
May 2024

The members of the Committee appointed to examine  
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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation presents an analysis of the impact of corruption as related to trust in political institutions in select West African nations. Corruption and some of its implicative hues are highlighted, considering such practice is generally an entrenched part of Africa in its economic, political, social, and cultural fabric and lifeline. In respect to the specific region of interest, robust Afrobarometer observational surveys convey data covering 14 of the 16 countries that comprise West Africa, with the exclusion of Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania which lack survey data. The study covers a seven-year period that runs from 2014 to 2021, excluding 2016 which has no data. The underlying theoretical argument is that citizens are more likely to trust their governing officials and institutions to manage and deliver public services to them chiefly through bribe-paying activities, clientelism, patrimonialism and many other self-interested conducts. These actions are usually unethical, illegal, and not easily explainable instruments for inequitably accessing rather scarce and ordinarily difficult-to-attain services and subsidies. This logic, standing as the executable pillar of the “efficient grease” hypothesis, assumingly solidifies citizens’ trust in their institutions for service delivery. Thus, the study’s findings show the following about West African governance: Actual corruption practices have no impact on institutional trust. Perceived corruption has a positive impact and does not undermine institutional trust. The impact of both experienced and perceived corruption taken together is positive and does not undermine institutional trust. The level of public service quality afforded citizens is positive and does not undermine institutional trust. When combined, both actual corruption practices and perception of corruption in relations to public services provided have a positive conditional interaction outcome of efficient grease construct predicated on bribes and red tape, meaning the result does not undermine institutional trust in West Africa. Various descriptive statistics and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression permutations explain and undergird the positional results of the study as framed in this abstract.

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My thanks to Dr. Earnest for being an accommodating witness to the completion of this journey.

In the humblest of ways possible, I hope to make some contribution to the social sciences with this added knowledge. I am also honored to be a part of the USD Coyotes academic story.

## **DEDICATION**

My mother, Quita Lee Minnie Trobell, never had a formal education, but had the foresight that her son must do the opposite. She would drop a few pennies in my book bag once in a while just so I could enjoy a doughnut at school as an extra incentive to focus on my lessons. I dearly owe her for showing me the way in my early life.

I became a lucky beneficiary of the legacy of John Fitzgerald Kennedy's Peace Corps endeavor established in early 1961 to help nurture mutual understanding between Americans and people from other nations and cultures. My direct link came through three volunteers who were assigned to an interior Liberian town in two consecutive years. Their unceasing prodding for me to learn and achieve better grades was the foundation and springboard that landed me in the United States, eventually creating an opportunity for a much better life.

Carol Cercek, from Cleveland, Ohio, always joked that I was like a little brother she never had. Maureen McCaffrey was a native of San Francisco, California, and Lois Strane hailed from Glendive, Montana. I only hope to pay forward in some small way the collective kindness of these Americans to someone else who may need a helping hand.

Lastly, my wife Darleen Anita Kaisand has always been an ardent supporter of all I do ever since we met at Augustana College (now University), in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. This was yet another example of JFK's Peace Corps mantra of bringing about understanding between Americans and people from other parts of the world! Here was an unexpected union between a farmer's daughter from central Iowa and an African son. Her support has never wavered in my personal pursuit of earning a doctorate degree and crossing it off my bucket list. We can now have more time for leisure activities to offset some of the stressors accumulated throughout the study period regardless of where the newfound achievement may take us.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

COMMITTEE SIGNATURES.....	i
ABSTRACT.....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iii
DEDICATION.....	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
LIST OF TABLES.....	vi
LIST OF FIGURES.....	viii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	13
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY.....	59
CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS.....	68
CHAPTER 5: RESULTS.....	108
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS.....	134
REFERENCES.....	153
APPENDICES.....	169
Appendix A: Cronbach’s alpha coefficient built .....	170
Appendix B: Define variables .....	178
Appendix C: Round 6 support tables and figures .....	190
Appendix D: Round 7 support tables and figures .....	196
Appendix E: Round 8 support tables and figures .....	202
Appendix F: Corruption and service impacts on individual institutions .....	208

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: African corruption by level of severity, 2014.....	4
Table 2: Round data schematic.....	71
Table 3: Percentage of population with some level of trust in these specific political institutions in West Africa (2014, 2015, 2017-2021) .....	76
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - Trust Political Institutions 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8) .....	78
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics - Corruption Experienced 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8) .....	81
Table 6: Percentage of population with perceptions most or all of the following are involved in corruption in West Africa (2014, 2015, 2017-2021) .....	83
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics - Corruption Perceived 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8) .....	84
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics - Public Service Quality 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8) .....	86
Table 9: Percentage of population with ease of access or proximity to the following services or amenities in West Africa (2014, 2015, 2017-2021) .....	89
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics - Citizen Ease of Access 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8) .....	90
Table 11: Trust in Political Institutions (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach’s Alpha Scale) .....	172
Table 12: Corruption Experienced (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach’s Alpha Scale) .....	172
Table 13: Corruption Perceived (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach’s Alpha Scale) .....	173
Table 14: Public Service Quality (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach’s Alpha Scale) .....	173
Table 15: Ease of Access to Public Services (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach’s Alpha Scale) ..	174
Table 16: Corruption (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach’s Alpha Scale) .....	175
Table 17: Quality of Admin Services (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach’s Alpha Scale) .....	176
Table 18: Media Exposure (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach’s Alpha Scale) .....	176
Table 19: Freedom of Speech (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach’s Alpha Scale) .....	177
Table 20: Fair and Equal Treatment (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach’s Alpha Scale) .....	177
Table 21: Define Variables Round 6.....	179
Table 22: Define Variables Round 7.....	181
Table 23: Define Variables Round 8.....	183



Table 24: Define Variables in Combined Rounds (RENAMED) .....	186
Table 25: Percentage of population with some level of trust in these specific political institutions in West Africa (Round 6, 2014 to 2015) .....	190
Table 26: Percentage of population with perceptions most or all of the following are involved in corruption in West Africa (Round 6, 2014 to 2015) .....	191
Table 27: Percentage of population with ease of access or proximity to the following services or amenities in West Africa (Round 6, 2014 to 2015) .....	192
Table 28: Percentage of population with some level of trust in these specific political institutions in West Africa (Round 7, 2017 to 2018) .....	196
Table 29: Percentage of population with perceptions most or all of the following are involved in corruption in West Africa (Round 7, 2017 to 2018) .....	197
Table 30: Percentage of population with ease of access or proximity to the following services or amenities in West Africa (Round 7, 2017 to 2018) .....	198
Table 31: Percentage of population with some level of trust in these specific political institutions in West Africa (Round 8, 2019 to 2021) .....	202
Table 32: Percentage of population with perceptions most or all of the following are involved in corruption in West Africa (Round 8, 2019 to 2021) .....	203
Table 33: Percentage of population with ease of access or proximity to the following services or amenities in West Africa (Round 8, 2019 to 2021) .....	204
Table 34: Public Service Delivery Quality Impact on Corruption in West Africa (2014 to 2021) .....	114
Table 35: Corruption and Administrative Service Quality Impacts on Institutional Trust in West Africa (2014 to 2021).....	116
Table 36: Corruption and Administrative Service Quality Impacts on Institutional Trust in West Africa Efficient Grease Multiplicative Interaction Model (2014 to 2021).....	130
Table 37A: Corruption and Service Impacts on Individual Institutions in West Africa (2014 to 2021) Part A.....	210
Table 37B: Corruption and Service Impacts on Individual Institutions in West Africa (2014 to 2021) Part B.....	211

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Full map of Africa.....	10
Figure 2: Map of Africa by region.....	11
Figure 3: Map of West Africa.....	12
Figure 4: Percentage of population who trusts political institutions in West Africa (2014, 2015, 2017-2021).....	77
Figure 5: Percentage of population who paid bribes at least once or twice in West Africa the past 7 yrs for service (2014, 2015, 2017-2021).....	80
Figure 6: Percentage of population satisfied with public service delivery quality the past 7 years in West Africa (2014, 2015, 2017-2021).....	85
Figure 7: Percentage of population who trusts political institutions in West Africa (Round 6, 2014 to 2015).....	193
Figure 8: Percentage of population who paid bribes at least once or twice in the past 2 years in West Africa for service (Round 6, 2014 to 2015).....	194
Figure 9: Percentage of population satisfied with public service delivery quality in the past 2 years in West Africa (Round 6, 2014 to 2015).....	195
Figure 10: Percentage of population who trusts political institutions in West Africa (Round 7, 2017 to 2018).....	199
Figure 11: Percentage of population who paid bribes at least once or twice in the past 2 years in West Africa for service (Round 7, 2017 to 2018).....	200
Figure 12: Percentage of population satisfied with public service delivery quality in the past 2 years in West Africa (Round 7, 2017 to 2018).....	201
Figure 13: Percentage of population who trusts political institutions in West Africa (Round 8, 2019 to 2021).....	205
Figure 14: Percentage of population who paid bribes at least once or twice in the past 3 years in West Africa for service (Round 8, 2019 to 2021).....	206
Figure 15: Percentage of population satisfied with public service delivery quality in the past 3 years in West Africa (Round 8, 2019 to 2021).....	207

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Corruption may appear to be a ubiquitous phenomenon in government operations around the globe. Its severity, causes, types, and consequences may also be cloaked in the different ways they evolve and are manifested geographically. Warf (2017), Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016) and other scholars have narrated the pervasive nature of African corruption as the worst or most severe in the world. There exist general causes and consequences that structurally affect all forms of public service corruption anywhere. However, the goal of this dissertation is to evaluate if corruption in West African governments in particular promotes and strengthens citizens' trust in functioning institutions in many aspects of governance including political, economic, cultural, and social obligations. First, the study defines the universality of corruption, and how its general impact is recognized. This narrative shall be followed with the aim of the research which is to establish a nexus of corruption and the efficient grease theory specifically targeting West Africa. The construct of corruption here is based on the framework of petty corruption from the perspective of giving physical bribes (experienced corruption) as a transactional means and community-observed habits (perceived corruption) as the engine that feeds the efficient grease theory. Efficient grease is thus defined as the assumption corruption practices can strengthen and increase citizens' institutional trust in governments through bribe paying and clientelism that coopt access to scarce services not readily and equally available to all (Lavallée, Razafindrakoto, & Roubaud, 2008). The result from testing such a theory shall help explain if manufacturing an avenue to gain privileged access to scarce institutional public service delivery is positively correlated with citizens' trust in their institutions.

Corruption, by general definition, is when a public employee uses his authority or public office and associated funds for private gains, in effect enriching himself (Warf, 2017). It is

simply the abuse of public office by an entrusted government employee to achieve personal interests. This characterization can cover far-flung “illicit, illegal and immoral behaviors” (Warf, 2017, p. 21) that may include but are not limited to, per Warf (2017) “graft, bribes, extortion, embezzlement, inflated payrolls in which the designated payees do not receive funds (“ghost salaries”), over-invoicing, theft of foreign aid, a blind eye toward smuggling, the purchase and sale of legislative votes, nepotistic hiring practices and selling of government contracts, licenses and land concessions” (p. 21). These illegal activities can occur in a more localized, parochial environment (petty corruption) in such places, for example, as law enforcement facilities and remote border crossings, customs office, or at the tribal chief level (Lavallée et al., 2008; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; Warf, 2017). On a grander stage, corruption could become institutionalized from top down in every governmental functionary with the top echelon skimming off ill-gotten largesse in the form of unreported collected taxes or incoming foreign aid funds that would be earmarked for the national treasury (Lavallée et al., 2008; Moyo, 2009; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; Warf, 2017). This practice could easily lead to what some may refer to as rent-seeking behavior (Warf, 2017; Mbaku, 2007) when a public service agent knowingly exploits a weak political system to his advantage (form of opportunism) by gaining influential authority and prestige or manipulating a similarly less controlled economic environment by profiteering from it. According to Seligson (2002), economists also refer to rent-seeking as “DUP” or directly unproductive profit-seeking activity. A relevant example of such practice is as follows: “When a municipal clerk asks for a payment above and beyond the officially established fee to process a birth certificate, the payment represents a value above that of the established price and hence can be considered rent-seeking behavior” (Seligson, 2002, p. 422). The upshot of prevalence of this behavior is that the demanders of these literal bribes, now

considered rents and not the expected standard user fees for routine services, are given official or unofficial licenses to do so by governing state authorities.

### **Causes and effects of corruption particular to Africa**

It cannot be overstated that the causal particularism and effects of corruption in Africa on geographical lines may yet be balanced on what Warf (2017) refers to as “patrimonial political cultures, clientelism and the role of natural resource exports” (p. 20). Political patrimony here suggests the way things have always been in an inheritable form of governance, while clientelism ascribes to some dubious client-patron relationship in the form of political (for example, promise of vote guarantee during election) or financial favors gained from some quid pro quo transaction (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). Impact of corruption linked to the third element, natural resource exports, centers on the so-called effect of the resource curse wherein countries endowed with natural resource abundance usually perform economically worse than those without such material wealth (Warf, 2017; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). The basic outcome of this resource dilemma can be assumed to be the functioning of an ineffective government all bent on illicitly manipulating sourced income from natural goods exports.

This corruption confluence in Africa among the three themes noted above seems to project a function of what Warf (2017) describes as the existence on the continent of “weak public institutions, anemic private sectors, high degrees of dependence on foreign aid and a history of restructuring guided by international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank” (p. 25). After all, this is a continent where several renowned sources such as the Pew Charitable Trust, The Economist, and Transparency International have made claims that, of the approximately 75 million Africans who paid bribes in 2014, the frequency of bribery there roughly ranged from 1 percent at the low end in Botswana and Mauritius to as high as 69 percent in Liberia (Warf, 2017). The police are ranked as the most corrupt, with business executives

second, followed by government officials. Thus, just about all activities from national infrastructure development - usually significantly subsidized by international private or foreign governmental ventures - to everyday functioning of local government, sweeping arms of clientelism, patronage, and patrimonialism become standard operating procedures (Warf, 2017; Moyo, 2009).

The following further accentuates the reaches of African corruption. Table 1 below presents the outcome of the severity of corruption on the African continent by population based on Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of “government malfeasance, issued annually since 1995 as part of a global corruption report” (Warf, 2017, p. 28). Warf (2017) posits some of the measurement survey indicators into CPI for this reporting period came from 13 various sources that included the World Bank, Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Survey, the African Development Bank, the World Justice Project, the Bertelsmann Foundation, Freedom House Index, Political Risk Services International and The Economist Intelligence Unit. Warf (2017) categorically asserts the index only assesses the extent of corruption in a country, and not necessarily its impacts. CPI scores were then normalized on an ordinal scale of zero as most corrupt to 100 as least corrupt.

**Table 1: African corruption by level of severity, 2014**

<b>Corruption severity</b>	<b>Corruption index</b>	<b>Population (millions)</b>	<b>% of population</b>
<b>Least corrupt</b>	≥80	0.0	0.0
<b>Slightly corrupt</b>	60-79	2.1	0.2
<b>Moderately corrupt</b>	40-59	118.5	10.7
<b>Very corrupt</b>	20-39	909.0	82.0
<b>Extremely corrupt</b>	≤20	79.3	7.2
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,108.9</b>	<b>100.0</b>

*Source: Reproduced from: Warf (2017, p. 28)*

The results show not a single African nation falls into the “least corrupt” category with Transparency International scores exceeding 80. Moderately corrupt countries with scores between 40 and 59 impacting 10.7 per cent of the population is notable. However, it is even more noticeable by sheer numbers the largest category of “very corrupt” (scores 20 to 39) which accounts for about 909 million people, or 82 percent of the continent’s 1.2 billion humans. The 79 million people who live in “extremely corrupt” states with scores below 20 still present dire governance issue on the continent as a whole. Warf (2017) postulates best when he asserts such “figures point to the degree to which African corruption is widespread, entrenched and normalized to a high degree” (p. 29).

Warf (2017) further pins African politics-corruption dynamic in the aforementioned general environment as neopatrimonialism which becomes a “blend between personal rule, patrimonial politics and bureaucratic forms of domination” (p. 25). This framework is understood as the rule of the game for survival where “patrons” may use state-owned resources to “buy” the loyalty of witting clients from a population set. Such exercise permeates the entire operating structure of government from the highest office to the tribal village levels as it punctuates the fact that power lies only with those with the right connections which accentuates interpersonal trust (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). From that perspective, this phenomenon may seem to be the very cornerstone public officials consider a perch for personal gain even as illicit as it may be. Once again, such an atmosphere might conveniently support the “efficient grease” narrative.

Such acts may be common in Africa, but their implementations across borders are vastly influenced by political, historical, cultural, and economic uniqueness, thus defining how corruption is perceived geographically among the various regional nations (Warf, 2017). In other

words, some countries may be agile and even creative in combating corruption while others struggle to do so. These applied, sometimes socially-constructed leaning norms (political, historical, cultural, and economic) could be acceptable as part of doing business by greasing the machinery that makes both business and government bypass operational bottlenecks (Lavallée et al., 2008; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). One country or region might harbor disdain for any type of corruption while others simply regard the practice as transactional routine. This scenario also bolsters the argument for the “efficient grease” hypothesis in further recognizing this effort simply as the dividing principle of assessing the various tipping points of the geographies of corruption in Africa where that keen sense of neopatrimonialism – that practice of social hierarchy of patron-client loyalty in enabling access to state resources - still reigns supreme (Warf, 2017).

Rationalizing corruption geographically in Africa may sound heavily skewed. Thus, corruption factors may not all carry the same effect throughout the continent. As noted in the following examples from Warf’s (2017) assertion, the resource curse could be at play in Nigeria (petroleum) and Guinea (enriched aluminum bauxite); colonial legacy of borders and tribal conflicts in Kenya, Sudan, Uganda; and foreign policies pushed especially by western nations during the Cold War era that blindly supported dictators and other ruthless leaders just to keep the Soviet Union out (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt). But, according to Warf (2017), Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016), and Moyo (2009), it appears the most devastating impact of corruption in Africa is the advent of failed states brutally consumed by civil wars, greed, and tribal conflicts. Some of the same countries and regions suffering from other factors already mentioned are notably found here as well – Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan,



South Sudan, Libya, Somalia, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

### **Supporting Premises and Objective of the Study**

From the general backdrop of African corruption tapestry presented above, the stage is set to analyze the corruption-public service-institutional trust-efficient grease nexus solely from West African public governance perspective. From that springboard, the level of severity of corruption as an independent variable in measuring government malfeasance cannot be derived from a single quantitative element. As much as deference is afforded the corruption-public service-institutional trust-efficient grease narrative in evaluating corruption as a right-hand-side variable, consideration should also be given to other independent variables that may well help further explain this trust ratio. These shall include demographic characteristics to differentiate views of responders who reside in urban or rural areas, age, and possible differences in leveraging gender. Other explanatory variables include level of education as a measure of literacy rate which can become an indicator towards combatting corruption, citizen's satisfaction with the form of government under which they live, the level of freedom enjoyed by both people and the media which serves as a watchdog entity that could expose corruption practices, a country's economic condition, quality of living conditions, and a confident measure of fair and equal treatment for all citizens. However, relative caution must be applied that by simply inserting or removing any number of these independent variables, as possible measuring wildcards in either quantitative or qualitative terms, could deliver different corruption indices across the African continent. Again, this seems to be the broader point of comparative corruption interpretation – that is, governing activities in different regions in Africa may likely carry

different impacts, effects, or nuances that could be significant in explaining the individual severity of corruption.

The objective of the study then is to analyze the interaction between corruption and trust in institutions (presidency, parliament/legislature, political parties, law enforcement, judiciary, etc.) and how this relationship would support citizens' experience with and perception of the "efficient grease" theory in service delivery in West African governance. Again, "efficient grease" is defined as the assumption that corruption practices can strengthen and increase citizens' institutional trust in West African governments through bribe paying and clientelism that coopt access to scarce services not readily and equally available to all.

Figure 1 below depicts a full map of the African continent, and Figure 2 presents the continent by regions, while Figure 3 gives a detailed map of West Africa. Sixteen countries make up the region of West Africa. The study collectively uses Afrobarometer household survey data for Rounds 6, 7 and 8 (2014 to 2021), with the year 2016 unavailable in Round 7. Data for the following countries, except Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania for which data are not available, are included in the analysis: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. Thus, only fourteen countries are studied. It is also important to note that the country name Cabo Verde is exclusively used in this study but is also interchangeably recognized as Cape Verde by other sources. Similarly, Ivory Coast is synonymous with Cote d'Ivoire in this study.

The dissertation's body is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study and its objective. Chapter 2 is the literature review of the subject-matter from both positive and opposing theoretical perspectives of scholars who have studied similar interests in addition to other shared sources. Chapter 3 lays out the research design and methodology employed for the

study. Chapter 4 presents qualifying data analysis. Chapter 5 elaborates on results from the data analysis. Chapter 6 presents the conclusion including some highlights on selective discussions of the study's posture on policy impacts, corruption mitigation, limitations, and recommendations for future studies.

**Figure 1: Full map of Africa**



Source: [Africa Map | Countries of Africa | Detailed Maps of Africa \(ontheworldmap.com\)](https://ontheworldmap.com), 2019

**Figure 2: Map of Africa by region**



Source: [west african countries - Bing images](#)

Figure 3: Map of West Africa



Source: [west african countries - Bing images](#)

## CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

As noted in the introductory chapter, corruption has been defined and characterized in different ways and deserving nomenclatures by scholars. For example, Macrae (1982) refers to corruption as an arrangement that may involve an exchange between two parties in the realm of a demander and a supplier. Such transactions can influence the allocation of resources, an exercise that usually culminates into use or abuse of public responsibility for private ends. Lavallée et al. (2008) simply define corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. These sentiments also serve as a couple of predicates to the collective view of how world organizations monitor corruption. For example, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003) is concerned about “the negative effects of corruption and impunity on the political, economic, social and cultural stability of African States and its devastating effects on the economic and social development of the African peoples” (p. 2). It further acknowledges the awful prospect that corruption does undermine “accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs as well as socio-economic development on the continent” (Olaniyan, 2004, p. 75).

In the same vein, per Lavallée et al. (2008, p. 4), the United Nations Convention against Corruption’s (2003) preamble begins with the declaration of its concern “about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law”. In its 1997 World Development reports on the burden of corruption on the legitimacy of states and their institutions, the World Bank expressed that if corruption is left unchecked “the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions can slowly erode political legitimacy to the point where even non-corrupt officials and members of

the public see little point in playing by the rules” (World Bank, 1997, p. 102). Its 2002 report further echoed such sentiment by pointing out that “Good governance also means the absence of corruption, which can subvert the goals of policy and undermine the legitimacy of the public institutions that support markets” (World Bank, 2002, p. 99).

These poignant declarations then set the stage for the need to assess the veracity or viability of the relationship attributed to corruption and its tendency towards institutional trust and the efficient grease theory that is the topic of this dissertation. The next section delineates the pros and cons ascribed to various scholars on how corruption impacts the health of nations politically, economically, socially, and culturally, and who loses and who wins in the greater governance schema. Though the discussion may be universal, its focus is however purposefully on the interest of West African corruption.

### **Debating the negative and positive consequences of corruption’s correlation with institutional trust and efficient grease theory**

Political science and economic literature abound in arguments on real and presumed negative and positive consequences of corruption’s correlation with institutional trust and the efficient grease theory. Much of it rests on what this study touts as the old-way thinking and new-way thinking of rationalizing corruption, or the old way / new way parallelism in defining corruption and its impact. This dissertation analyzes the scholarship on these two schools of thoughts and concludes that the “old way” is still incredibly viable and powerful in West African government operations, and may have in fact metastasized in scope in recent history.

In general, the new-way scholarship purports the danger of corruption. According to Della Porta (2000), corruption is said to have reduced trust in certain European nations such as Italy, France, and Germany. Lavallée et al. (2008) infer that this indicates there may be a “strong relationship in Western European countries between a high level of corruption and low



satisfaction with democracy” (p. 5). Anderson and Tverdova (2003) follow with similar sentiment that citizens living in the most corrupt countries of Eastern and Western Europe also harbor propensity to collectively show less trust in their political systems. When fanning other parts of the world to assess corruption footprints in governments, studies conducted in Latin America on El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Bolivia (Seligson, 2002), East Asian countries of Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan (Chang & Chu, 2006) and Africa (Cho & Kirwin, 2007) share similar outcomes.

Other studies on the negative impact of corruption indicate that, per Osabiyi, Aiyegbusi Oluwole, and Olofin (2019, p. 218) in reference to Mauro (1995) and Mo’s (2001) position on the subject, “corruption can create social-political instability which can create uncertainty; and this is capable of lowering productivity and economic growth”. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and Mauro (1995) make the argument that corruption could slow economic growth because it by nature discourages innovative activities. They point to the notion that there is a special bond between private innovators and government because innovators need government-supplied goods which are produced exclusively by government. These goods may include permits, licenses, and import quotas in the trading markets. According to Osabiyi et al. (2019), “Demand for these goods is high and inelastic; hence, they become primary target for corruption” (p. 218).

The literature does find contrasts in juxtaposing these new way critiques with some of the concepts as perceived by earlier political science and economic scholarship on mapping corruption effect on trust and the efficient grease hypothesis. Per Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968), the prevailing thoughts among proponents of efficient grease theory come down to bribery seen as an efficient way to substantially reduce effective red tape in an environment of

heavy bureaucratic burden and lengthy delays if public-private operations are to be achieved successfully. The net outcome, they claim, is that corruption can improve economic development and stabilize the political environment. Leff (1964) and Becker and Maher (1986) add that corruption can spur growth. Their major point of argument is that bribery can allow entrepreneurs to influence the decision-making process. Such access does foster economic growth in reducing uncertainty in dealing with myriad of bureaucratic bottlenecks and accelerating support for innovative activities of private entrepreneurs. In that capacity, corruption would then become a secondary compensation avenue for bureaucrats, which would in turn encourage a favorable environment for providing more efficient government services and improve entrepreneurs' chances to bypass inefficient government regulations at optimal rate in many cases (Leff, 1964; Acemoglu & Verdier, 1998).

In dissecting the contrasting effects of corruption from both the old and new scholarship bodies as noted above, proponents of the new way do not particularly sound sanguine about its economic prospects in institutional government practices. Méon and Sekkat (2005) and Lavallée et al. (2008) postulate that corruption may be detrimental to investment and growth everywhere, and this situation is particularly prevalent in countries already maligned by other institutional deficiencies. This ill-functioning descriptive characteristic can be rather poignant and detectable, per Méon and Weill (2006) and Lavallée et al. (2008), in countries with effective institutions, but could be positively associated with efficiency in countries where institutions already function deficiently. Such observation does shine direct light even more so on West African nations from the perspective of the role of institutional quality on the relationship between corruption and economic growth when considering the old-body literature approach to corruption. To that end, De Vaal and Ebben (2009) assert that the relationship between corruption and growth would then

depend on an institutional environment consisting of a sounding board of not only economic in nature, but to also include salient political, social, and cultural aspects in the mix. This narrative can then easily transition into the crux of the efficient grease hypothesis from a level that shall eventually align the variables of interests pertaining to West African corruption and institutional trust. The next section about efficient grease attempts to make that connection clearer.

### **Anchoring the efficient grease theory**

Based on old-way scholarship rationalization of corruption dynamics, the premise of the efficient grease theory is that corruption can strengthen citizens' trust since bribe paying and clientelism open the door to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies (Lavallée et al., 2008). This would in turn increase institutional trust. From this vantage point, corruption is then associated with a relational pathway between informal institutions (vestiges of corruption and bribery) and formal institutions, with the former fueling the functioning of the latter.

According to Lavallée et al. (2008), the theory can be understood to mean that if citizens must weigh ethics of abnormally functioning institutions against their own survival, they would likely choose to place a greater trust in the political institutions and all their appendages. They would do this from personal, basic experienced or perceived corruption activities if they knew that it was only through those malfunctioning practices they were able to attain access to needed services.

But, taking a step back for a moment from seeing corruption as this ubiquitous informal institution that helps the functioning of allocation of scarce public services in probable illicit fashion, serious thoughts should be allowed for how such state / nationwide behavior could perhaps erode citizens' trust in their institutions. One core argument about the efficient grease theory that corruption can bypass the usual bureaucratic bottlenecks and fast-track meaningful

transactions can sometimes be challenged by scholars. Myrdal (1968) posits that corrupt civil servants can be the real reason for unnecessary delays in the proper functioning of bureaucracies because they seek an opportunity to enrich themselves by extracting bribes. Kaufman and Wei (1999) undergird such sentiment as well in that corruption is simply an “endogenous element” of the inner workings of regulatory burden scheme in the underbelly of institutional bureaucracies. In fact, according to Lavallée et al. (2008), Kaufman and Wei (1999) elevate their argument by noting that, from their research on firms, there is a “positive and significant correlation between effective red tape and the value of the bribe paid by firms” (p. 5). Similar surveys this time on household demographics in Peru (Hunt & Lazlo, 2006) and sub-Saharan African nations (Lavallée et al., 2008) concur with this and other previous findings on the subject-matter.

Per Bratton (2007), these practices may well be perceived as unfair to a disadvantaged population but much beneficial to the powerful, dominant sector of society which can rationalize for operating from the outer perimeters of rules and laws. However, when informal institutions begin to be substituted as formal rules, citizens may realize that respecting the formal rules cannot be sustained because they would no longer be viable, efficient, or sufficient. As asserted by Lavallée et al. (2008), Cho and Kirwin (2007) describe this dynamic saying that there may be a vicious circular relationship between mistrust in the state and experiences with corruption such that “citizens’ experience of corruption lowers their trust in political institutions and that lower levels of trust are likely to increase the experience of corruption” (p. 6).

Extension in explaining this theory from old-way thinking perspective about the importance of corruption impact falls in the realm of corruption being ordinarily regarded, per Lavallée et al. (2008), as sort of the “grease that gets bureaucracy moving and, in so doing, increases the loyalty of the citizens” (p. 5). In that respect, scholars like Merton (1968), Abueva

Veloso (1966), Bayley (1967), and Nye (1967) have measured corruption as the enclosure that binds certain societies together. For instance, Lavallée et al. (2008) bolster Becquart-Leclerq 's (1989) position that corruption works like “grease in the gears ... it has substantial redistributive effects and is a functional substitute for direct participation in power” (p. 5). Such a claim could serve as added affirmation of the influencing capacity of how corruption may increase citizens' loyalty to and trust in their political institutions.

However, the stated reasoning above is subsumed by an institutional theory footing which stipulates that political trust is a “consequence, not a cause, of institutional performance” (Lavallée et al., 2008, p. 5). The phenomenon of trust in institutions is therefore a rationally-based characteristic which may be attributable to citizens' evaluations of institutional performance. In reframing the position of Mishler and Rose (2002) to that end, Lavallée et al. (2008) undergird this logic by claiming that “institutions that perform well generate trust; untrustworthy institutions generate skepticism and distrust” (p. 5). The landscape can therefore be characterized by how corruption, recognized as symptoms of badly run public organizations, may directly impact institutional/political trust on account of citizens' own experiences or perceptions such as accessibility to everyday living essentials of food, shelter, and security. There is also an indirect component to this fulcrum from corruption's unfavorable economic aspects (Mauro, 1995; Méon & Sekkat, 2005) that can thwart expansion and growth for such activities as domestic and international trades and responsible cultivation of natural resources. Meaningful infrastructure building of roads, electricity grid, clean drinking water system, schools, clinics, establishing genuine accountability in police conduct towards citizen security, etc. (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido Lobaton, 1999) can also be seen as part of overall development outcomes that lead to citizens' evaluating their trust in institutions.

In the final analysis of attempting to anchor efficacy of the efficient grease hypothesis on the bridge between corruption and trust, it is notable that corruption seems to always alter trust in wholesale institutions if bureaucrats are receptive to such twist. This feeds into the specter of wrongdoing as the ingrained underpinning of the new-way scholarship of the effect of corruption, which is interpreted as this illicit action having the ability to “offset the adverse effects on trust of ill-functioning bureaucracies and public services” (Lavallée et al., 2008, p. 6). Further analysis could probably indicate that bureaucratic responsibility in dutifully and equitably providing and managing deserving public services to all citizens by law and administrative policies can be solidly “bought” even with overwhelming awareness from all sides about the negative effects of corruption. This blind effort could therefore render the distributive task environment of political institutions potentially dysfunctional, their services unfairly and unevenly allocated, and their character and reputation placed in high-stakes freefall only benefiting those who can best exploit the corroded systemic relationship between demanders (citizens) and witting suppliers (state institutions and their representative actors).

### **Connecting the two opposing views to theoretical foundation**

The section that follows weighs opposing theoretical views laid out above against a framework of interpreting West African government corruption and some of its causes. Notwithstanding the premises of scholars on the negative side of the philosophical fulcrum, the presentation is an effort to make the case if the literature does support whether the study’s findings shall report a positive relationship among corruption, trust in institution, and impact on the efficient grease hypothesis in West Africa. This is the main concern of the study of which the research will analyze. It will be determined then at such point if efficient grease can be viewed as an instrument that legitimates bribe paying, sweeping clientelism and other aiding and abetting

institutional functional abnormalities whose ultimate collective goal is to open the doors to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies to the highest bidders or loyalists with various quid pro quo motives. Additionally, applicable public policy and other related political implications of such findings impacting the region studied shall be addressed and analyzed as well.

### **Theoretical foundation / framework**

The study is grounded in a collective framework of theories of which various scholars debate causes, virtues, merits, and limitations about the juxtaposition of the nexus of corruption, institutional trust, and the efficient grease theory. What is gleaned from such discourse points to the focus of the study. This then becomes how these theories highlight and explain some of the characteristics of corruption and how the intentionality of this illicit act impacts the workings of institutions and their alignment with the cornerstone of efficient grease hypothesis linked to West African government and greater societal behavior. The logical addendum to this narrative might have likely been to move in the direction of discussing possible remedies for alleviating corruption in the region, but this is not the intended roadmap of the dissertation. It shall, however, provide some suggestions as recommendations in the closing chapter in that regard. The following is an amalgamation of theories that undergirds the logical choice for this dissertation. The next section, after first laying out an expressive reaffirmation of characterization of corruption, fully narrates how these theories individually impact the culture of governance in West Africa with implications on the efficient grease theory.

### ***Reaffirmation of corruption characterization***

As noted early in the introductory chapter, corruption in Africa can be manifested in many shapes and forms. It can be petty in nature in a localized, parochial environment of law

enforcement facilities and remote border crossings, customs offices, or at the tribal chief levels (Lavallée et al., 2008; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; Warf, 2017). It can also be practiced on a grander stage at the executive levels of government (the president or prime minister and cabinet) when occupiers of these positions misuse funds earmarked for the national treasury. Nations with this propensity essentially become “wholesale, well-organized kleptocracies designed to enrich a small elite at the expense of the public” (Warf, 2017, p. 21). According to Ronning (2009), corruption in Africa could easily be costing upwards of an estimated 25 percent of its combined national income, amounting to over US\$148 billion per annum. This forecast has probably changed upwards in the ensuing years.

It is also posited by Ronning (2009) that as much devastating as corruption of the grand type by which government officials daringly and frequently pillage their national treasuries and stack the loot in Western bank accounts which is also correlated to thwarting economic growth of a nation, it is the brutal reality of petty corruption that noticeably stings the most. Ronning (2009) characterizes this type of small-scale corruption ingrained in African political culture as “the sort that the perpetrators may regard as normal” (p. 156) even as it cultivates an environment of misery citizens face in their daily lives. Ronning (2009) further postulates that this may fit the form of corruption former US president Jimmy Carter (Carter, 2004) warned about when he wrote that: “Democracies can no longer tolerate bribery, fraud and dishonesty, especially as such practices disproportionately hurt the poor” (p. 156).

When attributes of "normal" corruption are truly exposed on the petty front, its impact becomes even more clear on just about every aspect of existence for ordinary citizens. Per Ronning (2009), it literally becomes an institutionalized form of power abuse within the public sector with far-reaching ramifications on governance in such areas as law enforcement and the



delivery of basic services such as water, electricity, and housing. These corrupt activities can also include Zvekic and Camerer's (2002) slate of perpetrators referred to by Ronning (2009) as "criminal justice personnel, customs, procurement, police and immigration/border control" (p. 156). Such an environment further creates the likelihood for the following scenarios below to flourish.

According to Ronning (2009), it usually becomes difficult, if not outright impossible, to obtain services or results from public service providers and government departments duty bound by statutes without paying for them. Nothing gets delivered unless the citizens in need of services offer "routinely hierarchically defined bribes or kickbacks for services rendered" or offer a "dash" which is socially complementary to in West Africa as giving gift (Ronning, 2009, p. 156). This form of bribe is essentially about handing over something to an official to avoid paying a fine, customs duties or value added tax, for example. As previously alluded to in this segment, this conglomerate of qualifying petty corruption litmus tests is what ordinary citizens must endure in their day-to-day lives just to exist. Other examples of the "gift-giving parade" would sometimes include actual money discreetly handed over to a traffic cop who may stop an unsuspecting or hapless motorist for some fabricated moving violation (Warf, 2017), or parents paying the school principal to reserve an entry spot for their child, or even a student passing a mandatory competitive examination to move to the next grade up. A bribe can also create a faster track in processing an application for a passport or other forms of state identification documents, or having to pay a dishonest nurse directly in order to receive that desperately needed medicine for you or family members even if the treatment batch is stolen from a medical establishment the nurse works for (Ronning, 2009).

It is in this framework of normalcy ascribed to African corruption that de Sardan (1999) socializes the phrase “corruption complex” as a generalized predicate to some of the variants of this illicit and corrosive practice. He uses terms like nepotism, abuse of power, embezzlement and various forms of misappropriation, influence-peddling, insider trading and abuse of the public purse. De Sardan’s (1999) point is to find commonality among all practical terms of corruption that link them together to create the same social order. It is this so-called corruption complex he believes “has become, in almost all African countries, a common and routine element of the functioning of the administrative and para-administrative apparatus, from top to bottom” (pp. 27–28). Per de Sardan (1999) then, “corruption is neither marginal nor sectorized or repressed, but is generalized and banalized” (pp. 27–28).

The above narrative also serves as the core in emphasizing this study’s collection and analysis of the data in explaining corruption at the petty practice level in Chapter 4, Data Analysis. Though some cross referencing will occur between petty and grand corruption activities in Africa generally, the focus is primarily on West African governance. For now, the backdrop painted above is what the various theories that follow use to explain in limited but direct fashion the nature and behavior of corruption and its impact as witnessed in West African political, economic, social, and cultural dynamics. By extension then, some inferences can be drawn from the intersection of corruption and the efficient grease theory.

### **Theories and concepts**

As indicated directly above, the study employs a number of theories and concepts in explaining corruption impact on West African public governance. Some of these themes are grouped together based on how they intersect while others do stand alone. Four of the topics - clientelism, patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism, and patronage – extensively contribute to the

focus around the tendency of corruption's influence on the efficient grease hypothesis. The remaining topics serve only as added support material to further explain West African corruption, and therefore the discussion on each is respectively very brief. The collective topics of interest include:

- Clientelism, patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism, patronage
- Prebendalism, soft state thesis
- Institutional theory
- Low risk–high benefit theory
- Role of the resource curse – residuals from endowed natural resource exports
- Two publics theory, tribalism, nepotism

### **Clientelism, patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism, patronage**

#### ***Clientelism***

In ordinary democratic societies, there is usually the semblance of government operating in the arena of formal institutions where rules, procedures, and laws coexist as guardrails. In such a setting, O'Donnell (1996) asserts that “formal rules about how political (and administrative) institutions are supposed to work are often poor guides to what actually happens” (p. 40). The reality, per Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002), is that the informal systems of clientelism and patrimonialism tend to undermine popular citizen participation when the rule of law is subverted. This leads to opening the door to institutional corruption that hampers delivery of public goods and services to the larger block of the population. As part of an informal system, Munro (2010) asserts that “Clientelism is a social relationship based on informal rules” (p. 4) that would emphasize the exchange character of this relationship. But it also rationalizes the Weberian “tradition of stressing the vertical aspects of authority and dominance” (Munro (2010,

p. 4). Morgan (1998) further accentuates the philosophy of this Weberian institutional organization in that it centers around the administering of authority through bureaucracy and domination, a theory which portends that in a bureaucracy, power seems to be concentrated in the hands of the few who control the lives of a lot of people. Weber believes such power is legitimate in the framework of something akin to leaders possessing rational-legal authority, which amounts to a declaration of an unquestionable and clear line of decision-making and control (Morgan, 1998). Still, others like Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), and Stokes (2007) contemplate the social aspects of loyalty and reciprocity on clientelism.

According to Laswell (1958), the gist of clientelism is about who gets what in society which borders on a patron-client model, and is also what Migdal (1988) characterizes as the cornerstone for the politics of survival for both patrons and clients. To that end, clientelism becomes a political system in which Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) cite its influence as a pyramid scheme of patrons and clients with full complicity, and sometimes at the behest, of national officials. The narrative also supports Jackson and Rosberg's (1982) argument that the typical West African regime is "a system of patron-client ties that bind leaders and followers in relationships not only of mutual assistance and support, but also of recognized and accepted inequality between big men and lesser men" (p. 39).

Clientelism then carries multiple meanings in different cultural settings in Africa in general. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) describe it as a political system that is based on conditional loyalties that involve mutual benefits, wherein individuals of unequal power are linked together through the exchange of favors. This characterization perfectly underlines the earlier description above of a patron-client system as well as political machinery. Kaufman (1974) takes a wider view in describing clientelism with these basic elements:

- The relationship occurs between actors of unequal power and status.
- It is based on the principle of reciprocity; that is, it is a self-regulating form of interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which depends on the return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and services to each other and which ceases once the expected rewards fail to materialize.
- The relationship is particularistic and private, anchored only loosely in public law or community norms.

As its implications are further parsed, it should be noted various scholars have rooted the principle of clientelism in historical landscape that goes back to ancient times of aristocracy, nobility, and serfdom. For example, Munro (2010) suggests peasants (clients) were followers of nobles and aristocrats (patrons) through the offering of work and political support for the upper class. In return, the patrons gave the lower-class protection, jobs, and in many instances, land to cultivate. Scott (1972) advances this clientele relationship as an “instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron” (p. 92).

The continuing discussion, however, pertains to a simpler modern interpretation and its direct applicability of clientelism to West African society and political cultural norm as shall be further expounded. For now, the following provides a parallel support of Scott’s (1972) analysis of the clientele relationship related above. The core concept of modern clientelism is thus divided into five elements (Munro, 2010) as follows: a) The relationship is dyadic b) The relationship is

asymmetrical c) The relationship is personal and enduring d) The relationship is reciprocal e) The relationship is voluntary.

As the name suggests, in a *dyadic* setting, clientelism then becomes a qualified social relationship between two persons, patron and client (Landé, 1977). Here, for instance, the patron would control certain resources, money, goods, access to jobs, and other services, and all these accommodations and opportunities can be available to the client under certain conditions or circumstances. The client must, in return, give his own resources for it through work and other support mechanisms. Such arrangement, either by choice or some form of coercion, inevitably establishes a close personal relationship between patron and client that mainly assuages economic and political boundaries.

An *asymmetrical* clientele relationship exudes a space for either a vertical or hierarchic interaction between patron and client, but may not exactly be in the sense of a principal-agent dynamic where the patron is an agent with better access to information and standing with everything material or immaterial (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). In other words, a patron is not an agent of a client, and the client is not the principal of a patron either. Nevertheless, an asymmetrical environment is governed by an uneven (asymmetrical) distribution of resources, power, money, goods, prestige, social acceptance, and so on wherein the patron may likely control everything. Medina and Stokes (2007) describe such setting as the patron having a monopoly in this asymmetrical relationship that is more acute and prevalent in rural setting than urban area. Muno (2010) finds the opposite of monopolistic trend in urban surroundings, even with usually better educated and informed citizens, where a behavior pattern of oligopoly thrives as multiple patrons compete for clients to control. Per Kitschelt and Wilkinsons (2007), there is also a side effect of a linkage in a democratic system of government and clientelism between

politicians and voters based on electoral interests, all which becomes even more crucial among the educated population.

An additional crucial advantage for a patron is the normative higher societal status and authority he enjoys which further facilitates the dependency of a client because the patron is in a position of power (Scott, 1972). Such vertical power in a patron-client asymmetrical relationship can only be categorized in the realm of exploitation and domination (Kitschelt, 2000; Stokes, 2007). Weber (2019) refers to this type of clientelism as aligned with principle of traditional rule where there is a demarcation between master and servant. The servants obey due to their self-dignity which is naturally assigned through tradition (Weber 2019). This particular rationalization is quite prevalent in West African society subservient to patriarchal and patrimonial rules which underscore clientelism with the intersection of traditional practices.

The *patron-client relationship can be personal and enduring*, especially if it is face-to-face and not simply on a sporadic or spontaneous acquaintance level (Mainwaring, 1999). Such a connection helps to build trust for both parties. This personal relationship evolves over time to ensure predictability and monitoring with confidence about the reciprocity of the exchange, thus minimizing or diffusing uncertainty (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007). However, monitoring can be difficult in clientelism sometimes due to the informality of the relationship, the sheer number of clients involved, and also the web of time-lag in the exchange process, thus ascribing to what Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) label as a self-enforcing group equilibrium. For those reasons, it seems difficult to predict an optimum time limit necessary to develop a personal relationship. Even when such time element varies, relationship between patron and client might need to be sustained if both sides aspire to successful outcomes.

The *clientele relationship is reciprocal*, as already mentioned above, when material or non-material goods are exchanged between patrons and clients, thus representing an economic or other form of transactional purpose (Muno, (2010). In this arrangement, the patron usually controls resources, offering them to his clients in a vertical, authoritative manner. The clients would accept and use the resources, followed by offering their own resources in exchange. The return service is not always immediate or spontaneous, meaning there may be a time lag. Per Muno (2010), “The exchange relation underlying the vertical relationship does not require synchronicity to a large extent like the market logic. Instead, obligations may, and will be in general, satisfied only with a time lag” (p. 11). In that vein with particularism to West Africa, van de Walle (2007) notes three types of clientelism when related to reciprocal exchange: 1) Tribute as the traditional practice of gift exchange in peasant societies; 2) Patronage pertains to the practice of using state resources to provide jobs and services for political clients; and 3) Prebends become arrangements “in which an individual is given a public office in order for him/her to gain personal access over state resources” (p. 51). The apparent takeaway here seems to be all these scenarios bend towards institutional corruption.

The *voluntary characteristics* of a clientele relationship need to be dissected to some degree. Here, the burden of needs and demands, obligation, costs, power and force, loyalty, and other social and economic attachments connecting patron and client might not be so easy to interpret on the scale of volunteerism. As Muno (2010) postulates, the very premise that some of the essential elements necessary in keeping a clientele relationship functional also make exiting from such covenant restrictive, thereby presenting the patron-client relationship as not wholly voluntary.



Taking costs, for example, there could be the issue of a patron losing credibility and legitimacy when promises are not honored, and trustworthiness is diminished, and client recruitment becomes challenging. Per Van Lange, Klapwijk, and Van Munster (2011), such challenges could be based on inferences gained from Axelrod's (1984) game theory phrase "shadow of the future" which insinuates "the longer-term perspective that people might adopt in repeated-choice social dilemmas" (p. 126). In other words, in this scenario both patron and client would assess potential benefits-gained and opportunities-lost as the deciding factor to maintaining their reciprocal commitment.

Force, marked by pretenses of social ostracism or violence, can also be instrumental in binding clients to their patrons (Muno, 2010). This is so because the scale of asymmetry of power greatly leans towards strength of the patron, as he could single-handedly apply pressure (force) on one or multiple clients to capitulate to his demands. It is likely much harder from the client perspective to force a patron to buckle under pressure unless it is done so as a collective effort of a larger group of clients. Muno (2010) expands this thought pattern to reiterate a position that the landscape within where the interests of patron and client converge, the act of entering, exiting or sustaining clientelism is generally not violent in nature. Otherwise, the transaction would appear like a mode of slavery or some type of bondage. However, as much as the transaction might seem voluntary, it could still hold certain discretionary restrictive feature where some level of force prevents the absolute value of such volunteerism. It is this framework Muno (2010) refers to as "restricted voluntariness, with the degree of restrictions depending on the circumstances of clientelism" (p. 12).

Clientelism, as analyzed in the combined theoretical narrative segment above, does include various parallel functional ideas such as patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism, and

patronage. These typologies will now further help explain in the next section some of the reasons for corruption in West African government institutions and its political, socio-economic, and cultural implications.

### ***Patrimonialism***

Before relating the impact of patrimonialism to corruption, it is first connected to clientelism. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) assert that as much as clientelism at the core is about who gets what in government, it is the duty of governments to actually commit to providing policies that would deliver those essential services and programs. It then becomes that hallmark of politics and administration which Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002) believe should not be so easily mechanically distinguishable. This is so, they contend, because politicians use the expertise of high-level administrators to draft laws and regulations that these same administrators must implement. The implication here then, per Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002), is that lower-level administrators cannot avoid upholding some political or policy formulation functions as part of completing their duties.

It is in this framework that Weber (1947) envisions patrimonialism as some sort of guide to administrative structures and a workforce in government. In his view, patrimonialism becomes the pillar scenario where “the administrative apparatus is appointed by and responsible to the top leader” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002, p. 6). The actions of these subordinates are therefore duty-bound to their superiors who place them in the specified jurisdictions. For that reason, accountability for what they do is sometimes informal or off the record (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). In this regard, patrimonial administration can be deemed as closely associated with clientelistic politics when choice jobs are offered to proteges by their benevolent patrons in high positions as the exercise illegally circumvents the rules and laws that explicitly qualify job

and career protections. A patrimonial system therefore fosters the use of government employment and benefits of jobs “as a type of income-generating property” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002, p. 7) under a decentralized structure where these office holders exercise their administrative responsibilities unchecked. It is for this characterization of patrimonialism that Weber (1947) memorializes patrimonial rule with some similarities to the feudal system of lord and vassal except that the “feudal relationship is more ritualized and regularized, and thus more stable, than the ad hoc arrangements of patrimonialism” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002, p. 6).

To that end, Weber (1947) however contrasts patrimonialism with a rational legal system of public management in terms of valorized attributes and expectations of established hierarchical levels of salaried positions, written documentations, full-time staff, and political neutrality. Such a mandate would require following official rules where everyone operating in this governing framework does not charge for services for their personal gains (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). All nominal funds and deep-seated fiscal intakes, from that perspective, are supposed to be placed in the official state designated coffers or treasuries. Transcending even the appearance of this government position produces malignant outcomes as notably prevalent in West Africa as sampled below.

For example, the Nigeria experience with patrimonial system extensively permeates West African government operations. Patrimonialism in this regional context depends on the notion that the distinctions between the public and the private domains do intersect and become indistinguishable (Ogundiya, 2009). Power in such an arena emerges as a major source of wealth and its influence is advantageously highly personalized to the maximum. The actions, behaviors, and attitudes of the political elite with all this power then become entrenched in a traditional value system that, according to Ogundiya (2009), is “highly patriarchal where political power is

personalized, and leadership is permanent in the context of self-recruited oligarchy” (p. 284). A wider dimension of this environment is further advanced by Ogundiya (2009) in the following commentary attributed to Seteolu (2005):

These socially imbibed values are replicated in the political terrain where contending coalitions accumulate resources to offset side payments required to retain or expand followership in the context of power politics. The fierce struggle in the public space is linked to conflicts that characterize leadership succession in traditional political systems and the attractions of political control where party politics guarantee access to wealth and economic power (p. 284).

In this regard, Dudley (1973) and Osaghae (1995) assert that political elite can further manipulate social identities, for example ethnicity, to achieve an underlying goal wherein identity can then serve as a conduit to gain access to political power from which vantage point dominance and economic control can be consolidated. The ultimate result here is to manipulate power for personal or group enrichment, which is advancing collective and regional ethnicity interests. Thus, it appears West African governance of patrimonialism affirms corruption can be recognized as fuel for glaring political culture of control.

### ***Neopatrimonialism***

Another offshoot of clientelism in explaining West African corruption is neopatrimonialism. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) characterize neopatrimonialism as a “mixed system of government administration, with a rational-legal veneer overlaying a web of personalistic ties characteristic of patrimonial rule” (p. 40). In the developing nations of the region, many governments have established in the framework of what can be referred to as rational-legal administration which is still in the shadows of patrimonial rule. Policies in this environment are tradition based and normally conducted through networks of personal retainers and dependents (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). The core practice of neopatrimonialism then comes across as administrative systems “in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-

exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions” (Bratton & van de Walle 1997). From the West African perspective, Oguniyya (2009) refers to neopatrimonialism as a new form of patrimonialism characterized to project what usually contributes to state failures in the region. As such, it is likely patrons from the elite class with monopolistic control of state resources can easily influence and secure the loyalty of citizen clients, thus culminating into the before-mentioned informal patron-client relationships that can thread from very high positions of power hierarchies down to individuals in lower levels in both urban areas and rural villages ((Oguniyya, 2009).

### ***Patronage***

Another peripheral element of clientelism that impacts corruption is patronage. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) describe patronage in a most native term as the distribution of government jobs or other favors to political allies irrespective of their qualifications. At face value, covert measures are often used to avoid what is legally allowed to extend patronage for such act as arranging a no-show job for a loyalist. Such arrangement can also advance to what is referred to as “ghosts in the public sector—deceased, retired or non-existent people who nonetheless draw paychecks” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002, p. 9) where the ill-gotten money is usually redirected to people with the right connections.

Patronage in the political arena may also carry a latent effect. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) characterize the scenario like this: “Firing staff as part of a ‘spoils system’ is disruptive and leads to loss of organizational memory; replacing staff with unqualified political ‘hacks’ cripples government capacity. Favoritism in personnel decisions encourages toadyism and discourages underlings from speaking their minds or using their expertise if it threatens their career” (p. 10). Nonetheless, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) acknowledge that political

leaders, agency, or department heads can apply favoritism to gain or maintain control so they can stay in power by surrounding themselves with loyal employees. Such operation would allow these leaders to build public management teams who share the visions of the political parties, agencies, or departments at play with confidence that these employees would not sabotage or delay implementations of important programs. According to Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002), arranging jobs for supporters is also “one of the instruments that leaders have to strengthen political parties” (p. 11). This is so because party organizations are crucial in mobilizing public participation in civic affairs, thus projecting party building as another latent function of patronage.

Patronage at the political level certainly has a negative effect in state governance as can be attested to in the West African nations of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Here, an environment of predatory political behavior delegitimizes the administrative state of these countries into criminality when government officials sponsor smuggler rings, drug-runners, and money launderers (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). This occurs because ample opportunities exist in these countries with abundant mineral resources including timber and diamonds ripe as waiting fiscal feeders into the patronage system (Reno, 2000).

The possibility of the above scenario is not unimaginable. When officially recognized rulers fail to keep patrimonial networks happy and contained, the smuggling, gun-running, and other nefarious activities would continue and undermine the sitting government. This would ultimately provoke state failure or collapse and facilitate the rise of criminal organizations to fill the political vacuum, thus making notorious warlords or gangster-politicians the heads of evolved patron-client networks (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). In such cases, the warlords and their gangster acolytes mostly use violence and terror as well as the distribution of selective

favors to control commercial activities and sometimes impose a level of religious fanaticism on an already hapless population. It is an exercise which in practice becomes the source of governance in some territory or locality where the central state has withered, is destroyed, or has disappeared altogether (Reno, 1995), not to downplay the potential of destabilizing governments of neighboring states.

Alternatively, West African government officials may use their positions to exploit their constituents through the various levers of patronage especially in times of political competition. The upshot is for these politicians to reward their supporters and marginalize those who choose not to join their campaigns. This choice is notable here as the tentacles of ethnicity become a basis for the clarion call the patron-politicians exercise “to build a winning coalition by steering benefits toward people who visibly share the same background or heritage” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002, p. 20). What low-income and underclass voters hope for in return for their commitment in mobilizing support on ethnic lines is to improve their chances of obtaining individualized benefits available from the state (Chandra, 2001). It would still matter little if chosen politicians were out of office, as the ethnic voting bloc would still remain stalwart supporters based on tribal or linguistic group connections. Such rationale is afforded because the prevailing logic is that West African public officials would always have the propensity to advance the interests of their individual groups, a point documented by Wantchekon (2002) in his study of the nation of Benin when he asserts that clientelism, with patronage in tow, has a significant impact on voting behavior and tends to reinforce ethnic voting.

Another example of the patronage-clientelism link impacting West African political corruption is from the Ghana experience. In that country’s competitive politics, members of parliament donate to their constituents to help cover payments for everything from school fees,

electricity and water bills, funeral and wedding expenses, and some form of low-tech agriculture and farm implements. It measures up to a ritualistic routine when citizen constituents would muster at a precise time of day in hope that their members of parliament would address their immediate needs and concerns that would essentially include monetary handouts as well (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002). In the real world of democratic constitutional governance, the intentionality of such gatherings would be frowned upon and labeled as the lawmakers being negligent of fully conducting their “other” functions as policymakers and critics of the government (Lindberg, 2003). But in the age of reasonableness and practicality, West African political environment, and for that matter greater African wisdom, does not seem to operate from that rational state tapestry. To that end, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) postulate that those other “official” functions are not always that important when compared to gaining access to the patronage resources available from the state. This logic is underscored by van de Walle (2002b) to the extent that African politicians are usually guarded when espousing policy or programmatic platforms. In making that connection, it becomes clear that citizens steer in the same direction as their vote-seeking members of parliament, and that is the opportunity for access to basic services. All this maneuvering is essentially again about who gets what (maximizing benefits in the patronage-clientelist domain) in the enticing atmosphere of how best to distribute available accommodations by the political and ethnic elites to their loyal constituents.

### **Other supporting theses for clientelism**

As noted in the introduction, the topics of clientelism, patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism, and patronage are analyzed as the most essential elements in explaining the basis for corruption influence on efficient grease theory. Efficient grease affecting West African governance is categorized as the assumption corruption practices can strengthen and increase



citizens' institutional trust in governments through bribe paying and clientelism that coopt access to scarce services not readily and equally available to all. The following additional topics are briefly presented here only in their capacities to help further bolster interconnectedness with extended boundaries in explaining the widespread West African corruption impact on the political, socio-economic, and cultural governance in the region. The additional topics listed here again as a general reminder for discussion are:

- Prebendalism, soft state thesis
- Institutional theory
- Low risk–high benefit theory
- Role of the resource curse – residuals from natural resource exports
- Two publics theory, tribalism, nepotism

### ***Prebendalism, soft state thesis***

#### ***Prebendalism***

According to Joseph (1987), prebendalism is about the allotment of prebends – translated essentially as stipends – when someone is given a public office in order for him to gain personal access over state resources. Malfeasance evolves when the state's office holder uses the prebends to generate personal benefits as if he has the right to a share of such government revenue and can use it at will. A relevant example of this conduct would be to allow a customs officer to use the position for personal enrichment by manipulating import and export taxes (van de Walle, 2007). Looking at this from the perspective of governing in West Africa, prebend action plays on the politics of competition over allocation of resources and their transformed purposes for personal gains the state did not intend. Thus, per Seteolu (2005), prebendalism is a function of that competition for, and appropriation of, the offices of the state, which is slightly different from a

projection of clientelism which is classified as being closely associated with individual and group relationships within the all-encompassing political, socio-economic, and cultural environment of the population. Overall, van de Walle (2007) sees prebendalism, as a “characteristic of authoritarian states and is typically mediated not through political parties, but through the executive branch of government” (p. 52).

### ***Soft state thesis***

Myrdal (1970), who coined the soft state thesis, explains the concept as: “a type of social indiscipline which emanates as a result of a legislative deficiency, law observance and enforcement in particular, and inexorable non-compliance of state officials, and, often, their collaboration with the big men and their apparatchiks whose conduct they should have regulated. Within the theory of soft states belongs as well as corruption penchants” (p. 208). This is essentially when laws promulgated by the legislative arm of government are copiously applied but in a soft approach instead of robustly and consistently, thus opening the door for private individuals to take advantage of the landscape and also making it easier for businesspeople to bribe tax officials, for example (Goldthorpe, 1975). It then becomes too obvious for acts of corruption to thrive (Myrdal, 1968) because political leaders and their bureaucratic henchmen turn apathetic, perhaps out of kinship sentiment (Ogundiya, 2009), in making the people responsible, further increasingly creating an attitude of disobedience by the general population towards any authority. This is when instituted government programs and policies become maligned and ineffective, and sometimes unsuccessful. The takeaway then, per Andoh (2021), is to view a soft state landscape of being habitually or characteristically tolerant of corruption and corrupt activities.

### *Institutional theory*

Corruption in West Africa, for that matter the entire continent in general, widely varies, but the most visible kinds touch common citizens' lives every day. Van den Bersselaar and Decker (2011) dramatically characterize the landscape of these illicit acts as inextricably linked to a picture of government operational decadence and neglect when they speak of crumbling roads in disrepair that would include basic activity like grading dirt roads after the rainy season, daring highway robberies, unrelenting abject poverty, inability to provide public healthcare that is of good quality and affordable, unable or unwilling to provide adequate school facilities with functioning learning materials including basic textbooks, and the long time it takes to install basic infrastructural improvements like an electrical grid, sewage systems, and safe drinking water facilities especially in urban communities. This did not happen by accident as van den Bersselaar and Decker (2011) further postulate that there is a historical foundation to this that goes back to the legacy of colonialism which institutionalized behaviors that might have led to corruption because they went counter to traditional and indigenous management. It must be noted that Liberia, founded by descendants of freed American slaves, was never colonized but suffers the same from all the ills of corruption via osmosis of the humankind found in West African countries occupied and controlled by French and British imperial rules.

The institutional justification for corruption is placed on a scale as to whether corruption should be explained as a result of outside interference where applicable like the imbued influence of colonialism as a function of the way in which colonial powers had delegated local administration to traditional authorities, or from internal African factors such as a particular political culture of corruption which fancy this act as a form of informal redistribution (van den Bersselaar & Decker, 2011). This argument presents a logic that in considering the systemic

nature of corruption (De Sardan, 1999), the state's desire to extend its control broadly is tantamount to some of the same criticisms the patron-client marriage is faced with in dissecting clientelism and its impact.

Van den Bersselaar and Decker (2011) contend that the juxtaposition of the two contradictory institutional systems (colonial versus traditional native) led to significant confusion as to which was the correct set of rules even during the post-colonial period. According to van den Bersselaar and Decker (2011), "the resulting uneasy cohabitation of two institutional systems which delegitimized each other gave birth to the kind of generalized corruption now considered typical for Africa" (p. 15). Pillay and Dorasamy (2010) also assert that the significant dynamic of interspersed cultural norms and values might have determined the types of institutions that the African society created for itself and currently lives under. It is a similar sentiment Peterson and Smith (1997) adequately posit that the terms culture and society imply the existence of a heterogeneous entity that would include a diversity of values and beliefs.

Moreover, the political structures in such countries are usually unresponsive and unaccountable (Lodge, 1999; Mavuso & Balia, 1999). It is then highly conceivable that the use of public office for private gain can be expected as a result, a thread which essentially creates, per Pillay and Dorasamy (2010), causal links among a country's political culture, a lack of accountability as part of its political culture and the pervasiveness of corruption. It can also be surmised that genuine attempts to eradicate or simply control corruption in this type of society by limiting unconstrained discretion afforded bureaucrats and instituting liberal democratic and transparent processes are always inhibited by a corrupt political heritage, thus allowing the continuance of an institution.

### ***Low risk–high benefit theory***

Low risk–high benefit theory literally implies a principle of deterrence. This is whenever punishment for unethical and corrupt practices is light or ineffective, premised on plea-bargaining or otherwise, public officials and other bureaucrats will not be deterred from getting involved in corruption (Ijewereme, 2013). The extreme of this axiom is, however, when the punishment is severe, public servants will be reluctant or even afraid to engage in corruption and other related unethical practices (Azelama, 2002).

Ijewereme (2015) opines that there is a balancing decision between risk and benefit in Nigeria and other West African nations where the theory of low risk–high benefit is adopted when people about to carry out corrupt practices first weigh and compare the risk involved in it to the benefit. It is only when they are confident that the benefit outweighs the risk that they embark on committing corrupt practices. Incidentally, risk includes the possibility of getting caught and the stigma associated with exhibition of other negative social implications for the culprit (Ijewereme, 2015). The benefits, however, could include monetary proceeds, privileges and respect enjoyed in the society due to amassed wealth even if ill-gotten, and increased standard of living (Azelama, 2002; Ijewereme, 2013). The obvious and roaming caveat awaiting a contemplating corrupt actor, per Ijewereme (2015), is when democratic ethos and rule of law are well established, risk of involving in corruption is high, and punishment attached to corrupt practices might exponentially increase.

### ***Role of the resource curse – residuals from natural resource exports***

Auty (2004) and Ross (2001) assert that since the 1960s, resource-poor countries – those with limited or no valuable exportable natural raw material - have outperformed and economically grown higher than resource-rich countries. This opposite tendency occurs as a

function of how political and economic characteristics of governing of resource-endowed nations concentrate revenues from these resources to regionalized and geographic enclaves on a clientelistic basis, and entrust power into the hands of few elites (Ijewereme, 2015). Such collective action is bound to further reduce the power brokers' incentive to develop fair and equitable governing apparatus that would enable the generation of taxes to benefit all sectors of a country's economy. A weak and vulnerable environment then ensues because some of these resource-rich nations often lack basic ethics, transparency, and accountability, and are also often misunderstood as enclaves of poor people with dearth of satisfied needs (Abubakar, 2004).

### ***Two publics theory, tribalism, nepotism***

The theory of two publics, as practiced in West Africa, is predicated on Ekeh's (1975) definition of the intersectionality of tribalism and nepotism within geographic region of a West African country when it comes to resource re-allocation of government services. Ekeh's (1975) refers to this as serving both the primordial public and the civil public. The Nigeria example best describes how the scenario might play out. As asserted by Ijewereme (2015), the primordial public is about kinship with intended overtures towards tribalism and nepotism inside ethnic groups, while the civil public relates to the society outside kinship either in the public sector or in the private sector where the general population works.

Nigerians in the civil public by natural tendency, according to Ijewereme (2015), view their duties as moral obligations to benefit and sustain a primordial public that they themselves are members of by exhibiting higher loyalty to their kinship bloc than the civil societies. Therefore, in any circumstance where there is a conflict of interest between the primordial public and the civil public, Nigerians tend to protect primordial interests at the expense of the civil public (Azelama, 2002). As Ijewereme (2015) postulates, this reasoning may support the logic

why some Nigerians might desire to be associated with unethical practices within the civil public to acquire benefits for their primordial public. Ekeh (1975) provides an example within context where a public servant corruptly enriches himself in the public sector and shares a substantial portion of the loot with his primordial public of his tribal people. It must be noted, as Ekeh (1972) explains, that tribalism, when considered as a pejorative term, is used to denote animosities between or among members of different ethnic groups.

Nepotism as applied to the specific purpose of this discussion, on the other hand, is a biased method of distribution of state resources when a public officer chooses his relatives and family members or friends in awarding contracts, job recruitment, promotion, appointment to public positions, which would clearly ignore any prescribed merit principle, thus possibly downgrading quality of public service (Amundsen, 1997). At its core for that matter, Ijewereme (2015) opines that nepotism provides a tainted room for preferential treatment of one individual over another, without considering the relative merit of the respective individuals. It can safely be deduced then that both tribalism and nepotism breed corruption in the civil public for the benefit of primordial public as the two publics theory realistically takes hold in impacted societies in Nigeria in particular, and the regional boundaries of West Africa in general.

### **Public policy implications**

The policy narrative described here is based on Western democratic principles where policy decisions are “taken in the open after public discussion and review” versus the clientelistic environment where policy decisions are “taken in secret without public discussion or involvement” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002, p. 5). The making of policy is directly related to issues of government effectiveness in governing generally and in the delivery of services. Since

the various theories of corruption impact governing in general and how funds are dispersed and services delivered, it is important to address various issues in the discipline of policymaking.

Justifications for applying public policy to government functions may carry many forms and interpretations especially when the link between politics and public policy agendas are closely marked. Theodoulou and Cahn (2013) posit that political science's affinity to government relations may be rooted in general theories, but the policymaking process takes into consideration theories that might help predict and explain specific political or general outcomes. From that perspective, both disciplines are intertwined in helping government to better function.

Normally, the disciplines imply that people in civil society willingly delegate power to sovereign government. And if such a government does not produce what its citizens desire, the institution can be changed (Theodoulou & Cahn, (2013). The government's role then is to deliver on security, equal opportunity in economic achievement and political freedom and choices that go beyond just self-interest of the few to what may benefit the masses.

Because these activities speak to direct paramount human needs, social interaction is such that citizens participate and therefore contribute to policymaking outcomes. Per Theodoulou and Cahn (2013), decisions by individuals or groups to participate in policy setting processes are innately rooted in their own motivation encapsulated in some aspects of bounded rationality and rational choice theories in terms of the enactment of personal preference that is based on cognition, experience, and issue environment they are faced with. They must allow for uncertainty and therefore be prepared to adapt to whatever outcomes may ensue. Such activities, Theodoulou and Cahn (2013) claim, help not only manage current mode of thinking but also shape future political-public policy process dynamic. As the ideals of political science merge with public policy in effecting instrumentalization of government – namely, providing for and



improving the welfare of society including security and market incentives – de facto workings of government itself would expect to feel the strain of such obligation which could erode some of the pillars that undergird its function in totality (Theodoulou & Cahn, (2013).

In the face of said strain, policy deciders and recipients (actors) alike should recognize intersection of political science and policymaking process might then take solace in the idea that incrementalism for program execution needs to be practiced if reasonable outcomes are to be achieved (Baumgartner & Jones 1993, 2009). Policymakers can probably afford to sometimes do little or do more to hold the line because there are just too many issues and clients to satisfy all at the same time and pace. However, because the stability of holding the line in effectuating policy climate can possibly become cyclical, episodic, evolutionary, and therefore not static at all, Baumgartner et al. (1993, 2009) refer to the premise as punctuated equilibrium. The trajectory of punctuated equilibrium as a theory is best described by Baumgartner et al. (1993, 2009) like this: "...These changes occur both incrementally and in bursts, and when the bursts occur, old ways of doing things are swept aside, to be replaced by new organizational forms" (p. 235). Incremental public policy implementation is therefore not on an exact plane; rather, it is done by trial and error for expediency to achieve self-interest or group agenda on both ends of the spectrum (Theodoulou & Cahn, 2013; Sabatier, 2007; Baumgartner et al.,1993, 2009).

It can never be assumed there is an exact definition of public policy or who decides what it really is. Again, public policymaking can be thought of as part of political science discipline and cannot be separated from how government is run. Thus, as expressed above, it could be agreed that there is policymaking, but there are varied opinions on how and why these decisions are made, and who has the outright legitimacy to make them to best satisfy interested entities. In a broader dimension, the relationship between citizens and their government underlines the

meaning of policy setting (Theodoulou & Cahn, 2013). There is that obligation aspect mentioned above within which the government can choose to initiate and complete certain activities in the best interest of the various actors, or it can be prodded to do so by popular demand. Per Theodoulou and Cahn (2013), in either frame, policy setting is an iterative process that always requires “planning, formulation, implementation, enforcement and evaluation” (p. 3). Ripley and Franklin (1986) and Theodoulou and Cahn (2013) therefore refer to the overall policy setting endeavor as how policy typologies framework can help to cut through the noise of overwhelming policy activity demands by categorizing them in brackets so these sought-after policy enactments can adequately be distributed initially, redistributed, regulated, or self-regulated by the government and individual or various interest groups as needed.

In the final analysis, the strength of merits from being exposed to the various approaches is to hopefully be able to discern the appropriate theory, model or framework that can be adequately applied to a given policymaking process decision. The very essence of defining and implementing public policy then is to align interest groups with the political system in a substantive advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) to ensure that policy conforms to their core belief system at a given point in time thereby fulfilling policy agendas in measurable fashion without bias. In theory, this may sound feasible, but realism prevails in that human rationality of self-interest is usually at the forefront in the decision-making process.

It is then rational to assert that public policy acts are likely overshadowed by corruption intrusions in West African government decision-making processes fueled by that tempting self-interest caveat as noted above (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002; Theodoulou & Cahn, 2013). Such intentionality is based on who gets what at what costs, and what are the residual benefits to both patrons (state and its representatives) and ordinary citizens as clients (Brinkerhoff &

Goldsmith, 2002). To that end, Ripley and Franklin's (1986) redistributive policies type serves as a more malleable conduit through which corruption may be most carefully as well as overtly visible. The three other Ripley and Franklin's (1986) typologies -- namely distributive policies, protective regulatory policies, competitive regulatory policies -- are important, but not quite explicitly relevant in the larger scope of the relationship being assessed in this dissertation about the nexus among corruption, institutional trust, and efficient grease hypothesis. This is so because the nature of corruption prevalent here is of the petty kind associated with redistribution of public services and effecting programs at the granular level that more directly impact the everyday lives of citizens materially and structurally, and not necessarily activities that fall in the grand corruption category as identified earlier in the reading.

In further emphasizing the point noted above, understanding the relationship between public policy implications and corruption in West African governance can be challenging and somewhat compromised if explaining its contours is only rooted in Western and American scholarship. To safeguard against such a prospect, corruption itself must be considered not only as an institutional variable but as a policy variable as well. It is in that context this study is compelled to find the need to first summarize the importance of redistributive policies advocated by such Western / American public policy alliance before applying it to West Africa. Redistributive policies of service and program allocations, as noted above, are what the study considers as the centerpiece in explaining corruption in the region's governance. The following segment presents key components of Ripley and Franklin's (1986) policy type of redistributive policies.

### ***Redistributive policies***

Redistributive policies and programs are initiated to adjust for parity for already issued programs (Ripley & Franklin, 1986). In that respect, it is about the reallocation of resources in an attempt to level the social, economic, and even political benefit playing field from the well-off to the disadvantaged. Ripley and Franklin (1986) refer to the underlining intention of this typology from public policy perspective as government's attempt to readjust the allocation of wealth, property, rights, or some other consequential values among social classes or racial groups in society. The authors construe the rendering of this practice as having winners and losers because some valued items are transferred to one specified group at the expense of another. The practice of affirmative action in the job environment or university admissions setting in the United States (sans the recent 2023 Supreme Court ruling to discard such statute for student academic admission) when certain minority groups are more favored than majority white representation does equally qualify under redistributive typology policies as well (Ripley & Franklin, 1986). Another example could be directly related to the welfare system in the provision of food stamps to the disadvantaged.

From a policy justification perspective, Weimer and Vining (2017) list achieving efficiency as the most defensible justification for redistributive public policy. They claim efficiency can further be improved and advanced through collective actions of providing human dignity by recognition of equality, distributional equity, economic opportunity, and political and governmental participation and intervention. At some point in working within this relationship quest for efficiency application, one or more actions may take precedent over others within the context of a compromise. For example, per Weimer and Vining (2017), a working efficiency policy may be abandoned or recalibrated just to protect human life or curtail immediate

suffering, or the marketplace could even be faced with adjusting price equilibrium in order to ease economic pressure off the less fortunate consumer sector. As an example, justification from Weimer and Vining's (2017) framework for TANF (Temporary Aid to Needy Families) welfare provision is about ensuring human dignity and creating economic opportunity through government intervention.

Stone's (1997) justifications for redistributive public policy are found in equity, efficiency, security and liberty of the polis or the community of society. Efficiency, or maximizing output from input, may just be the most defensible, but the others do apply as well in appropriate situations. Stone's (1997) justification would apply policy equity and security for the poor which is a direct linkage to the purpose of TANF as well.

The hope of changing or coordinating the behaviors of individuals and corporate citizens by the government in a collaborative fashion relies on certain policy tools use. Policy design attributes that explain the importance of statutes, guidelines, and structures of how to implement policies can help better explain tools for the policy process (Ripley & Franklin, 1986).

Weimer and Vining's (2017) policy tool selection is about the economics of market and government failures based on choice, and valuation of equity opportunity and equality in distribution of policy decisions. The authors refer to actions taken by government to tackle these issues as rendering generic policies. By nature, these generic policies can be overly complex and diverse, thus demanding to be broken down to fit a particular policy intent sought for to deliver best outcome. The most appropriate or likely) policy tools used here, per Weimer and Vining (2017), include the ability to deregulate, facilitate and stimulate markets; manipulate incentives through subsidies and taxes; establish rules; supply goods through nonmarket avenues; and provide insurance and cushions as economic protection. Still on the TANF example, Weimer and

Vining's (2017) policy tool used here would likely be through subsidies with certain rules attached.

Stone's (1997) tools for TANF are based on inducements, rules, facts, rights, and powers whereby the author specifically would use inducements to get recipients off welfare under established rules.

Schneider and Ingram's (1993) list of tools includes capacity-building inducements (entitlements and subsidies); standards and charges to discourage certain actions like pollution; other subsidies that may or may not demand eligibility requirement (direct payment to farmers or college students); symbolic (battered women reliance on police assistance); use of authority; and more coercive tools of use of sanctions, force and sometimes death. For TANF, Schneider and Ingram (1993) would apply capacity-building inducements such as entitlements and subsidies.

In identifying participants in the redistributive policymaking and implementation process, Wilson (1980) lists participants as careerists (maintaining agency's functions is their rewards); politicians (advancing their career outside of agency is paramount); and professionals (reward is maintaining their professional esteem or status). Participants for the TANF policy example under Wilson's (1980) framework are the careerists who maintain the agency's program.

Gormley's (1986) list of participants includes bureaucrats, regulated industry officials, politicians, citizens, journalists, judges, and professionals, all who may have individual agendas in mind. The recipients, taxed citizens, politicians, and program administrative bureaucrats are Gormley's (1986) TANF participants.

Schneider and Ingram (1993) label participants as targeted citizen groups (advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants) and the rulemaking agencies these groups interact with.

Schneider and Ingram's (1993) participants in TANF are the targeted welfare recipients and rulemaking agencies.

### ***Comparative public policy implications in West African governance***

The above-mentioned Western-style redistributive policy aspects highlighting justifications, policy toolsets, and who participates, may not apply at a level of good conscience governance in West Africa due to leaderships mired in corruption and malfeasance. Certain outcomes from such a scenario are bound to lead to compromised service and program deliveries by unaccountable civil servants, bureaucrats, and their citizen agents as direct testament to the practical side of the various theories and concepts reported in the literature review section in explaining corruption impact on West African public governance. The negative aspects of such ad hoc governance as practiced in West Africa even under the façade of democracy, are well-known, per Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002), to be: “procedures lack openness and clarity, officials are not publicly accountable for their actions and therefore government is indifferent to citizen demands and the need for public goods, public investment priorities are distorted, and so on” (p. 9). In this landscape, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) further postulate that the relationships between the patrons and clients may become compromised by misunderstanding and manipulation because no independent entity keeps an eye on them. The throughline might well be that the client, as the subordinate party, may conveniently be taken advantage of or harmed by other means he cannot control. At the same time, large segments of society comprising mostly the poor and uneducated may suffer because they are completely excluded from these transactions. Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002), however, maintain that there could be a silver lining of some offsetting gains from these same practices that would include “the

appeasement of elites and the integration of ordinary people into the governing system and society” (p. 9).

The silver lining commentary above may undergird what Hutchcroft (1997), and Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) characterize as institutional dualism. They argue that “most underground or quasi-legal governance practices such as political patronage are neither good nor bad in themselves” (p. 9). The authors support this conundrum of a position on the grounds that only outcomes are important, and they can vary to serve multiple purposes. The extrapolation here can be measured in terms of, for example, how it might be quite easier “to see the harm caused by clientelistic politics and patrimonial administration than it is to observe their positive features...as no governance system could operate effectively without some degree of institutional dualism, some balance among ‘bad’ informal practices and ‘good’ formal ones” (p. 9). This is especially so because it may appear every institution, democratic or otherwise, has the potential to exude some benefit as well as harm, with the key being “the degree of reciprocity, or how much citizens get back from these customs and relationships” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002, p. 9).

As much as the ideals of institutional dualism also apply in West African governance, its approach may weigh even more negatively in this society of low sustainable productivity and high inequality. In order for an effective government to take hold and properly serve all in such environment, it must be willing to understand and assimilate the “cultural and socio-political context of the country, including underlying social relations and traditions, basic characteristics of the state and the economy, and the range of choices available to citizens” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002, p. 22). Such rationale is just as paramount in fully recognizing, interpreting, and respecting culture and social relations and their collective impacts on what the authors



describe as the fundamental “balance of power among social groups, the depth of dependency relations among these groups and classes, and the super relative extent to which poor people rely on the power elites in government for land, credit, and other resources” (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002, p. 22). It is also in this setting clientelism and its many hues can successfully operate because the private sector can be relatively diminished due to its lesser financial footing and therefore expediently corroborative with government defrauding schemes, thus leaving the public sector as the major source of financial and many other types of economic handouts. The visible warning signs of malfeasance could come in the form of non-transparency in policymaking and inequitable redistributive resource allocations to the greater society through manipulations of government rules and regulations, or whether the government elites are engaged in blatant ransack of the national treasury and enriching themselves with the loot. This scenario would leave the unfortunate citizens with no choice but to seize the opportunity to engage in petty corruption activities themselves to offset the pains of deprivation in order to sustain their daily livelihoods.

In closing out the public policy implications section, the study invokes Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2011) in asserting a Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s (2007) quote. It best sums up the link between implementing effective public policies and the constrained will manifested by limits of weak or maligned West African leaderships plagued by societal ravages of corruption that would prevent them from honoring their constitutional and moral obligations to the citizens.

Government effectiveness is defined by Kaufmann et al. (2007) as capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (p. 330).

All these safety-net attributes could be in peril if governing bodies and controlled societies in West Africa operate in the cloud of corruption that runs counter to the true import of public policy which would render its purpose naked and meaningless.

Meanwhile, this study hopes that, through its literature discovery and presentation, it has contributed to academics and practitioners alike in further understanding and advancing knowledge. The gist is to recognize how public policy implementation may comparatively vary in regions (that is, West Africa in particular versus the West to include Western Europe and the United States specifically) on political, socio-economic, and cultural grounds when explaining impacts of corruption on the efficient grease theory as related to institutional decision-making. The remaining chapters are geared to strengthen this aspiration.

### **Literature Gap Analysis**

Many empirical studies have been conducted to evaluate the impact of corruption on political institutions in various world regions. Some of these scholarly works measured corruption's negative effect (Della Porta, 2000; Seligson, 2002; Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Chang & Chu, 2006; Cho & Kirwin, 2007; Ogundiya, 2009; Ijewereme (2015) while others advocated the position that corruption is an essential element that produces positive economic growth and other benefits in governing (Shils, 1960; Leff, 1964; Bayley, 1967; Huntington, 1968, 1973; Becker & Maher, 1986; Becquart-Leclercq, 1989; Acemoglu & Verdier, 1998). The two views respectively represent the new way (corruption is detrimental) / old-way (corruption can reasonably be healthy) rationalization of the value and impact of corruption as noted in the general discussion presented above in the literature review on debating the negative and positive consequences of corruption in running governments. These expressions simply validate there is notable interest in an effort to

understand and explain what corruption entails in governing, and for the purpose of this dissertation, especially in West African political institutions.

Various data sources to measure different perspectives of African corruption have been employed, including those from Transparency International's interpretation of its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of government malfeasance and Afrobarometer surveys. For example, Warf (2017) used data from Transparency International to assess African corruption empirically and geographically, and linked its levels of severity using correlations to gross domestic product per capita, literacy, income inequality and freedom of the media. His evaluation covered select countries from different regions of the continent. Lavallée et al. (2008) assessed and rejected the "efficient grease" hypothesis that corruption can strengthen citizens' trust since bribe paying and clientelism open the door to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies, and that this can increase citizens' trust in their institutions. The focus of that study was on sub-Saharan Africa.

This dissertation encapsulates some elements of data gathering and structures of Warf (2017) whose study was based on selective variables for a single year (2014) only, and Lavallée et al. (2008) who exclusively used Afrobarometer surveys. Lavallée et al. (2008) based their data selections from what are called rounds, which represent different periods in time (years) covering a select number of countries. They studied Round 2 (2002 to 2003) and Round 3 (2005 to 2006) comprising 15 sub-Saharan African nations.

This dissertation, on the other hand, collects data for 14 of the 16 West African countries – with two missing data – as first mentioned in the introductory chapter. The Afrobarometer surveys data here are for Rounds 6, 7 and 8 (2014 to 2021), with the year 2016 unavailable in Round 7. Its use of the data is to test the "efficient grease" hypothesis as well, and it achieves

similar findings but with additional benchmarks in testing corruption at the individual institutional level.

A more robust data volume could have been obtained from Afrobarometer Round 1 to Round 8 - Round 8 being this study's cutoff point - to measure consistency of corruption events over a longer period, but the process to accomplish that had some heavy limitations.

Nevertheless, characteristics of data collected for this study might suggest that applied survey timeframes are sufficient to evaluate and test the efficient grease theory even with more data spread than that orchestrated by Lavallée et al. (2008) in presenting their findings. Most importantly, the dissertation also expands its cognitive variable selections beyond what Warf (2017), Lavallée et al. (2008), or some of the other scholars mentioned in this segment utilized. More of this rationale shall come into focus in Chapter 4, Data Analysis.

## CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter shall formulate the research design and methodology path chosen for the study as well as present the research question and hypotheses.

### **Design**

Many scholars have long concluded that the central task of social science research is to capture the essence of how to make things better by improving some specific practice or correcting a set of phenomena to head in the proper direction to holistically benefit humanity (Fraenkel & Wallen, 2003). Sekaran (2000) characterizes research as a systematic and organized effort to investigate a specific problem in order to provide a solution with the intention to perhaps add new knowledge, investigate existing theories or develop new ones, all of which can be established, if proven, as generalized evidence. There are three basic categories of research, per Creswell (2008), classified as quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003), Driscoll, Afua, Salib, and Douglas (2007) further break down the classifications as follows: Quantitative research is about collecting and analyzing numerical data for statistical testing of hypotheses, measurement of variables and their relationships. Qualitative research leans more towards the collecting and analyzing of non-numerical data such as words and images to understand meanings, patterns, or experiences. Mixed research methods attempt to comprehensively answer the research question by merging both qualitative and quantitative approaches in holistic fashion.

It is therefore the positivist, experimental, or empiricist method quantitative research exudes and is embedded in the natural sciences that further explicitly paves the way to inquire into an identified problem thereby giving more weight of assurance in finding unambiguous and accurate knowledge of the world (Crotty, 1998). The positivist nature of quantitative research is

based on objective, and reproducible measures and reasonably logical assumptions that there is still a set of universal laws existing in the real world yet to be discovered (Cavana, Delahaye & Sekaran, 2000). In locating these universal laws, Fraenkel and Wallen (2003) assert that the goal of quantitative method should be to determine whether the predictive generalizations of a theory based on scientific testing hold true, as they concern themselves with how much, how well, or to whom the investigative issues may ultimately apply.

In so many ways it can be deduced that the research design is the set of logical sequence of processes and procedures that would connect the research question, empirical data and their analyses, theoretical findings, and conclusions. In effect, the research design is a strategy for answering research questions using empirical data (McCombes, 2023). It is in that vein that this dissertation chooses observational descriptive design which invariably incorporates some of both quantitative and qualitative research attributes discussed above, including (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000) their deductive nature. Cross sectional data collection, which falls under observational descriptive study, is done so for a particular group, population, or individuals in their natural setting (Carlson & Morrison, 2009) at a specific period in time based on observations about some phenomena present in that population without manipulations of the variables or introducing any form of interventions. Such variables, for example in the interest of this study, would include corruption perception and experience, age, gender, education level, living conditions, etc. Wooldridge (2009, 2006) refers to such collected non-experimental data as retrospective data because the product is assembled by the researcher who is only acting in a capacity as a passive collector.

There are strengths (advantages) and weaknesses (disadvantages) associated with using observational descriptive design. For the purpose of this dissertation, some strengths of the

design, as purported by George (2023) and Rezigalla (2020), would include: It is usually quite straightforward to conduct, since the researcher just observes participant behavior as it happens or utilize preexisting data. This design allows inferences to be drawn from studying subjects that cannot be randomized safely (randomized, nonetheless), efficiently, or those with overt ethical difficulties. Most importantly, it reliably serves estimation of prevalence which Rezigalla (2020) characterizes as a proportion of a population who has a specific characteristic in a given time period. For this dissertation, prevalence could measure up to, for instance, the percentage of the population in West Africa who trusts their institutions, the percentage who believes their government officials are corrupt, or that the level of public services provided by the government is subpar and quite deplorable. Two of the prime weaknesses George (2023) and Rezigalla (2020) touch on are the difficulty in deriving causal relationships and vulnerabilities to certain biases as observer bias and omitted variable bias (OVB). Difficulty in forming causal relationships surmises conclusive results may not be complete enough to make them generalizable or externally valid, thus creating opportunities for further research. Observer bias is when researchers' expectations, opinions, or prejudices influence what they perceive or record in a study simply because they possess firsthand awareness of the research aims and hypotheses. OVB, on the other hand, happens when one or more relevant independent variables are not included (that is, variables are unobserved or hidden) in the design or regression model, which could cause misinterpretation of important factors in data analysis and hence results.

Per Fraenkel and Wallen (2003), the extant purpose of observational descriptive research is to become more familiar with phenomena, to gain new insight, and to formulate a more specific research problem or hypothesis. In that regard, according to Grove, Burns, and Gray (2013), observational descriptive designs “may be used to develop theory, identify problems with

current practice, make judgments, or determine what other similar situations are doing” (p. 215). In validating such task, Kerlinger and Lee (2000) assert that researchers in this scenario would not be able to directly control independent variables as their meanings have already been manifested and therefore are not manipulable. In other words, variables must be measured without influencing or controlling them unlike in experimental research (McCombes, 2023). The application of such observation is better suited for this dissertation’s objective of analyzing the interaction between corruption and trust in institutions and how this relationship would support citizens’ perception of the “efficient grease” theory in service delivery under West African governance. Further justifications for selecting the observational descriptive design amenable to this study are presented below.

There are additional reasons to present here for adopting observational descriptive design to append the analysis of West African corruption research. For starters, the design has no comparison or treatment groups to measure changes as all countries of interest are treated at the same time, and variable selections are random. When such defining characteristics are set in motion using pooled cross sectional survey data, McCombes (2023) and Geertz (1973) surmise robust analytical information can be obtained for frequencies, averages, percentages, trends, categories, and patterns to describe, for instance, demographics of a country or region, and can also gauge and impact public policy decisions on political, economic, cultural, and other social justice concerns.

A snapshot in time of the qualifying data collected can be gleaned from this setup. Such snapshots, according to Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991), can help describe what is happening or has already happened in terms of attitudes, opinions, or behaviors that are observed or measured at a given time and in a given environment from which to draw conclusions. It is extremely



important to maintain that one-time assessment of the sample respondents to mitigate losing what McNabb (2010) refers to as an effort to uphold a picture of the sample that has the propensity to change especially if the research is repeated at a future date even with a different sample from the same population group. To that end, this dissertation is attempting to assess a sustained West African general population's attitudes, perceptions, and raw experiences towards their interactions with the various institutions and if they can be trusted in many service area deliveries. From that perspective in assessing the population in this study, expected responses to the what, where, and when questions are on the table. However, per McCombes (2023), the "why" and "how" questions are not always clearly resolved but can still be provoked even if results do not respond to a cause-and-effect reasoning. Presumably, exploring answers to the latter questions is the reason future research activities may be conducted as recommended aspiration by this study.

Finally, observational descriptive design is maintained as the best research roadmap for this dissertation. It is primarily so because it fittingly describes the population makeup of individuals, groups, activities, events, and situations. As validated by Geertz (1973), analysis of the generalized population can provide significant details, meanings, and context from the perspective of their own experiences and the lives they have endured in the past, are living now, and what they aspire the future to hold for them. This collective information set is quantifiable enough to present deductive rationality about the region of interest. That is the crux of this study which is to discover West African citizens' attitudes towards how they individually experience corruption, how they process their perceptions about corrupt activities, and how those entities impact the way they engage with their political institutions for accessing public services. This observational descriptive design, therefore, creates an opportunity to assess the heartbeat of the

studied region if the link between corruption and trust in political institutions is offset by the weight of the efficient grease theory associated with West African governance.

## **Method**

The dissertation uses ordinary least squares (OLS) as the more appropriate linear regression statistical model to better support predictive analysis of characteristics of majority of the variables in the study which are ordinal and thus subscribe to Likert scale (Boone & Boone, 2012; Likert, 1932) interpretations. Notable exceptions are age (ratio/ordinal), gender (binary), and residency (binary, as either urban or rural).

The data structure executed in the OLS models for this dissertation is pooled cross-sectional, again with emphasis on OLS being the leading method of estimation for this type of data per Wooldridge (2009, 2006). This is so because pooled cross-sectional data track randomly selected samples of individuals, groups, populations at one point in time, usually in years. Notably, the samplings are new each time for these multiple cross sections, as pooled cross-sectional studies do not follow up with individuals over time, and are therefore unlike other observational designs used in that respect, for instance, as in case studies (Wang & Cheng, 2020). This characteristic of the data structure makes it more amenable to observational study as this dissertation ascribes to. Similar limitations and strengths in using pooled cross-sectional data are manifested in the observational descriptive design discussion above.

Per Wooldridge (2009, 2006), this data structure is important for policy analysis when measuring the effect of new government policies compared to previous time periods, for instance. In that regard, the upshot to using pooled cross-sectional data arrangement in the interest of this dissertation would be how a key relationship would have changed over time. This connectivity is how the relationship between corruption and trust in government institutions

would be interpreted for West Africa at the policy level if such opportunities were ever entertained in earnest. Data to accomplish such a comparative analysis would entail, as an expressed core of this study for example, the gathering of three waves (rounds) of data from the starting point of 2014, continuing with future waves of the same fourteen West African countries, if possible, through 2021. The unit of analysis here is the citizen of the country within the study year.

All the while, overall inferential statistics can be explained with fixed effects as related to pooled cross-sectional data. Fixed effects guards against possible unbalanced secondary Afrobarometer survey data, now restructured and characterized as pooled cross-sectional, employed in this study as part of an estimation of data integrity. Fixed effects, per Wooldridge (2009, 2006), count towards corrections for heteroskedasticity that usually plagues OLS method. This is when residuals, the differences between observed and predicted values of impacted variables, do not maintain constant variance (Wooldridge, 2009, 2006). Such unequal residual scatterings or error terms characteristics of heteroskedasticity, meaning the variance of the errors varies across observations, usually cause a problem for OLS regression which assumes that the residuals come from a population that maintains constant variance (Long & Ervin, 2000). It makes it difficult then to trust the results of the analysis when heteroscedasticity is present in a regression, thus rendering OLS estimator inefficient. Application of fixed effects in this dissertation to curb heteroscedasticity is about controlling for country-specific effects of the 14 countries covering 2014 to 2021. In this study then, the overarching reason for introducing fixed effects is that it acts as a tool for controlling differences over time in the countries studied in the pooled cross-sectional data. Fixed effects, in other words, removes potential omitted variable

bias by measuring unique changes and demeaning them within countries across time. In that respect, fixed effects essentially operates like a control variable.

OLS models in the study use regression standard deviation, *ceteris paribus*, as instruments to interpret results of how corruption experienced, corruption perceived, and delivery of public service quality are related to changes in trusting political institutions in West African governments. The ability of standard deviation to express associated change up or down in linking independent variables and dependent variables makes it easier to understand and explain policy implications from what is being investigated or applied.

Another element of interpretation is established when a multiplicative interaction of select variables is engaged in a complementary OLS model to evaluate the efficient grease hypothesis represented in Table 36 as it relates to its nexus with corruption and institutional trust. This can be accomplished by including a multiplicative term in the regression as a product of two independent variables that provide interacting effects on the dependent variable (Friedrich, 1982; Gill, 2001; Hainmueller, Mummolo, Xu, 2019). A linear interaction regression format offered by Friedrich (1982, p. 798) to do just that is

$$Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_1X_2 + e$$

where  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  are multiplied to create an interaction term. In this study, corruption and public service quality variables respectively mirror  $X_1$  and  $X_2$  to create the efficient grease construct variables *Corruption Experienced times Public Service Quality*, *Corruption Perceived times Public Service Quality*, and *Corruption (Corruption Experienced and Corruption Perceived combined) times Public Service Quality* all which serve as individual interaction terms described in Table 36 of the results chapter. Associated robust standard error output also helps guide explanation of these relationships.

## Research question and hypotheses

Many perceptions and experiences are documented (Warf, 2017; Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002; de Sardan, 1999) about insidious corruption activities in greater Africa, but this study's interests lie in the specific region of West Africa. The overt scholarly reaction to this injurious and hindering challenge to societal progress, especially those of the political and socio-economic kind, in this part of the world categorically leaves an important question on the table about the seeming operationalization of this practice. Certainly, some (Leff, 1964; Becquart-Leclercq, 1989; Acemoglu & Verdier, 1998; Lavallée et al., 2008; Ronning, 2009) claim its benefits while others (Della Porta, 2000; Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Ogundiya, 2009; Ijewereme (2015) lament its vulnerabilities as well in governance. This leads to the following research question for the dissertation:

Does "efficient grease" theory hold in West Africa? Efficient grease in this respect is defined as the assumption corruption practices can strengthen and increase citizens' institutional trust in West African governments through bribe paying and clientelism that coopt access to scarce services not readily and equally available to all.

The following hypotheses render context to the research question in evaluating the impact of corruption at various intersections of governing as to who gets what at what costs from a pivot of institutional trust.

**H<sub>a1</sub>:** Reported Corruption (experienced, perceived and/or a combined index) is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa.

**H<sub>a2</sub>:** Reported Public service quality is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa.

**H<sub>a3</sub>:** The interactive effect of Corruption and Public service quality is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa.

## CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS

This chapter evaluates the data for the study and normalizes their meanings from descriptive statistics perspective. First, the source of the data and collection method are narrated. This is followed by defining all the pertinent variables used in the study. The data analysis focuses on describing and summarizing the data in the form of frequencies that highlight percentages of occurrences of both dependent and independent variable categories and their relationships. Such variable interconnections shall be projected as input to Chapter 5 for comparative result tabulations when OLS regressions assess the impactful relationships among institutional trust, corruption (experienced and perceived), and public service quality. A specific OLS model shall test the “efficient grease” theory via a multiplicative interaction measure in further exploring and analyzing the trust-corruption-public service quality nexus as an extended consequence of government operational red tape with questionable policy implication.

### **Data source**

The data source for this study comes from Afrobarometer surveys. The following narrative framing that research organization and how this dissertation uses its pooled cross-sectional data (introduced in Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology) is derived from publicly available information from Afrobarometer referential links and associated codebooks (Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey Manual, 2014; Afrobarometer Round 7 Survey Manual, 2017; Afrobarometer Round 8 Survey Manual, 2019). All invoked references from these links are therefore direct expressions applied to not only the data sources, but also to the data collection segment that comes below later.

Per the collective link sources above, Afrobarometer describes itself as an independent pan-African research network that provides data on African citizens’ values, evaluations, experiences,

and perspectives. This is done, for instance, by conducting public attitude surveys on corruption, access to services and infrastructure, government and leadership performance, poverty and living conditions, political participation, democracy, governance, the economy, and society in general. In aggregate, these surveys attempt to measure citizens' actual experiences of deprivation of basic necessities that may include, for example, food, water, and medical care, even if such calculations to some degree may appear subservient to higher-level macro-economic indicators usually embedded in a country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) accounting. Further attention is also given not just to access to public services such as electricity and clean water supply, but also how the quality and reliability of those services the government can provide do measure up.

Such findings can generally be disseminated to policymakers, policy advocates, civil society organizations, academics, news media, intergovernmental funders and investors, and ordinary Africans at the national, regional, continental, and global levels. At the country level, survey results can be used to establish citizens' policy initiative and priorities, to react to anti-corruption and human rights commissions demands, to track performance at various government institutions, and monitor impact of such policy decisions. Other stakeholders at the regional, continental, and international levels include the likes of the African Union, the African Development Bank, and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. According to Afrobarometer's general sources cited above, its primary goal is to share the views of ordinary citizens in order to amplify their voices in policymaking and decision-making processes that affect their lives.

Possible important benefit to Africa's development, if these survey results are taken seriously, would be that the citizen's voice would have transcribed public opinion as a pillar of democracy in African policy and decision making. As succinctly pointed out by Afrobarometer's

own judgment, before its survey network came on to the scene, very little was known about the values, preferences, or knowledge of ordinary Africans. Rather, so-called experts, intellectual elites, media, opinion leaders, and politicians claimed to know what ordinary Africans thought, and to speak for them. Through Afrobarometer data used in research, there are plenty of opportunities that now allow Africans to speak for themselves (Afrobarometer, 2023).

### **Data collection approach**

As discussed above in the data source segment, Afrobarometer conducts a comparative series of public attitude surveys particular to African nations that explore and measure citizen attitudes about democracy and governance, economy, and corruption, including many other related civil society topics. These surveys have been undertaken at periodic intervals called “rounds” since 1999. The number of countries in each round has progressively increased over time. This dissertation’s study period uses data from Round 6 (2014 to 2015), Round 7 (2017 to 2018), and Round 8 (2019 to 2021) for a total of a seven-year coverage timeline. Data for 2016 is not available. The study also employs only 14 of the 16 countries that make up the West African region, excluding Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania because they lack data. Table 2 below provides additional summary information on data stratification used in the dissertation.



**Table 2: Round data schematic**

	<b>Round year ending</b>	<b>Years reported</b>	<b># of countries included</b>	<b># of observations</b>	<b>Author inserted country code variable</b>	<b>Author inserted round # variable</b>	<b>Author inserted round year variable</b>
<b>Round 6</b>	2015	2014 2015	12	16,789	country_code	round	round_yr
<b>Round 7</b>	2018	2017 2018	11	14,794	country_code	round	round_yr
<b>Round 8</b>	2021	2019 2020 2021	14	18,398	country_code	round	round_yr
<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>49,981</b>			

*Source: Author's summary using Afrobarometer Survey for Rounds 6, 7 & 8 (2014 to 2021) data*

**NOTES:**

**Round year ending** is reported survey year and is supported by accompanying codebooks.

**Years reported** are the number of years covered in the rounds. All 3 rounds account for 7 years of data: 2014 to 2021, with 2016 missing.

**# of countries included** indicate only West African countries with data in the study. Guinea-Bissau & Mauritania have no data for any round. In addition, also Round 6 is missing data for Gambia & Guinea; Round 7 is missing data for Gambia, Liberia & Sierra Leone. Overall, 16 countries make up West Africa, when counting Guinea-Bissau & Mauritania. But study covers only 14.

**# of observations** give observation count for each round. Grand total is 49,981.

**Author inserted country\_code variable** to assign number / label to each country in alphabetical order.

**Author inserted round # variable** to coincide with round numbers of 6, 7 and 8.

**Author inserted round\_yr variable** to coincide with round-end years 2015, 2018, and 2021.

The gist of the survey is Afrobarometer relies predominantly on personal interviews to obtain information from individual respondents. It begins when a standard questionnaire, which contains identical or functionally equivalent items, is applied to every respondent in each country. Because questions are standardized, responses can be compared across countries.

Per Afrobarometer documentary sources cited above, in conducting the personal interview, the well-trained interviewer goes to a randomly selected household and interviews a randomly selected adult individual -- that is anyone defined as citizen aged 18 and above -- from that household. Thus, every adult citizen has an equal chance of being selected as a respondent. It must be noted that randomness is an important characteristic that undergirds observational descriptive design which is uniquely purposed for this dissertation as emphasized in the design and method discussion in Chapter 3. The interviewer asks this respondent a series of questions in a face-to-face situation and in the language of the respondent's choice. The interviewer records the responses (the answers) provided by the respondent, using electronic tablets, with the interview process usually lasting about an hour. According to Afrobarometer, there are seemingly three advantages to this approach: a) The survey response rate is usually high; b) Refusal rates are very low; and c) The respondents are afforded the opportunity to clarify their answers. As a result, per Afrobarometer, this method enables it to make reliable inferences about public opinion from aggregating these responses.

Since Afrobarometer surveys are based on national probability samples, the aggregated response results are meant to represent larger groups, with sample sizes ranging from 1,200 to 2,400. Both sample sizes are large enough to make inferences about all voting age citizens. Afrobarometer reports its country-level average margin of sampling error to be no more than plus or minus 2.8 percent at a 95 percent confidence level with a sample size of 1,200 or plus, or

minus 2 percent for sample sizes of 2,400. Even though within-country weights are included in the Afrobarometer surveys, this dissertation does not employ them. Therefore, this study's survey is more precisely representative of the respondents rather than representative of the entire population in the country.

The data collected in this fashion with such a high degree of confidence level support how well the comparative analyses of testing the trust-corruption-public service quality and their nexus to the efficient grease theory hold true. The discussion now moves to defining and characterizing variables associated with this dissertation.

### **Dependent variables defined**

This dissertation works with two measures of corruption: citizens' actual experiences with petty corruption (experienced) and perceptions of the general prevalence of corruption among politicians and public officials (perceived). These corruption indicators are then extended to public service quality for citizens to determine intersectionality with trust in political institutions. A related examination to locate an efficient grease nexus – the deterministic focus of the study - is derived from this trust-corruption-public service relationship. Both dependent and independent variables influence the outcomes.

All the dependent variables and select independent variables (the remaining independent variables are standalone) in this study are not single-item variables. Rather, they are a set or group of variables that measure the same underlying construct in this dissertation whose survey questions are predominantly based on Likert format. Acquiring Cronbach's alpha coefficients is appropriate in establishing levels of fitness of these separate variables from a Likert scale in building a single construct – dependent or independent variable.

Cronbach's alpha, as a statistical scaling method, is used to measure reliability of internal consistency or item interrelatedness of a scale or test (Cronbach, 1951). Reliability here applies to the data, and not the scale or test measure. According to Cho and Kim (2015) and Cortina (1993), internal consistency is the extent that all items on a scale or test can contribute positively towards measuring the same construct. This makes internal consistency reliability relevant to composite scores, which is summing all items (variables) of the scale or test to ascertain how correlated they are with each other in measuring the same thing. What is significant to note here is that Cronbach's alpha is usually reported in scales ranging from 0 to 1, with the larger values representing more reliability (Cortina, 1993), meaning there is a closer correlation among the variables for near perfect consistency in measurement.

The same scaling practice described above is fully applied in this study. Furthermore, its impacted dependent and independent variables with multiple items relating to the same construct are given detailed explanations in associated Cronbach's alpha generated tables in Appendix A.

It is noted, for the record, that Appendix B, Table 24 displays all relevant sourced variables used in this dissertation. There are five ordinal dependent variables for this study. They are *Trust in Political Institutions*, *Corruption Experienced*, *Corruption Perceived*, *Public Service Quality*, and *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services*. As described earlier, each dependent variable is built from related multiple variables through Cronbach's alpha methodology, with accumulated individual alpha scores indicating ranges of internal consistency and reliability of the variables. Again, values closer to 1 indicate a greater internal consistency of the variables in the scale, meaning higher Cronbach's alpha values show greater scale reliability.

## **Trust in Political Institutions**

The Cronbach's alpha computed composite value of trust in political institutions is 0.9 (Appendix A, Table 11), indicating a very high variable internal consistency and reliability exist.

The dependent variable *Trust in Political Institutions* is constructed from eight individual variables that ask for citizens' responses about their level of trust in specific political institutions. These ordinal variables are *Trust President*, *Trust Parliament National Assembly*, *Trust Electoral Commission*, *Trust Ruling Party*, *Trust Opposition Political Party*, *Trust Police*, *Trust Courts of Law*, and *Trust Tax Revenue Office*.

The survey question is: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? The response choices are: 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 8=Refused, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard. The dissertation uses response selections of 2 and 3 to construct percentage of population with some level of trust in these specific political institutions. Higher averages of these two responses indicate greater trust in individual institutions.

Table 3 and its summary analysis of citizens' level of trust are presented below. Supporting information from the individual rounds is also found in Appendices C-Table 25, D-Table 28 and E-Table 31.

The study also presents a second analysis to gauge ordinary citizens' overall trust in political institutions on aggregate in their countries, still engaging the same individual dependent variables listed above. This time, the response selection of 3 ("a lot") is only to measure the percentage of the population who expresses greater trusts in political institutions in West Africa. Figure 4 and its summary analysis of citizens' trust aggregate are also explained below.

Supporting information from the individual rounds is also found in Appendices C-Figure 7, D-Figure 10, and E-Figure 13.

**Table 3: Percentage of population with some level of trust in these specific political institutions in West Africa (2014, 2015, 2017-2021)**

	<i>President</i>	<i>Parliament National Assembly</i>	<i>Electoral Commission</i>	<i>Ruling Party</i>	<i>Opposition Political Party</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Courts of Law</i>	<i>Tax Revenue Office</i>
<i>Benin</i>	26	24	23	21	18	28	26	14
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	32	30	30	17	16	37	28	17
	26							
<i>Gambia</i>	23	22	24	21	20	29	25	21
<i>Ghana</i>	28		24	25	21	19	24	12
<i>Guinea</i>	24	19	20	20	16	21	17	8
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	27	23						
<i>Liberia</i>	17	13	17	13	15	12	16	14
<i>Mali</i>	29							
<i>Niger</i>	33	29	31	29	26	40	36	22
<i>Nigeria</i>	19							
<i>Senegal</i>	31	21	24	20	19	39	30	17
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	27							
<i>Togo</i>	24	18	17	18	14	22	19	11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>26</b>							


Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 data

When the trust response in the survey is scaled to “somewhat” or “a lot”, this study’s sampling aggregated data across all three rounds (6, 7, and 8) indicate that the most trustworthy institutions are the presidency and police, respectively at 26 percent and 25 percent. For trust level of the presidency, Niger is at 33 percent, Burkina Faso at 32 percent, and Senegal at 31 percent. The police numbers are Niger 40 percent, Senegal 39 percent, and Burkina Faso 37 percent. The two least trusted institutions are the opposition political party at 18 percent and tax revenue officials at 15 percent. The lowest trust numbers for tax revenue officials are especially notable in Guinea (8 percent), Nigeria (10 percent), and Togo (11 percent), which suggests a much smaller segment of the population in these countries trust or have confidence in this particular institution. In assessing trust levels of individual countries, Niger, Burkina Faso, and

Senegal show high trust across most institutions in contrast to Liberia which comes in at a least trusting level across majority of the institutions.

On aggregate, the relative trust ranking of all the institutions seems close to each other when considering averaging the duality of the questions of “somewhat trusting” and “trusting a lot”. The result of this averaging of 21 percent trust in these institutions suggests that about a fifth of West Africa’s population have some level of trust in their presidency, parliament or national assembly, electoral commission, the ruling party, opposition political party, police, courts of law, and tax revenue office.

**Figure 4: Percentage of population who trusts political institutions in West Africa (2014, 2015, 2017-2021)**



Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey data Round 6 (2014-2015), Round 7 (2017-2018), Round 8 (2019-2021)

From sample data of the study, Figure 4 above indicates that West Africans are evenly split in trusting their political institutions in the aggregate, with Niger consistently being the most trusting in Round 6 (49.9 percent), Round 7 (41.9 percent), and Round 8 (33.1 percent). The translation here is Niger trusts its president, parliament, the electoral commission, ruling party,

opposition political party, police, courts of law, and tax officials. Of the three rounds, citizens of Burkina Faso report the second highest trust numbers. Liberia and Nigeria, on the other hand, contrastingly show the least trust in their political institutions. By the numbers, Liberia’s Round 6 is 9.7 percent, Round 7 has no data, and Round 8 is 12.4 percent. Nigeria, displaying the lowest trust of the entire study group, reports Round 6 at 7.5 percent, Round 7 at 13.5 percent, and Round 8 at 9.2 percent. Overall, about two-thirds of the West African countries that trust their political institutions fall between 18 to 28 percent ranking or a 23 percent average, indicating there is support for how governments operate in the region.

It is interesting to note, from a policy perspective, how the majority of Round 8 percentages recede from those of the previous two rounds, creating a picture which coincidentally corresponds to the 18 to 28 percent cluster reported above. Further, though this study’s survey does not include questions on the phenomenon, this author’s theory is that because Round 8 (2019 to 2021) took place at the height of Covid-19, there might have existed a valley of mistrust between citizens and their respective governments in handling the pandemic. This might have probably partially contributed to the backward slide of Round 8 numbers in a hidden form.

**Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - Trust Political Institutions 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8)**

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Trust Pol Institution	0.00	0.74	-1.55	4.35
Corruption	0.00	0.55	-1.37	4.83
Quality Admin Service	0.00	0.43	-0.99	3.24
Media Exposure	0.00	0.70	-1.57	4.70
Satisfied With Democracy	2.61	1.63	-1.00	9.00
Freedom of Speech	0.01	0.77	-4.24	5.17
Fair Equal Treatment	0.03	0.74	-1.31	7.11
Urban	1.69	0.46	1.00	2.00
Age	38.11	36.09	-1.00	999.00
Women	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.00
Country Economy	2.54	1.44	-1.00	9.00
Living Conditions	2.70	1.30	-1.00	9.00
Primary	0.26	0.84	0.00	3.00
High School	0.63	1.66	0.00	5.00
University	0.31	1.53	0.00	8.00
Observations	49981			



## Corruption Experienced

The Cronbach's alpha computed composite value of citizens who have experienced petty corruption in order to receive services is 0.6 (Appendix A, Table 12), indicating an acceptable but questionable variable consistency and reliability exist.

The ordinal dependent variable *Corruption Experienced* is constructed from five individual variables that ask citizens about their actual experiences with petty corruption. These ordinal variables are *Pay Bribe for Public School Service*, *Pay Bribe for Medical Care*, *Pay Bribe for Identity Document*, *Pay Bribe for Police Assistance*, and *Pay Bribe to Avoid Police*.

All response choices for the individual variables follow this pattern: 0=Never, 1=Once or twice, 2=A few times, 3=Often, 7=No contact, 8=Refused, 9=Don't know. The survey questions are:

Pay bribe for public school services -- How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a teacher or school official in order to get the services you needed from the schools?


Pay bribe for medical care -- How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a health worker or clinic or hospital staff in order to get the medical care you needed?

Pay bribe for identity document -- How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a government official in order to get the document you needed?

Pay bribe to receive police assistance -- How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a police officer in order to get the assistance you needed?

Pay bribe to avoid problem with police -- How often, if ever did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for a police officer in order to avoid a problem during one of these encounters?

The dissertation uses response selection of 1 (meaning, once or twice) to construct percentage of the population who paid bribes at least once or twice in the past 7 years for services. Figure 5 and its summary analysis of citizens' actual experience in paying bribes are presented below. Supporting information from the individual rounds is also found in Appendices C-Figure 8, D-Figure 11, and E-Figure 14.



Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey data Round 6 (2014-2015), Round 7 (2017-2018), Round 8 (2019-2021)

As has been noted throughout this data analysis chapter, the study intends to assess how a combination of petty corruption experienced and the perception that corruption is commonplace in West African countries can impact institutional trust. Secondly, the outcome of such assessment is at the core of the efficient grease theory. Discussion on corruption perception as a dependent variable shall follow this corruption experienced segment.

In assessing petty corruption experienced, focus is on whether a citizen in the past seven years has actually had to pay bribes, give gifts, perform some acts of favor for any government official in order, for instance, to place a child into a school, to get access to needed medical care,

to get a document such as driver’s license, landownership deed or other official permit, to obtain police assistance, or avoid problem with police officer even if the encounter was a minor traffic infraction.

Based on the survey, about 79 percent of the population, or 11 out of the 14 West African countries, clustered responses suggest approximately 4 to 6 percent of the region’s inhabitants have personally experienced corruption through citizens’ petty bribe paying activities in the past seven years. Liberia and Cabo Verde are opposite extremes on the spectrum. Interestingly, bribe paying worsens in Round 8 for most of the countries compared to previous rounds on aggregate. Again, Liberia still leads in this category at 13.8 percent as the most corrupt nation in that time period while Cabo Verde, coming in less than a full percentage point of 0.6, boasts as the least corrupt country in the studied region.

**Table 5: Descriptive Statistics - Corruption Experienced 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8)**

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Corruption Experienced	-0.00	0.61	-1.93	1.46
Quality Admin Service	0.00	0.43	-0.99	3.24
Media Exposure	0.00	0.70	-1.57	4.70
Satisfied With Democracy	2.61	1.63	-1.00	9.00
Freedom of Speech	0.01	0.77	-4.24	5.17
Fair Equal Treatment	0.03	0.74	-1.31	7.11
Urban	1.69	0.46	1.00	2.00
Age	38.11	36.09	-1.00	999.00
Women	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.00
Country Economy	2.54	1.44	-1.00	9.00
Living Conditions	2.70	1.30	-1.00	9.00
Primary	0.26	0.84	0.00	3.00
High School	0.63	1.66	0.00	5.00
University	0.31	1.53	0.00	8.00
Observations	49981			

## Scale of Perceived Corruption

The Cronbach's alpha computed composite value of citizens' perceptions of West African institutional corruption is 0.9 (Appendix A, Table 13), indicating a very high variable internal consistency and reliability exist.

The ordinal dependent variable *Corruption Perceived* is constructed from six individual variables that ask about citizens' various perceptions of general prevalence of corruption among politicians, public officials, and overall bureaucracy. These ordinal variables are *Office of the Presidency*, *Member of Parliament National Assembly*, *Civil Servants*, *Police*, *Judges and Magistrates*, and *Tax Officials*.

All response choices for the individual variables follow this pattern: 0=None, 1=Some of them, 2=Most of them, 3=All of them, 8=Refused, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard. The survey question is: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Office of the Presidency (The President and Officials in his / her Office), Members of Parliament / National Assembly, Civil Servants, Police, Judges and Magistrates, and Tax / Revenue Officials.

The dissertation uses response selections of 2 (Most of them) and 3 (All of them) to construct percentage of the population who think the named individual government officials fit the profile reputation of being corrupt or having corruption tendencies before agreeing to provide services in the past 7-year period. Table 6 and its summary analysis of citizens' perceptions of corruption of government officials in West Africa are presented below. Supporting information from the individual rounds is also found in Appendices C-Table 26, D-Table 29, and E-Table 32.

**Table 6: Percentage of population with perceptions most or all of the following are involved in corruption in West Africa (2014, 2015, 2017-2021)**

	<i>Presidency</i>	<i>Parliament National Assembly</i>	<i>Civil Servants</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Judges &amp; Magistrates</i>	<i>Tax Revenue Officials</i>
<i>Benin</i>	22	23	23	26	23	
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	13	15	17	14	16	12
<i>Cabo Verde</i>	6	7	8	11	5	
<i>Gambia</i>	21	16	17	24	20	22
<i>Ghana</i>	18	19	20	30	21	
<i>Guinea</i>	24	22	24	27	30	13
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	14	15	16	26	18	
<i>Liberia</i>	29	33	28	36	26	29
<i>Mali</i>	22	23	24	27	29	
<i>Niger</i>	12	13	13	14	12	8
<i>Nigeria</i>	23	28	26	34	23	
<i>Senegal</i>	13	14	14	18	14	10
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	21	23	21	30	20	
<i>Togo</i>	22	22	22	25	26	17
	<b>19</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>	

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 data

The intent of the above questions in generating this composite dependent variable is to ferret out a commonplace understanding about the listed government entities' reputation dissociated from whether a citizen has ever been approached directly or indirectly to pay bribes in exchange for receiving public services. Again, the merit of this phenomenon appears to be strictly presumptive from the perspective of the general population. Based on the survey data, West Africans believe about a fifth (20 percent) to nearly a quarter (24 percent) of their political institutions are involved in corrupt practices. The police come across all three rounds (Rounds 6, 7, and 8) perceived as the most disreputable institution. The translation here is that close to a quarter (24 percent) of the West African people believe that most or all their police officers are corrupt. Furthermore, about a third of the nations in the region (Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone) score between 30 percent to 36 percent on police perceived corruption which is significantly higher than the posted average of 24 percent. According to the survey data, tax officials (15 percent) are considered the least corrupt, followed by the office of the presidency

(19 percent). It is also notable that Liberia’s citizen perception of corrupt officials is highest across almost all its institutions. With those numbers, Liberia in fact leads all the other countries in the study perceived as the most corrupt.

**Table 7: Descriptive Statistics - Corruption Perceived 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8)**

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Corruption Perceived	0.00	0.86	-1.38	8.94
Quality Admin Service	0.00	0.43	-0.99	3.24
Media Exposure	0.00	0.70	-1.57	4.70
Satisfied With Democracy	2.61	1.63	-1.00	9.00
Freedom of Speech	0.01	0.77	-4.24	5.17
Fair Equal Treatment	0.03	0.74	-1.31	7.11
Urban	1.69	0.46	1.00	2.00
Age	38.11	36.09	-1.00	999.00
Women	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.00
Country Economy	2.54	1.44	-1.00	9.00
Living Conditions	2.70	1.30	-1.00	9.00
Primary	0.26	0.84	0.00	3.00
High School	0.63	1.66	0.00	5.00
University	0.31	1.53	0.00	8.00
Observations	49981			

## Public Service Quality

The Cronbach’s alpha computed composite value of citizens’ satisfaction level of public service delivery quality in West Africa is 0.8 (Appendix A, Table 14), indicating a high variable consistency and reliability exist.


The ordinal dependent variable *Public Service Quality* is constructed from five individual variables that ask citizens how satisfied they are with the quality of public services the government is providing. These ordinal variables are *Handle improving health services*, *Handle addressing educational needs*, *Handle providing water and sanitation services*, *Handle maintaining roads and bridges*, and *Handle providing reliable electricity*.

All response choices for the individual variables follow this pattern: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 8=Refused, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough.

The survey question is: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Improving basic health services, Addressing educational needs, Providing water and sanitation services, Maintaining roads and bridges, and Providing a reliable supply of electricity?

The dissertation uses response selection 4 (Very well) to construct percentage of the population who say they are satisfied with the quality of public services the government has provided in the past 7 years. Figure 6 and its summary analysis of citizens' level of satisfaction with public service quality in West Africa are presented below. Supporting information from the individual rounds is also found in Appendices C-Figure 9, D-Figure 12, and E-Figure 15.

**Figure 6: Percentage of population satisfied with public service delivery quality the past 7 years in West Africa (2014, 2015, 2017-2021)**



Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey data Round 6 (2014-2015), Round 7 (2017-2018), Round 8 (2019-2021)

The survey questions attempt to evaluate the quality of public service delivery from viewpoints of citizen satisfaction barometer. This is measured in terms of how well the government delivers on its obligations to improve the lives of ordinary people in the areas of basic health services (clinics and hospital availability), addressing educational needs (enough

schooling opportunities throughout the country), providing water and sanitation services (safe drinking well or running water,) maintaining roads and bridges (manageable infrastructure to support trade, commerce, and greater opportunity of movement), and providing a reliable supply of electricity (mostly essential to the urban hub).

Ghana and Benin exhibit progressive movements in citizen satisfaction with services across all three rounds. Ghana jumps from 6.2 percent in Round 6 to almost tripling to 16.2 in Round 7, and finally edging up to 17.2 percent in Round 8. Benin follows in a similar fashion, but rather dramatically from the bottom of the pile at 3.5 percent in Round 6 to the second highest satisfied population group with service delivery at 14.7 in Round 8. Approximately, 79 percent of the countries in the studied region show disimproved trend in citizen satisfaction in Round 8 compared to the previous two rounds. Cabo Verde, Guinea, and Nigeria register the worst in this downward trend.

**Table 8: Descriptive Statistics - Public Service Quality 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8)**

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Pub Service Quality	-0.00	0.77	-2.61	5.11
Corruption	0.00	0.55	-1.37	4.83
Media Exposure	0.00	0.70	-1.57	4.70
Satisfied With Democracy	2.61	1.63	-1.00	9.00
Freedom of Speech	0.01	0.77	-4.24	5.17
Fair Equal Treatment	0.03	0.74	-1.31	7.11
Urban	1.69	0.46	1.00	2.00
Age	38.11	36.09	-1.00	999.00
Women	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.00
Country Economy	2.54	1.44	-1.00	9.00
Living Conditions	2.70	1.30	-1.00	9.00
Primary	0.26	0.84	0.00	3.00
High School	0.63	1.66	0.00	5.00
University	0.31	1.53	0.00	8.00
Observations	49981			



## **Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services**

The Cronbach's alpha computed composite value of citizens' proximity to public services or their ease of access to them in West Africa is 0.6 (Appendix A, Table 15), indicating an acceptable but questionable variable internal consistency and reliability exist.

The ordinal dependent variable *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services* is constructed from eight of ten individual ordinal variables that consider citizens' proximity to public services in terms of determining the presence or absence of services, or ease of access to them in Afrobarometer's identifiable primary sampling unit/enumeration area. In conducting household surveys, interviewers sample communities or clusters referred to as primary sampling units or PSUs (Thomson, Stevens, Ruktanonchai, Tatem, & Castro, 2017). According to Aliaga and Ren (2006), PSUs are usually geographically constructed areas which are parts of enumeration areas (EAs) that contain a number of households corresponding roughly to villages, towns, and urban blocks created in the last population census. This perspective seems to purposefully describe the dependent variable at play here for West Africa.

In so doing, the Afrobarometer survey data is therefore gathered from both conducting ordinary interviews of randomly selected citizens and contextual observations by interviewers and their supervisors in the PSUs/EAs. The ordinal variables applied in this dissertation are *Electricity grid in the PSU EA*, *Piped water system in the PSU EA*, *Mobile phone service in the PSU EA*, *School in the PSU EA*, *Police station in the PSU EA*, *Health clinic in the PSU EA*, *Bank or money service in the PSU EA*, and *Paid transport in the PSU EA*.

All response choices for the individual variables follow this pattern: 0=No, 1=Yes, 9=Can't determine. The survey questions are:

Electricity grid in the PSU/EA: Are the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: Electricity grid that most houses could access?

Piped water system in the PSU/EA: Are the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: Piped water system that most houses could access?

Mobile phone service in the PSU/EA: Are the following services present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area: Mobile phone service?

School in the PSU/EA: Are the following facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area, or within easy walking distance: School?

Police station in the PSU/EA: Are the following facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area, or in easy walking distance: Police station?

Health Clinic in the PSU/EA: Are the following facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area, or within easy walking distance: Health clinic?

Bank or money services in the PSU/EA: Are the following facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area, or within easy walking distance: Bank, money transfer point, mobile banking services or ATM?

Paid transport in the PSU/EA: Are the following facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area, or within easy walking distance: Is there any kind of paid transport, such as a bus, taxi, moped, or other form, available on a daily basis?

The dissertation uses response selection 1 (“Yes”) to construct percentage of the population with ease of access or proximity to public services or amenities in the past 7 years.

Table 9 and its summary analysis of population’s ease of access or proximity to public services or amenities in West Africa are presented below. Supporting information from the individual rounds is also found in Appendices C-Table 27, D-Table 30, and E-Table 33.

**Table 9: Percentage of population with ease of access or proximity to the following services or amenities in West Africa (2014, 2015, 2017-2021)**

	<i>Electricity Grid</i>	<i>Piped Water System</i>	<i>Mobile Phone Service</i>	<i>School</i>	<i>Police Station</i>	<i>Health Clinic</i>	<i>Bank or Money Service</i>	<i>Paid Transport</i>
<i>Benin</i>	56	56	92	93	32	66	35	79
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	29	47	82	91	22	57	30	54
<i>Cabo Verde</i>	98	86	88	88	43	56	38	97
<i>Gambia</i>	73	81	81	71	27	39	27	62
<i>Ghana</i>	89	73	94	91	32	57	45	82
<i>Guinea</i>	37	23	84	89	40	71	34	87
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	75	64	82	85	27	56	36	77
<i>Liberia</i>	36	24	85	88	43	70	32	92
<i>Mali</i>	33	43	89	90	25	70	48	46
<i>Niger</i>	32	45	82	90	21	63	21	69
<i>Nigeria</i>	81	40	92	94	50	75	34	85
<i>Senegal</i>	77	81	98	91	32	64	51	82
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	32	30	81	76	21	47	19	75
<i>Togo</i>	64	50	93	92	27	58	42	87
<b><i>TOTAL</i></b>	<b>58</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>77</b>

Source: Author’s calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 data

As noted above, Afrobarometer collected data through random interviews of citizens in addition to controlled survey input as captured from the field team’s personal observations to measure service infrastructure proximity and access within the PSUs/EAs. This survey area would include not only urban centers, but also remote towns and villages. Thus, the data used in this dissertation also consider the presence or absence of electricity grid, piped water system, mobile phone service, school, police station, health clinic, banking and some of its peripheral financial transactional services such as money transfer point, mobile banking services or ATM, and paid transport available daily, such as a bus, taxi, moped, or other form.

In analyzing the percentage of the population in West Africa with ease of access or proximity to services or amenities, Table 9 suggests that school (88 percent), mobile phone

service (87 percent), and paid transportation (77 percent) are the most present and accessible. This is consistently true in all three rounds (Rounds 6, 7, and 8). Additional observable parsing indicates that approximately two-thirds of the citizens in the fourteen countries studied are in proximity or have access to electricity grid (58 percent) and health clinics (61 percent) – with Nigeria leading at 75 percent for this service area, while only half can say they have access to piped water (53 percent). Citizens’ proximity and access to banking and money services (35 percent) and police stations (32 percent) have the least presence. It is also highly probable that because of its small geographic size in the region studied, Cabo Verde enjoys the highest marks of all the countries in proximity and access to electricity grid (98 percent), piped water system (86 percent), and paid transportation (97 percent)

**Table 10: Descriptive Statistics - Citizen Ease of Access 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8)**

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Citizen Ease of Access	0.00	0.48	-0.95	4.83
Corruption	0.00	0.55	-1.37	4.83
Media Exposure	0.00	0.70	-1.57	4.70
Satisfied With Democracy	2.61	1.63	-1.00	9.00
Freedom of Speech	0.01	0.77	-4.24	5.17
Fair Equal Treatment	0.03	0.74	-1.31	7.11
Urban	1.69	0.46	1.00	2.00
Age	38.11	36.09	-1.00	999.00
Women	1.00	1.00	0.00	2.00
Country Economy	2.54	1.44	-1.00	9.00
Living Conditions	2.70	1.30	-1.00	9.00
Primary	0.26	0.84	0.00	3.00
High School	0.63	1.66	0.00	5.00
University	0.31	1.53	0.00	8.00
Observations	49981			

### **Independent variables defined**

It was stated in the introduction to the dependent variable allocations segment earlier in this chapter that citizens’ actual experiences of petty corruption and perceptions of the general prevalence of corruption among politicians and public officials are the two measures of corruption. The study then aligns these two corruption indicators with public service quality for

citizens to determine their impact on trust in political institutions, and by extension their nexus with the efficient grease theory. These four elements respectively constitute the two major independent variables of interest as *Corruption* and *Quality Administration Services*. The individual variables that make up each of these key independent variables are presented as population-level frequency proportions of the study's entire dataset universe which can contribute to explaining policy-level influence on the dependent variables as well.

Demographic and non-demographic variables are also inserted to complete the list of independent variables and establish control variables. These additional variables, serving as gauging mechanisms that also influence the dependent variables in potential public policy-making, include level of citizens' media exposure (*Media Exposure*), satisfaction level of the population with democracy as practiced in their country (*Satisfied With Democracy*), whether there exists all that is considered normalized freedom of speech (*Freedom of Speech*), if there is presence of fair and equal treatment for all citizens (*Fair Equal Treatment*), population breakdown by urban and rural sectors, age, gender makeup, economic condition of the country and impact on all citizens, citizens' present living conditions, and education levels of the general public. Descriptive statistics inferred from all independent and control variables that can add to predictability of the dependent variables in this study continue below. Again, the study period covers three rounds of Afrobarometer survey data (Rounds 6, 7, and 8) from 2014 to 2021 on West African countries.

### **Corruption**

As stated earlier, the dissertation uses two measures of corruption as those actually experienced by citizens and those perceived by them. Both are absorbed into this single ordinal independent variable called *Corruption*. Since there are "sub-variables" comprising each

corruption category, the interrelatedness of all these separate items positively contributing to measuring the same thing must be ensured. As elaborated earlier in the chapter, Cronbach's alpha is employed to measure reliability of internal consistency of the data through scaling or testing, a process that shall continue in this dissertation to be applied to all independent variables with multiple items trying to measure the same construct as well.

Thus, for the independent variable *Corruption*, the Cronbach's alpha computed composite value is 0.8 (Appendix A, Table 16), indicating a high variable internal consistency and reliability exist.

### **Individual experienced corruption items**

For individual experienced corruption ordinal variable items, the question asked was How often, if ever, did you have to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favor for

- (a) a teacher or school official in order to get the services you needed from the schools
- (b) a health worker or clinic or hospital staff in order to get the medical care you needed
- (c) a government official in order to get the document you needed
- (d) a police officer in order to get the assistance you needed
- (e) a police officer in order to avoid a problem during one of these encounters

Possible responses were Never, Once or twice, A few times, Often, No contact, Refused, Don't know.

The dataset indicates that paying bribe for public school services has the following percent breakdown per population: Never 33.00, Once or Twice 3.42, A Few times 1.99, Often 1.13, No contact 59.83, Refused 0.00, Don't know 0.41. There is a 0.22 percent missing data rate.

Paying bribe for medical care by the population exhibits these percentage rates: Never 48.56, Once or Twice 4.60, A Few times 2.99, Often 2.10, No contact 41.12, Refused 0.01, Don't know 0.18. There is a 0.45 percent missing data rate.

Paying bribe for identity document has these percentages: Never 27.19, Once or Twice 4.80, A Few times 2.56, Often 1.73, No contact 63.26, Refused 0.01, Don't know 0.21. The missing data rate is 0.24 percent.

Paying bribe to receive police assistance produces these percentages: Never 5.66, Once or Twice 2.62, A Few times 3.09, Often 1.30, No contact 87.22, Refused 0.00, Don't know 0.11. There is no missing data.

Paying bribe to avoid problem with police has the following percent breakdown per population: Never 16.66, Once or Twice 4.48, A Few times 3.27, Often 3.35, No contact 71.86, Refused 0.02, Don't know 0.22. The missing data rate is 0.15 percent.

### **Individual perceived corruption items**

For individual perceived corruption ordinal variable items, the question asked was: How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Office of the Presidency, Members of Parliament/National Assembly, Civil Servants, Police, Judges and Magistrates, Tax Officials.

Possible responses were None, Some of them, Most of them, All of them, Refused, Don't know/Haven't heard.

Citizens' perceived corruption of the Office of the Presidency, per the dataset, has the following percent breakdown: None 12.51, Some of them 40.60, Most of them 22.00, All of them 14.35, Refused 0.23, Don't know/Haven't heard 10.30. The missing data rate is 0.02 percent.

Perceived corruption of Members of Parliament/National Assembly produces the following percent breakdown: None 9.77, Some of them 41.02, Most of them 25.13, All of them 13.74, Refused 0.20, Don't know/Haven't heard 10.14. The missing data rate is 0.01 percent.

Civil Servants perceived by the population as corrupt exhibit these percentages: None 8.56, Some of them 43.25, Most of them 26.63, All of them 12.62, Refused 0.16, Don't know/Haven't heard 8.75. The missing data rate is 0.03 percent.

The Police perceived by the population as corrupt produces these percentages: None 9.00, Some of them 34.90, Most of them 28.83, All of them 20.57, Refused 0.14, Don't know/Haven't heard 6.54. The missing data rate is 0.02 percent.

Perceived corruption of Judges and Magistrates by the population has the following percentages: None 9.71, Some of them 40.58, Most of them 25.08, All of them 15.18, Refused 0.16, Don't know/Haven't heard 9.26. The missing data rate is 0.03 percent.

The population's perception of Tax Officials as being corrupt produces the following percentages: None 8.80, Some of them 39.96, Most of them 26.83, All of them 14.58, Refused 0.10, Don't know/Haven't heard 9.69. The missing data rate is 0.05 percent.

### **Quality Administration Services**

The ordinal independent variable *Quality Administration Services* is constructed from individual ordinal variables of both public service quality and the user-friendliness manifested in citizens' ease of access to public services. It becomes a testament to how effective government capacity is in fulfilling delivery obligations of needed services to its greater population outreach. Cronbach's alpha is used here to evaluate reliability of internal consistency of the data since there are multiple items (variables) trying to measure the same construct. The Cronbach's alpha



computed composite value for the independent variable *Quality Administration Services* is 0.7 (Appendix A, Table 17), indicating a very acceptable variable internal consistency and reliability exist.

### **Individual Public Service Quality items**

This study reports in percentages from Afrobarometer data the level of public service quality anchored in service delivery satisfaction endured by citizens of West Africa. Greater positive value indicates acceptable service provisions by government stakeholders.

The question asked citizens in evaluating their satisfaction with service delivery quality is: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Improving basic health services, Addressing educational needs, Providing water and sanitation services, Maintaining roads and bridges, Providing a reliable supply of electricity? Possible responses were Very badly, Fairly badly, Fairly well, Very well, Refused, Don't know/Haven't heard enough.

Improving basic health services produces these percentages: Very badly 23.43, Fairly badly 27.15, Fairly well 39.29, Very well 8.52, Refused 0.03, Don't know/Haven't heard enough 1.57. The missing data rate is 0.02 percent.

Addressing educational needs percentages are: Very badly 23.38, Fairly badly 25.77, Fairly well 38.48, Very well 10.86, Refused 0.02, Don't know/Haven't heard enough 1.47. The missing data rate is 0.02 percent.

Providing water and sanitation services numbers are: Very badly 29.68, Fairly badly 29.33, Fairly well 32.60, Very well 6.78, Refused 0.02, Don't know/Haven't heard enough 1.56. The missing data rate is 0.03 percent.

Maintaining roads and bridges has the following percent breakdown: Very badly 28.76, Fairly badly 24.86, Fairly well 34.35, Very well 9.98, Refused 0.03, Don't know/Haven't heard enough 2.00. The missing data rate is 0.02 percent.

Providing a reliable supply of electricity exhibits these percentages: Very badly 32.41, Fairly badly 25.97, Fairly well 31.43, Very well 8.15, Refused 0.04, Don't know/Haven't heard enough 1.99. The missing data rate is 0.01 percent.

### **Individual Citizens' Ease of Access to Public Services items**

The intent of the survey question here is to determine citizen proximity in terms of the presence or absence of public services or ease of access to them if available. The Afrobarometer survey data used represents cumulative responses from both conducting ordinary interviews of randomly selected citizens by field interviewers and contextual observations recorded by the interviewers and their supervisors in the primary sampling units and enumeration areas.

The question that asked citizens and explored the interviewers' own cognitive observations to determine proximity and access to services is: Are the following services or facilities present in the primary sampling unit/enumeration area, or in easy walking distance?

The services or facilities of interest are Electricity grid, Piped water system, Mobile phone service, School, Police station, Health clinic, Bank or money services, and Paid transport.

Possible responses were No, Yes, Can't determine.

Electricity grid that most houses could access percentages are: No 37.86, Yes 62.08, Can't determine 0.06.

Piped water system that most houses could access has these percentages: No 44.56, Yes 54.75, Can't determine 0.69.

Mobile phone service presence or absence is acknowledged by the following percentage: No 10.76, Yes 88.62, Can't determine 0.62.

School presence or within easy walking distance is marked by these percentages: No 10.46, Yes 89.37, Can't determine 0.18.

Police station, if present or in easy walking distance, is marked by these percentages: No 66.71, Yes 32.33, Can't determine 0.96.

Health clinic, if present or in easy walking distance, shows these percentages: No 37.26, Yes 61.85, Can't determine 0.90.

Bank or money services, if present or in easy walking distance, show these percentages: No 62.72, Yes 36.65, Can't determine 0.62.

Paid transport checks if there is any kind of paid transport, such as a bus, taxi, moped, or other form, available on a daily basis. Percentages are: No 22.20, Yes 77.54, Can't determine 0.26.

### **Media Exposure**

The ordinal independent variable *Media Exposure* is constructed from individual ordinal variables that depict how citizens get their information mainly about politics, the economy, cultural and other government-influenced issues that impact their lives across the board.

In relation to whether there is a link between exposure to corruption and the role of the media in reporting excesses of this illegal practice in West Africa, Ronning (2009) asserts it may be incumbent on providers of news content in every capacity to properly highlight and inform the population about factors that may contribute to the development of corrupt practices. In essence, how citizens receive and digest their news may serve as determinants of attitudinal behavior towards their government institutions. The press could be well exalted in that role,

especially if their reporting effort eventually serves as a deterrent in combating corruption, even if cognizant of personal security risks from thin-skinned government apparatus.

Furthermore, gaining knowledge through well-sourced information may shed assuring light on the prevalence of corruption and its relationship to trust in institutions, perhaps evoking meaningful questions about some of the nuances of the efficient grease theory to the lowest common denominator for the everyday citizen.

Cronbach's alpha is used here to evaluate reliability of internal consistency of the data since there are multiple items (variables) trying to measure the same construct. The Cronbach's alpha computed composite value for the independent variable *Media Exposure* is 0.7 (Appendix A, Table 18), indicating a very acceptable variable internal consistency and reliability exist.

#### **Individual Media Exposure items**

The question that asked citizens by what means they gather and consume information that may influence their decision-making process towards their government's action or inaction concerning matters that impact their daily lives is: How often do you get news from the following sources: Radio news, Television news, Newspaper news, Internet news, Social media news? Possible responses were: Never, Less than once a month, A few times a month, A few times a week, Every day, Refused, Don't know.

Radio news used as information source percentages are: Never 16.42, Less than once a month 4.54, A few times a month 8.46, A few times a week 24.59, Every day 45.88, Refused 0.00, Don't know 0.09. The missing data rate is 0.02 percent.

Television news used as information source percentages are: Never 38.71, Less than once a month 5.41, A few times a month 7.45, A few times a week 16.20, Every day 31.98, Refused 0.00, Don't know 0.22. The missing data rate is 0.02 percent.

Newspaper news used as information source percentages are: Never 75.76, Less than once a month 6.57, A few times a month 6.11, A few times a week 6.20, Every day 4.69, Refused 0.03, Don't know 0.59. The missing data rate is 0.04 percent.

Internet news used as information source percentages are: Never 68.27, Less than once a month 3.05, A few times a month 4.00, A few times a week 8.50, Every day 15.32, Refused 0.03, Don't know 0.81. The missing data rate is 0.03 percent.

Social media news (such as from Facebook, Twitter now called X, WhatsApp or others) used as information source percentages are: Never 66.98, Less than once a month 2.77, A few times a month 3.77, A few times a week 8.79, Every day 16.58, Refused 0.04, Don't know 1.03. The missing data rate is 0.04 percent.

### **Satisfied With Democracy**

The ordinal variable *Satisfied With Democracy* checks for the system of government in the country, and if democratic, assesses citizens' view about their satisfaction level with this form of representative authority endorsed by the people to sustain freedom and equality for all. The question asking citizens to express their views on their form of government is: Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country?

The possible responses given, and percentages derived are: The country is not a democracy 0.97, Not at all satisfied 21.93, Not very satisfied 29.59, Fairly satisfied 29.73, Very satisfied 13.86, Refused 0.06, Don't know 3.86. The missing data rate is 0.01 percent.

### **Freedom of Speech**

The ordinal independent variable *Freedom of Speech* is constructed from individual ordinal variables to collectively express citizens' evaluation of the amount of freedom they may have in the country. Such a measure in attitude can become yet another barometer in judging

trust in a government that is tolerant and accepting of inalienable criticisms and choices citizens make in selecting their leaders.

Cronbach's alpha is used here to evaluate reliability of internal consistency of the data since there are multiple items (variables) trying to measure the same construct. The Cronbach's alpha computed composite value for the independent variable *Freedom of Speech* is 0.7 (Appendix A, Table 19), indicating a very acceptable variable internal consistency and reliability exist.

### **Individual Freedom of Speech items**

The question asked citizens to express their level of freedom covers four areas: In this country, how free are you: To say what you think; To join any political organization you want; To choose who to vote for without feeling pressured; To state your opinion on how free you think the news media in the country is to report and comment on the news without censorship or interference by the government? Possible responses were: Not at all free, Not very free, Somewhat free, Completely free, Refused, Don't know. Breakdown of responses to the level of freedom citizens have with associated percentages are:

To say what you think: Not at all free 8.79, Not very free 17.51, Somewhat free 28.10, Completely free 44.53, Refused 0.02, Don't know 1.03. The missing data rate is 0.01 percent.

To join any political organization you want: Not at all free 5.43, Not very free 8.67, Somewhat free 20.21, Completely free 64.09, Refused 0.09, Don't know 1.50. The missing data rate is 0.02 percent.

To choose who to vote for without feeling pressured: Not at all free 3.15, Not very free 5.41, Somewhat free 17.72, Completely free 72.77, Refused 0.02, Don't know 0.89. The missing data rate is 0.03 percent.

To state your opinion on news media freedom in the country to report and comment on the news without government censorship, interference, or retribution: Not at all free 9.09, Not very free 24.57, Somewhat free 34.78, Completely free 26.35, Refused 0.05, Don't know 5.16. There is no missing data percentage to report.

### **Fair Equal Treatment**

Citizens' attitudes towards legitimacy of a government are not simply defined just by nomenclatures of political systems (democracy or otherwise) and freedom of speech mantra, but are also pursued under grant of other basic political rights and liberties that can be catalogued as political goods. As rendered by Nussbaum (1997), these political rights and liberties are crucial in the context of formation and fulfillment of human needs. In that sense, the government must act as steward in the interest of political justice (Nussbaum, 1997) to ensure those needs are equally protected among all citizens in the shared space called a nation.

It is in that regard of promoting fair and equal treatment for all citizens among themselves or the government playing the role of overseer the ordinal independent variable *Fair Equal Treatment* is formulated. This narrative is reflected in the question that momentarily follows.

Meanwhile, Cronbach's alpha is used here to evaluate reliability of internal consistency of the data since there are multiple items (variables) trying to measure the same construct. The Cronbach's alpha computed composite value for the independent variable *Fair Equal Treatment* is 0.6 (Appendix A, Table 20), indicating an acceptable but questionable variable internal consistency and reliability exist.

### **Individual Fair and Equal treatment items**

The separate questions to citizens were about whether their overarching individual treatment as people was fair and equal under the law by government institutions, and how different sectors of the population treat each other in areas of recognizable socio-economic standing, religious beliefs, and ethnicity. The possible responses given to the individual variable questions and their respective percentages derived are:

Are people treated unequally under the law? Never 18.05, Rarely 17.67, Often 31.95, Always 28.85, Refused 0.05, Don't know 3.40. The missing data rate is 0.03 percent.

Have you personally been treated unfairly by other citizens of the country based on: your economic status, that is, how rich or poor you are? Never 68.90, Very Badly 12.61, Fairly Badly 13.21, Fairly Well 4.74, Refused 0.04, Don't know 0.48. The missing data rate is 0.01 percent.

Have you personally been treated unfairly by other citizens of the country based on: your religion? Never 88.17, Once or twice 5.25, Several times 4.68, Many times 1.58, Refused 0.04, Don't know 0.29. The missing data rate is 0.00 percent.

Have you personally been treated unfairly by other citizens of the country based on: your ethnicity? Never 73.78, Sometimes 10.58, Often 7.46, Always 6.10, Refused 0.02, Don't know 1.73. The missing data rate is 0.35 percent.

### **Control variables defined**

The control variables selected in this study serve as societal determinants that could help explain such factors that may potentially influence formation of institutional trust - part of the building block of the efficient grease theory - by the citizenry. Consideration is given to population breakdown into urban and rural sectors, age, gender, general economic condition of the country and its impact on all, citizens' present living conditions, and education levels of the



general public. The statistical importance of control variables inclusion is to minimize and overcome omitted variable bias or OVB. Per George (2023) and Rezigalla (2020), OVB occurs when one or more relevant independent variables are not included (that is, variables are unobserved or hidden) in the design or regression model, which could cause misinterpretation of key factors in data analysis. Such miscalculation could further produce inaccurate results when the explanatory variables (independent variables) and outcome variables (dependent variables) are statistically associated.

The control variables in this dissertation, therefore, are *Urban, Age, Women, Country Economy, Living Conditions, Primary, High School, and University*. The education level used in the study is limited to primary school, high school, and university completed. All these variables are demographic or socio-economic in nature serving as a collective thermometer assessing the character of the population under study.

*Urban* determines whether a citizen resides in an urban or rural area. It is binary with a value of 1 (rural) or 2 (urban). The population in the study is 31.29 percent rural and 68.71 percent urban.

*Age* can effectively become a significant explanatory indicator of trust in political institutions. According to Seligson (2002), younger people “might express a higher degree of belief in the legitimacy of their political system, having recently completed the socialization experience of public school, including courses in civic education” (p. 422). The older generation, because of their longevity in dealing with politics and those who govern, have consequentially endured “many years of disappointment with politics and have a more jaded view of the political system” (Seligson, 2002, p. 422). Translation of this discourse means that younger people,

because they still hold on to the legitimacy of a democratic government, might tend to place more trust in their political institutions than those who are old hands at political participation.

*Age* is a ratio/ordinal variable asking the question how old a person is in this study.

Displaying the mean, median, and mode of the population shall give some substance to measuring the central tendency of the variable in the data. The age range is 18 to 89. The mean, as the arithmetic average of this range, is 38 years old. The median age at the 50-percentile mark is 34. The mode, if not including responses that fall into “Missing”, “Refused”, and “Don’t know” categories, is 30 years old high or 5.03 percent of the population and 79 years old at the low end or 0.09 percent.

Gender may play a vital role as a determinant in legitimacy of institutional trust but more so from a leverage that women and men may not view and experience political system alike. According to Seligson (2002) and Chang and Chu (2006), women are likely discriminated against in many aspects of political and economic life of a nation, thus even placing them in a position where they incur the brunt of corruption while attempting to achieve their eclectic goals. Such scenario would have women trending more towards placing less trust in political institutions. That is the primary underpinning reason, in addition to the fact female respondents slightly edge their male counterpart in this study, the variable is highlighted as *Women* in this dissertation. The binary value of Gender is 1 for male at 49.95 percent, and 2 for female at 50.05 percent.

Country economic condition - Per Fernando (2023), GDP is the total value of goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period. Thus, it is a measure of an economy's output, size, and health of a nation. GDP can also be divided by population to show living standards over time (Lucas, Jr., 2004). Thus, GDP or gross domestic product can be a

measure of many things. However, this dissertation's reckoning of economic indicator attributable to a nation is only to check whether effects of citizens experiencing corruption or perception of it may trickle down to their personal economic standing. The ordinal variable *Country Economy* speaks to that narrative as manifested through response to the question asked: How would you describe the present economic condition of this country? Possible responses were: Very bad, Fairly bad, Neither good nor bad, Fairly good, Very good, Refused, Don't know. Breakdown of citizens' responses to describing the present economic condition in the country with associated percentages are: Very bad 29.41, Fairly bad 28.21, Neither good nor bad 11.30, Fairly good 24.43, Very good 5.63, Refused 0.02, Don't know 0.97. The missing data rate is 0.03 percent.

*Living Conditions* is a variable that expresses the present living conditions of the population. For this study, it is measured by what Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) refer to as citizens' economic vote. The prevailing assumption is citizens might vote for the government if the economy is performing well; otherwise, they would consider voting against the sitting administration. The insinuation is that citizens expect their living conditions to be uplifted if the nation's economy prospers. Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) postulate that the psychology of the economic vote rests on the classic reward-punishment theory which they highlight as follows: "Voters, regardless of the democracy in which they live, assess national economic conditions, and reward or punish the politicians responsible for those conditions" (pp. 211-212). When this theory is superimposed on a level of citizens' trust in their political institutions, it is only rational that they would likely place greater trust in these institutions and governments if they believe their own living conditions are trending in positive direction.

For the ordinal variable *Living Conditions*, the following question was asked to capture the citizens' account of their living conditions with the economy in the background: In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions? Possible responses were: Very bad, Fairly bad, Neither good nor bad, Fairly good, Very good, Refused, Don't know. Breakdown of citizens' responses to describing their own present living conditions in the country with associated percentages are: Very bad 21.88, Fairly bad 27.57, Neither good nor bad 15.18, Fairly good 29.12, Very good 5.87, Refused 0.01, Don't know 0.22. The missing data rate is 0.16 percent.

Citizen level of education is essential to understanding how political system is supposed to function. According to Seligson (2002), people with more education in a society may possess better knowledge of their governing apparatus and are therefore best equipped to criticize its missteps or carefully rationalize its performative gesture if done in good faith.

Grönlund and Milner (2006) dress up this theory even further with the assertion that political knowledge can be a powerful predictor of political participation, meaning the more citizens know about their political system and its actors, the more it becomes a central aspect of informed voting. In that context, being educated may then explain the depth of what citizens know about politics. However, Grönlund and Milner (2006) also offer a proviso that the marriage of education and knowledge of a country's political system usually has a stronger effect in countries that adhere to majoritarian electoral systems than those that do not.

This study limits the education level completed by the population set to the ordinal control variables *Primary*, *High School*, and *University*. The question of the highest level of education a citizen has thus pertains to these variables in percentages as follows:

Primary school completed 8.60, Secondary school / high school completed 12.54, and University completed 3.82. These accumulate to 24.96 percent or approximately a quarter of randomly selected members of West African population who demonstrate some educated knowledge about their political systems in making rational decisions.

## CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

This chapter reflects on the relationships between the predictor, right-hand side, independent variables and response, left-hand side dependent variables as deliberated and constructed in analyses of the data in Chapter 4.

Explaining the pathway of these relationships is also supported by scholars as purported in the literature review section of this dissertation. From collective narrative of these scholarly sources, the study is able to establish connection between the interrelated institutional trust dependent variables and the various affecting independent variables as it derives a nexus to the presumed efficient grease theory associated with West African governments. This exercise then produces both descriptive and inferential statistics that have now become input to representative investigations and interpretations of their meanings in this results chapter. For this dissertation, inferential statistics will test the research question and associated hypotheses. According to Adler and Clark (2011), this occurs when inferences are made about the population from which the sample was selected, which in this case is embodied in the West Africa dataset used for the study.

Vogt, Vogt, Gardner, and Haeffele (2014) posit that an ordinary approach to understanding such inferential statistics is through null hypothesis significance testing or NHST. According to these scholars, statistical significance tests are used to test the null hypothesis whose central theme declares that there are no relationships between or among the variables under study. However, to balance out the relationship argument of the null hypothesis, this study introduces qualified alternative hypotheses (that is, statements tested in attempt to disprove the null hypothesis) to counter that relationships do indeed exist between or among the variables. Some instances may also highlight the direction of those relationships (such as positive or

negative correlations). The crucial point here in testing the null hypotheses, according to Trafimow and Earp (2017), is to avoid what is generally referred to as Type I and Type II errors defined as follows:

A Type I error...involves rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true (e.g., concluding that there is a population difference between the conditions in question, when in reality there is no population difference), whereas a Type II error involves failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is false (e.g., concluding that there is no population difference between the conditions in question, when in reality there is one) (p. 20).

The above suggestions are all hinged on the probability or p-value of significance established for the study.

The platforming of variable relationships of this study uses ordinary least squares (OLS) as the more appropriate linear regression statistical model for estimating linear relations between the responsive dependent variables and explanatory independent variables. The study's rationale here in applying OLS regression technique, as supported by Stock and Watson (2019), is to estimate the unknown effect of changing one variable over another. The predicted outcome could, for instance, impact policy decision-making at the governing level in the West African countries in this study. The assumption here is that there exists an additive, linear relationship between or among the variables (dependent and independent variables). The normative point of interest then becomes how much Y (dependent variable) changes when X (independent variable) changes one unit, holding all other variables constant. In other words, for each one-point increase in the independent variable, the dependent variable unit increases or decreases by that point score, holding all other variables constant. Thus, in the OLS regression applied in this study, a Cronbach's alpha change of 1 standard deviation in an independent variable is associated with a percentage point change in the standard deviation of the dependent variable, again holding

all the other independent variables constant. This is the measurement technique used to interpret results from the linear regression estimates applied in this study.

The above narrative exhibits the backdrop for the underlying technical basis of explaining regression and its relationship with testing dependent and independent variables in this study. Discussion of the dissertation now moves to the next section. Here, the practical interpretations and investigative results shall be emphasized about those relationships as pertained to variables in the study on West African institutional corruption and its red tape ramifications on the efficient grease theory. Core hypothesis testing and investigation are presented in sequence with Table 34, Table 35, and Table 36.

### **OLS regression model and hypothesis investigation results**

The series of OLS regression analyses investigating results of the applied hypotheses related to the dependent and independent variables starts with Table 34. Its models test if there could be other factors, known or unknown, that are related to corruption or if corruption is in fact just exogenous. Table 35 assesses the relationships among institutional trust, corruption (experienced and perceived), and public service. It is also demonstrated that this regression additionally produces associated demographic information embedded in some of the independent variables. All this is done to test for corruption and public service delivery impacts on institutional trust in West Africa and then apply this measure to the efficient grease proposition in Table 36, which delivers the multiplicative interaction effect of corruption and institutional trust on efficient grease.

The coefficient percentages reported in all the regression tables are associated with standard deviation representing the unit in which this study's variable relationship results are measured and interpreted for the hypotheses. In this continuum, it shows how much the



dependent variable is expected to change (increase or decrease) by percentage points when the independent variable increases by one unit, when holding all the other independent variables constant. They are all characterized by robust standard errors.

The alternative hypotheses are reintroduced here to be tested through impacted OLS regressions. Appropriate alternative hypothesis testing is mapped to the proper dependent variable for predicted estimates in impacted tables. Then the remaining independent variables from *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services to University* in Table 35 and Table 36 are respectively investigated where appropriate. Below are the hypotheses used, which are then followed by Table 34, Table 35, and Table 36. and their explanations.

**H<sub>a1</sub>:** Reported Corruption (experienced, perceived and/or a combined index) is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa.

**H<sub>a2</sub>:** Reported Public service quality is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa.

**H<sub>a3</sub>:** The interactive effect of Corruption and Public service quality is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa.

Lastly, while the remaining independent variables from *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services to University* in Table 35 and Table 36 are not guided by stated hypotheses, they are nevertheless respectively interpreted from regression results for demographic perspectives.

Before discussing all regression tables in the study, the following brief points are highlighted about standard errors, R-squared (Within), and Country FE as applied in all the models.

## **Standard Errors**

As stated in the methodology chapter, the narrative for standard error can help guide explanation of relationships in the regression. The robust standard errors here check for the amount of discrepancy between what this study's sample dataset represents and the true population of the West African countries. It should be noted standard errors in all the regression tables are adjusted for 14 clusters as country representation.

Nagele (2001) asserts the standard error of the mean (SEM), for example, estimates how the mean of the sample is related to the mean of the given population. In other words, standard error is the mark of how well this dissertation's sampling data represents the population or how well statistically the sample mean predicts the real population mean. Therefore, the explanation for comparative discrepancies between sample data and that of the real population of West Africa in the study can be parsed as follows: In percentages, if the standard error is smaller, or even closer to zero, then the estimated value projected in the study is closer to the population's true value (Biau, 2011). Otherwise, it is left to logic to surmise then that the larger the standard error, the statistical comparison sought might become less accurate.

## **R-squared (Within)**

R-squared ( $R^2$ ) is deemed as a goodness-of-fit measured as the percentage of the variance in the dependent variable that the independent variables can explain, or as succinctly put by Wooldridge (2009, 2006), as "simply an estimate of how much variation in y is explained by x in the population" (p. 199).

However, the findings of the OLS regression for this study's pooled cross-sectional data pertain to a refined meaning of R-squared (Within) measurement. R-squared (Within) here explains the correlations among countries in percentage points. Its purpose is to help understand the effects of policies within the West African countries. In other words, it accounts for how well

the independent (explanatory) variables can effectuate policy changes in the dependent (response) variables within each of the 14 countries in the study.

### **Country FE**

Fixed effects are irremovable physical conditions if their impacts are not controlled, that is their values do not necessarily change over time in the countries of this study. In these situations, the countries' manufactured and implemented policies could therefore bias regression outcomes. Conditions such as countries being landlocked, countries having abundance of natural resources or the lack of those that can produce economic value for national treasuries, types of political and administrative power structures (democratic or not), whether the population is perennially susceptible to famine due to regional uncooperative climate changes, etc., can possibly be demeaned by running regression with fixed effects to help normalize outcomes.

To that end, fixed effects can remove omitted variable bias (OVB), which occurs when one or more relevant independent variables are not included, by calculating fluctuations within groups across time (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Wooldridge, 2009, 2006). This dissertation resorts to applying an indicator variable using country (`i.country_code`) to create dummy variables that help address some of those missing, unobserved, hidden, or unknown characteristics.

**Table 34: Public Service Delivery Quality Impact on Corruption in West Africa (2014 to 2021)**

	Corruption Experienced (1)	Corruption Perceived (2)	Corruption Combined (3)
Public Service Quality	0.01 (0.01)	0.10** (0.03)	0.06** (0.02)
Media Exposure	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.09*** (0.01)
Satisfied With Democracy	0.01*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.00)
Freedom of Speech	0.01 (0.02)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Fair Equal Treatment	0.02 (0.01)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)
Urban	0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)
Age	0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Women	0.04** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.00)
Country Economy	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Living Conditions	0.00 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.00)
Primary	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)
High School	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)
University	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-0.14* (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.05)
Observations	49981	49981	49981
R-squared (Within)	0.0329	0.0637	0.0769
Country FE	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### Impact of Public Service Quality on Corruption

The relationship between corruption (experienced, perceived, combined) and public service quality variables is ancillary to the research question and efficient grease. Such a link as explained here is not based on hypothesis testing but only to indicate association of variable endogeneity or exogeneity.

The variables of interest in Table 34 above for public service link to corruption is *Public Service Quality*. It is not statistically significant when determining its impact on corruption experienced, suggesting that when citizens participate in corruption activities, that does not

meaningfully correlate to the effect of quality delivery of public service. On the other hand, the impact of this variable of interest on corruption perceived and combination of the two variables is statistically significant. For corruption perceived, it produces a coefficient of 0.10 percentage point with a standard error of 0.03. This confirms that citizens are still cognizant of corruption practices even if they benefit from quality delivery of public services. Another way to phrase this phenomenon could be that more people may believe (perceive) there is corruption in government, but they themselves have not had a direct, face-to-face experience with physical activity, and are being satisfactorily served. This exchange occurs at the rate of 0.10 change in the standard deviation of corruption perceived with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Public Service Quality*, ceteris paribus.

For combined corruption experienced and perceived, a coefficient of 0.06 percentage point with a standard error of 0.02 is the result. The service quality effect of the combined corruption happens at the rate of 0.06 change in the standard deviation of the dependent variable with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in the independent variable *Public Service Quality*, ceteris paribus.

Since the purpose of this table is to only find association between public service and corruption, the various levels of impact of the remaining independent variables on descriptive statistics as projected by specific coefficients are not considered essential for further interpretation.

**Table 35: Corruption and Administrative Service Quality Impacts on Institutional Trust in West Africa (2014 to 2021)**

	Trust Political Institutions (1)	Trust Political Institutions (1)	Trust Political Institutions (1)
Corruption Experienced	0.02 (0.01)		
Corruption Perceived		0.16*** (0.02)	
Corruption, Combined			0.23*** (0.03)
Public Service Quality	0.20*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)
Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Media Exposure	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)
Satisfied With Democracy	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Freedom of Speech	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Fair Equal Treatment	0.06* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Urban	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Age	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Women	0.01** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Country Economy	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Living Conditions	0.01 (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)
Primary	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
High School	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
University	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)
Constant	-0.39*** (0.06)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.37*** (0.05)
Observations	49981	49981	49981
R-squared (Within)	0.1803	0.2142	0.2064
Country FE	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### Investigating alternative hypothesis $H_{a1}$

$H_{a1}$ : Reported Corruption (experienced, perceived and/or a combined index) is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa.

Table 35 above measures the level of trust citizens have in their political institutions when correlated with effects of corruption in West Africa. The variables of interest tested by this

alternative hypothesis for corruption in relations to institutional trust are *Corruption Experienced*, *Corruption Perceived*, and *Corruption* (*Corruption Experienced* and *Corruption Perceived* combined). *Corruption Experienced* is not statistically significant, meaning actual corruption practices have no impact on institutional trust in West Africa.

*Corruption Perceived* is statistically positively significant, and has a coefficient of 0.16 percentage points with a standard error of 0.02. This indicates that citizens' perceptions of corruption in their countries do not diminish their trust level in political institutions by 0.16 change in standard deviation with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in the independent variable *Corruption Perceived*, ceteris paribus. In other words, the effects of corruption perceived do not degrade or undermine, but rather oddly elevate citizens' trust in West African government institutions. Thus, the alternative hypothesis "*Reported Corruption (experienced, perceived and/or a combined index) is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa*" rejects the null hypothesis.

*Corruption* (*Corruption Experienced* and *Corruption Perceived* combined) is statistically positively significant with a coefficient of 0.23 percentage points and a standard error of 0.03. This indicates that the impact of both experienced and perceived corruption taken together is positive and does not undermine institutional trust by a 0.23 change margin in standard deviation with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in the independent variable *Corruption*, ceteris paribus. Thus, the alternative hypothesis "*Reported Corruption (experienced, perceived and/or a combined index) is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa*" rejects the null hypothesis.

### **Investigating alternative hypothesis H<sub>a2</sub>**

*H<sub>a2</sub>: Reported Public service quality is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa.*

Table 35 above measures whether the trust citizens have in their political institutions is correlated with the level of public service quality afforded them in West Africa. The variable of interest tested by this alternative hypothesis for public service in relations to institutional trust is *Public Service Quality*. It is positively significant with trust in institutions across the board with corruption experienced, corruption perceived, and the combination of both.

*Public Service Quality* is statistically positively significant, and has a coefficient of 0.20 percentage points with a standard error of 0.01 for corruption experienced, a coefficient of 0.18 percentage points with a standard error of 0.01 for corruption perceived, and a coefficient of 0.19 percentage points with a standard error of 0.01 for corruption combined.

The level of public service quality afforded citizens is positive and does not undermine institutional trust by a margin of 0.20 change in standard deviation with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in the independent variable *Public Service Quality*, ceteris paribus for corruption experienced; 0.18 change in standard deviation with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in the independent variable *Public Service Quality*, ceteris paribus for corruption perceived; and 0.19 change in standard deviation with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in the independent variable *Public Service Quality*, ceteris paribus, for corruption combined. The alternative hypothesis "*Reported Public service quality is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa*" therefore rejects the null hypothesis.

It is noted that the interpretive essence of this alternative hypothesis essentially also has similar connotation in Table 36. That is, *Public Service Quality is* positively significant with trust in institutions and the nexus with efficient grease across the board for corruption experienced, corruption perceived, and the combination of both.



## **Interpreting demographic and control variable results of regression**

The coefficient analysis in this segment specifically applies to Table 35.

### Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services

Citizens' ease of access or proximity to public service amenities in West Africa may determine trust level in their institutions. This is associated with the presence or absence of public services or how easily the population can access such services like the availability of schools, adequate health care systems, electricity, piped water systems, for example.

*Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services*, in a capacity as independent variable, is statistically negatively significant in trust relationship for corruption experienced, corruption perceived, and corruption combined. For all three corruption entities, citizens' ease of access has the same coefficient of negative 0.07 percentage points with a standard error of 0.02. This interprets the notion that the prospect of not having easy access or proximity to public services, which should be readily and equally available to all, diminishes the level of citizens' trust in West African political institutions by -0.07 change in standard deviation with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services*, ceteris paribus, as they feel excluded or marginalized.

### Media Exposure

The citizens of West Africa get their political news from sources like radio, television, newspapers, the internet, and social media. How the population receives and digests their news may serve as determinants of attitudinal behavior towards their institutions in evaluating trust in, prevalence of corrupt behavior, and level of service provisions by the government (Ronning, 2009). It is then the duty of the news media to sufficiently inform the population by properly highlighting factors that may contribute to the development of corrupt practices and other functional misconduct of the government.

From that perspective, the media shows less trust in institutions as it is statistically negatively significant for corruption experienced, corruption perceived, and corruption combined. Corruption experienced has a coefficient of -0.07 and a standard error of 0.02. Corruption perceived has a coefficient of -0.06 and a standard error of 0.01. Corruption combined has a coefficient of -0.05 and a standard error of 0.02.

The explanation is a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in the independent variable *Media Exposure* reinforces a -0.07 change in the standard deviation of trust in political institutions, ceteris paribus, within the media's judgment that citizens are quite aware the government is surely corrupt and would not trust it, and -0.06 change in the standard deviation of trust in political institutions, ceteris paribus, the population perceives government institutions as corrupt and would not trust it. When both corruption variables are combined, the media postulates citizens would be less likely to trust their institutions by -0.05 change in standard deviation, ceteris paribus. From the media's point of view, all the corruption scenarios create less trust in West African institutions.

#### Satisfied With Democracy

The independent variable *Satisfied With Democracy* investigates the satisfaction level of basic form of representative governance bounded by aspired freedom and equality citizens live under. The variable is statistically significant across all the corruption independent variables in relation to citizens' trust in their political institutions.

For corruption experienced, a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Satisfied With Democracy* produces a coefficient of 0.09 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.01, ceteris paribus, suggesting citizens have an improved outlook towards how government treats them under democratic principles.

For corruption perceived, a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Satisfied With Democracy* has a coefficient of 0.08 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.01, ceteris paribus, which insinuates citizens' perceived view of corruption is sustained, but they still trust the government administrations with a higher approval rate for democratic practices.

For corruption combined, a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Satisfied With Democracy* has a coefficient of 0.08 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.01, ceteris paribus, which suggests when both corruption variables are taken together, citizens still trust institutions would protect their democratic privileges at a higher rate. Overall translation is citizens trust their institutions for their stewardship of democracy even under a corrupt governing system.

### Freedom of Speech

The independent variable *Freedom of Speech* generates the collective temperature of citizens' evaluation of the amount of freedom they may have in the country. It is yet another measure of the population testing the government's tolerance level in allowing freedom of expression that is supposed to undergird the broad strokes of democracy. The variable is statistically significant across all the corruption independent variables in relation to citizens' trust in their political institutions.

For corruption experienced, a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Freedom of Speech* shows a coefficient of 0.10 change in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.01, ceteris paribus, suggesting citizens trust the rate at which political institutions respect their rights to free speech would increase.

A Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Freedom of Speech* has a coefficient of 0.09 change in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.01, ceteris paribus, attached to corruption perceived. The translation here is wherever citizens perceive that corruption is taking place among them, the population still enjoys a higher trust factor in the government allowing some societal freedom of expression.

For corruption combined, a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Freedom of Speech* shows a coefficient of 0.09 change in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.01, ceteris paribus, suggesting citizens trust the rate at which political institutions respect their rights to free speech would increase even when corruption (experienced and perceived) is taken into account.

#### Fair Equal Treatment

Besides the narratives of democratic political systems and support for freedom of speech, protection and guarantee of human rights and liberties are also investigated under a fair and equitable treatment agenda in West African governance (Nussbaum, 1997). However, the variable is statistically significant for only corruption experienced.

A Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Fair Equal Treatment* has a coefficient of 0.06 change in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.02, ceteris paribus, attached to corruption experienced. The translation is, even under the veil of experienced corruption, fair and equal treatment among citizens and how the government respects their humanity is improved.

#### **Control variables**

The control variables investigated in the study as reflected in Table 35 are *Urban, Age, Women, Country Economy, Living Conditions*, and education level broken into *Primary, High School, and University*. They are not variables of interest here but are instead selected for their

expected unchanging characteristics throughout the investigative period of the data. If their properties are not controlled by holding them constant, they could possibly influence the outcome of this study. It is reiterated then that this dissertation focuses on intersectionality of the effects of corruption, public service delivery quality, citizens' trust in political institutions and their nexus with efficient grease theory in West Africa.

Surprisingly, the variable *Urban* is not statistically significant for corruption when associated with trust in political institutions although all coefficients show negative values.

The variable *Age* is not statistically significant for corruption when associated with trust in political institutions. Its coefficients and standard errors are all registering as 0.00 (all zeros); thus, *Age* has no influence on determining statistical outcome here.

The variable *Women* is statistically significant for only corruption experienced in trust relationship. For corruption experienced, a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Women* shows a coefficient of 0.01 change in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.00, ceteris paribus. This suggests women corruption involvement and trust confidence factor in institutions is functionally positive.

The variable *Country Economy* is statistically significant equally for corruption experienced, corruption perceived, and corruption combined in trust relationship. For all three, Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Country Economy* shows a coefficient of 0.06 change in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.01, ceteris paribus. This relationship suggests citizens harbor a trusting view that the institutional government is responsible for the present positive economic condition of the country which is in turn attributable to improvement in their personal economic posture even under corrupt governance.

The variable *Living Conditions* is statistically significant equally for only corruption perceived and corruption combined in trusting political institutions. It is noted here that the premise of citizens' living conditions in this study is construed as an economic vote. The upshot is citizens usually vote for the government if the economy is performing well; otherwise, they would consider voting against the sitting administration (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000).

A Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Living Conditions* has a coefficient of 0.01 change in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.00, ceteris paribus, for corruption perceived. This suggests that citizens who harbor the belief that the government is corrupt also would still vote for the sitting administration much of the time on the grounds their own living conditions might continue to improve, and would therefore let the incumbent leaders remain in office.

A Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Living Conditions* has a coefficient of 0.01 change in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.00, ceteris paribus, for corruption combined. The interpretation here is the rate at which citizens trust their government enough to earn their vote because of a lift in their own current living conditions is positive despite the aura of corruption.

As noted earlier, the completed education level selected by the author from the population in this study is broken into primary, high school, and university.

The variable *Primary* is not statistically significant for corruption experienced, corruption perceived, or corruption combined in trust relationship.

The variable *High School* is statistically significant equally for corruption experienced, corruption perceived, and corruption combined in trust relationship. A Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *High School* has a coefficient of -0.02 change in the standard

deviation with a standard error of 0.00, *ceteris paribus*, for trust in political institutions. This indicates that citizens who completed high school generally have a more negative opinion about placing trust in their political institutions on grounds that corruption still permeates the government.

The variable *University* is statistically significant equally for corruption experienced, corruption perceived, and corruption combined in trust relationship. A Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *University* has a coefficient of -0.01 change in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.00, *ceteris paribus*, for trust in political institutions. This implies that citizens who completed university education have a negative opinion about placing trust in their political institutions.

### **Summary of corruption and trust relationship**

In closing the discussion on Table 35 for the study, the following summary recognizes the relationships of the independent and control variables with trust in political institutions. After all, institutional trust variable is the link most central in contributing to measuring efficient grease attributes that may shape some of the policy decisions West African citizens ultimately endure from their government.

The effects of corruption experienced are not statistically significant. But corruption perceived positively correlates with trust in political institutions by 16 percent, and so does corruption combined by 23 percent, indicating that citizens' view of corruption does not undermine their overall trust in how the government is run. A similar conclusion can be drawn for quality public service delivery in that it increases the level of trust in citizens' political institutions by 20 percent for corruption experienced, 18 percent for corruption perceived, and 19 percent for corruption combined.

Citizens' ease of access to public services equally projects negative trust in institutions by a 0.07 change margin. The media has an adverse reaction to how political institutions behave in West Africa as is depicted by the negative 0.07 change rating for corruption experienced, negative 0.06 change for corruption perceived, and negative 0.05 change for corruption combined.

People's satisfaction with democratic practices in the country is at 0.09 change for corruption experienced, 0.08 change for corruption perceived, and 0.08 change for corruption combined. The government's tolerance for freedom of speech is at 0.10 change for corruption experienced, 0.09 change for corruption perceived, and 0.09 change for corruption combined. It can then be surmised from this comparative analysis that citizens base their opinions about political institutions on democratic value system, thus serving as factors that increase trust in this case. Meanwhile, citizens' judgment in attitude towards their trust in political institutions about fair and equal treatment in West African society is only positively significant for corruption experienced at 0.06 change.

A reasonable assumption would be that citizens who reside in urban areas are more critical about their government performance due to the fact urbanites may expect more beneficial and visible outputs that reflect timely policy measures than rural folks in West Africa. In this study, if people living in cities and larger towns are less sanguine about trusting their political institutions, it is not so reflected by the fact the coefficients are not statistically significant across the board for corruption experienced, corruption perceived, and corruption combined.

Age seemingly has no influence on institutional trust in the study as it is not statistically significant. Gender influence matters, and in this study, it may just be that men and women have equal level of trust in their institutions in West Africa at the 0.01 change level only for corruption



experienced.

When the country prospers economically, depicted here at a 0.06 change rate across all three corruption spectrums in their trust relationships, and citizens' living conditions are on a positive plane albeit at just a 0.01 change only for corruption perceived and corruption combined, people's trust in their political institutions also increases.

Educational level influences trust in political institutions in West Africa. Although, the result of primary education is not significant here, having a high school diploma or university degree enables citizens to become more vigilant and critical about their government's performance. A negative 0.02 change for high school graduates or a negative 0.01 change for university degree holders across all three corruption categories suggests these two groups trust their political institutions less. Rationality would probably have it that the higher the education level of individuals, the less trusting and more suspicious they would become of their political institutions. The 0.02 change for high school figure doubles that of university graduate, thus challenging that very notion. In West Africa, this might all make sense because it is quite likely that more people enter and complete high school than the proportion for university.

### **OLS regression model and “efficient grease” theory interaction**

Table 36 below depicts a complementary ordinary least squares model that tests the “efficient grease” theory via a multiplicative interaction measure and using Cronbach's alpha measure. In that respect, it further explores and analyzes the trust-corruption-public service quality nexus as an extended consequence of government operational red tape that might be associated with questionable policy implications in West Africa.

The intuition here is to use the same dependent, independent and control variables as in Table 35 above. But this time, qualifying multiplicative interaction terms are added to the

regression. The respective applied term is the product of an experienced, perceived or combined corruption variable and public service quality variable to determine effect of corruption on efficient grease. Both multiplicand (experienced, perceived, or combined corruption variable) and multiplier (public service quality variable) already exist in the regression. The selection of specific variables for this arithmetic procedure is the author's choice within the required framework of determining the multiplicative interaction term as earlier introduced in the methodology section of the study.

This analysis is quite plausible since the efficient grease theory is essentially a conditional hypothesis (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2005) to test the interaction effect between institutional trust and corruption in government providing services to its population, as pursued in this study. The phenomenon likely exists since trust and corruption are interconnected on the basis of the degree of red tape (bribes) citizens must endure if they want public services made available to them. After all, the purpose of this study is to prove the hypothesis of "greasing" the wheels that run institutions in West Africa to get service is rejected or not.

Further, multiplicative term usage in quantitative analysis in social science, according to Friedrich (1982), can help dispel the assumption of additivity that states "the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable is always the same, regardless of the level of other variables" (p. 797). Again, establishing interaction metric by removing the additivity problem may enable effects of the independent variable on dependent variables to vary in some fashion, depending on other variables in the regression as long as observing the usual standard for *ceteris paribus* is maintained. As a reminder from the methods section about the evolution of multiplicative interaction, the efficient grease construct variables *Corruption Experienced* times *Public Service Quality*, *Corruption Perceived* times *Public Service Quality*, and *Corruption*

*(Corruption Experienced and Corruption Perceived combined) times Public Service Quality*  
serve as the individual interaction terms described below in Table 36.

**Table 36: Corruption and Administrative Service Quality Impacts on Institutional Trust in West Africa  
Efficient Grease Multiplicative Interaction Model (2014 to 2021)**

	Trust Political Institutions (1)	Trust Political Institutions (1)	Trust Political Institutions (1)
Corruption Experienced	0.02 (0.01)		
Efficient Grease: Corruption Experienced X Public Service Quality	0.02 (0.01)		
Corruption Perceived		0.16*** (0.02)	
Efficient Grease: Corruption Perceived X Public Service Quality		0.02 (0.01)	
Corruption, Combined			0.21*** (0.03)
Efficient Grease: Corruption, Combined X Public Service Quality			0.04* (0.02)
Public Service Quality	0.20*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.01)
Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.02)
Media Exposure	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.06** (0.01)	-0.05** (0.02)
Satisfied With Democracy	0.09*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)
Freedom of Speech	0.10*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)
Fair Equal Treatment	0.06* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Urban	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Age	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Women	0.01** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Country Economy	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)
Living Conditions	0.01 (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)
Primary	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
High School	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)
University	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)
Constant	-0.39*** (0.06)	-0.39*** (0.05)	-0.38*** (0.05)
Observations	49981	49981	49981
R-squared (Within)	0.1806	0.2150	0.2077
Country FE	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### **Investigating alternative hypothesis H<sub>a3</sub>**

*H<sub>a3</sub>: The interactive effect of Corruption and Public service quality is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa.*

For naked interpretation of efficient grease as a test marker of the interaction effect between institutional trust and corruption in government, overall attributes of the descriptive independent variable relationships to the dependent variable have minimally changed in Table 36 compared to Table 35. Now, the respective relation between *Corruption Experienced* and *Public Service Quality*, *Corruption Perceived* and *Public Service Quality*, and *Corruption (Corruption Experienced and Corruption Perceived combined)* and *Public Service Quality* serves as individual interaction terms. These are the predictive primary outcomes sought from this multiplicative interaction model in evaluating efficient grease construct and trust nexus.

Corruption experienced and public service interactive effect (efficient grease interaction construct) is not statistically significant.

Corruption perceived and public service interactive effect (efficient grease interaction construct) is not statistically significant.

Corruption combined and public service interactive effect (efficient grease interaction construct) is however statistically positively significant with a coefficient of 0.04 **change** and a standard error of 0.02.

This suggests, when combined, both actual corruption practices and perception of corruption, and public services provided have a positive conditional interaction outcome of efficient grease construct predicated on bribes and red tape in West Africa in the realm of institutional trust by a 0.04 change standard deviation margin with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in the combined independent variable, *ceteris paribus*. The alternative

hypothesis “*The interactive effect of Corruption and Public service quality is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa*” rejects the null hypothesis.

This framework is also supported by R-squared (Within) narrative. As noted earlier, the statistical essence of R-squared (Within) in this study is to help explain policy correlations among countries. R-squared (Within) values in both Table 35 and Table 36 basically remain unchanged for trust in political institutions even after introduction of multiplicative interaction terms. This implies effects of policies within countries might not be as positive or publicly promulgated in the interest of efficient grease red tape influence. That is, efficient grease and its corruption attributes are not a collective welcomed function and feature of effective institutional governance in West Africa according to results of this study.

It is fitting in closing this section, then, by echoing Friedrich’s (1982) assertion that the use of multiplicative interaction models is prolific in the social sciences to test conditional hypotheses so much so that “. . .there is no escaping the fact that conditional relationships are often an accurate reflection of social reality" (p. 832).

This chapter ends with a continuum to Appendix F. As results have shown from the discussions so far, corruption and administrative public service impacts in gauging efficient grease effect present standings that corruption does holistically influence institutional trust in the realm of efficient grease theory in West African governance. The argument explored in Appendix F, however, gives a more relative interpretation of how corruption and public service factors separately affect the eight individual institutions in the study. These institutions are the presidency, parliament/national assembly, electoral commission, ruling party, opposition political party, police, courts of law, and tax/revenue office. The goal is not to reveal if corruption in these

eight institutions studied have a quid pro quo connection between citizens and bureaucrats but to simply validate if corrupt practices indeed are part of West African governing operations.

## CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS

The study uses Afrobarometer household survey data about West Africa for Rounds 6, 7 and 8 covering the period 2014 to 2021, with the year 2016 unavailable in Round 7. Data for the following countries totaling 14 of 16, excluding Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania for which data are not available, are included in the analysis: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. Round 6, for 2014 and 2015, contains 12 of the 14 countries; Round 7, covering 2017 and 2018, has 11 countries; and Round 8, running from 2019 to 2021, accounts for all 14 countries.

The objective of this dissertation is to investigate if corruption influences West African governments in promoting and strengthening citizens' trust in functioning institutions in many aspects of governance including political, economic, cultural, and social obligations in service delivery. This effort is to identify if a link exists among corruption experienced (measured in actual physical bribe paying activities for transactional purposes), corruption perceived (the very thought citizens might have that their government is infiltrated with corrupt behaviors), and trust in political institutions as conduit in providing public services. The combination of these three notions creates a nexus to test the "efficient grease" theory targeting West Africa which stipulates that corruption can strengthen citizen trust since bribe paying, clientelism, patrimonialism and many other self-interested conducts open the door to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies, and that this exercise would ultimately increase institutional trust in governance.

Corruption, when identified as petty in this study, disorients the bounds of functional civil activities that are supposed to support the general framework of providing routine government services. Its characteristics are therefore marked as "illicit, illegal and immoral behaviors" (Warf,



2017, p. 21). It is also structurally distinguished from the grand type of corruption which is institutionalized at the highest level of government and can be readily entrenched in distorted and misguided policymaking regarding, for example, tax collection and redistribution of foreign aid funds that would benefit the entire population (Lavallée et al., 2008; Moyo, 2009; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; Warf, 2017).

To that end, petty corruption, as the focused interest in this study, can take on many forms including “graft, bribes, extortion, embezzlement, inflated payrolls in which the designated payees do not receive funds (“ghost salaries”), over-invoicing, theft of foreign aid, a blind eye toward smuggling, the purchase and sale of legislative votes, nepotistic hiring practices and selling of government contracts, licenses and land concessions” (Warf, 2017, p. 21).

There is some level of argument in political science and economic literature about real and presumed negative and positive consequences of corruption’s correlation with institutional trust and the efficient grease theory. Much of it rests on what this study refers to as the old-way and new-way philosophies of rationalizing corruption. This dissertation analyzes the scholarship on these two schools of thoughts and concludes that the “old way” is still incredibly viable and powerful in West African government operations.

Numerous empirical studies have been conducted to evaluate the impact of corruption on political institutions in various world regions. Some of these scholarly works measured corruption’s negative effect (Della Porta, 2000; Seligson, 2002; Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Chang & Chu, 2006; Cho & Kirwin, 2007; Ogundiya, 2009; Ijewereme (2015). Others have advocated the position that corruption is an essential element that produces positive economic growth and additional benefits in governing (Shils, 1960; Leff, 1964; Bayley, 1967; Huntington, 1968, 1973; Becker & Maher, 1986;

Becquart-Leclerq,1989; Acemoglu & Verdier,1998). The two views respectively represent the new-way thinking that corruption is detrimental, and the old-way stating corruption can reasonably be healthy. This rationalization of the value and impact of corruption is well noted in the general literature review discussion on debating the negative and positive consequences of corruption in running governments in this study. Thus, for the purpose of this dissertation, these expressions simply validate there is notable interest in an effort to understand and explain what corruption entails in governing especially in West African political institutions.

Based on such foundation, this study is focused on the old-way philosophy as valorized by earlier political science and economic scholarship when mapping corruption effect with trust and the efficient grease hypothesis. Per Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968), the prevailing thoughts among proponents of efficient grease theory come down to bribery seen as an efficient way to substantially reduce effective red tape in an environment of heavy bureaucratic burden and lengthy delays if public-private operations are to be achieved successfully. The net outcome, as claimed by Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968), is that corruption can improve economic development and stabilize the political environment. Leff (1964) and Becker and Maher (1986) also add that corruption can spur growth. The probable major point of argument by all these scholars is bribery can allow entrepreneurs to influence the decision-making process. From petty corruption perspective, such influencing leverage would even make access to publicly available services much easier for the common population.

The access attributes noted above seem to foster economic growth in reducing uncertainty in dealing with myriad of bureaucratic bottlenecks and accelerating support for innovative activities of private entrepreneurs and localized business and market interests on a national scale. In that capacity, corruption would then become a wider secondary compensation

source for bureaucrats, which would in turn encourage a favorable environment for providing more efficient government services and improve entrepreneurs' chances to bypass inefficient government regulations at optimal rate in many cases (Leff, 1964; Acemoglu & Verdier, 1998).

It therefore seems plausible then when the old-way scholarship rationalization of corruption dynamics is adopted in this study, the premise of the efficient grease theory becomes more fitting that corruption could strengthen citizens' trust because bribe paying and clientelism open the door to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies (Lavallée et al., 2008). This would in turn increase institutional trust, which has a direct impact on the investigating hypotheses of this study that follow in the next section below.

Alternative hypothesis 1 ( $H_{a1}$ ) investigates *reported corruption (experienced, perceived and/or a combined index) is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa.*

*Corruption Experienced* is not statistically significant.

*Corruption Perceived* is statistically positively significant at the 10 percent level or 90 percent confidence measurement, indicating a p-value of 0.001. The test has a coefficient of 0.16 percentage points with a standard error of 0.02. This shows that citizens' perceptions of corruption in their countries do not diminish their trust level in political institutions at a standard deviation rate of 0.16, with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Corruption Perceived*, ceteris paribus, thus rejecting the null hypothesis.

*Corruption (Corruption Experienced and Corruption Perceived combined)* is statistically positively significant at the 10 percent level or 90 percent confidence measurement, indicating a p-value of 0.001. The test has a coefficient of 0.23 percentage points with a standard error of 0.03. This indicates that the impact of both experienced and perceived corruption taken together is positive and does not undermine institutional trust by a 0.23 change in standard deviation

margin, with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Corruption*, ceteris paribus, thus rejecting the null hypothesis.

Alternative hypothesis 2 (**H<sub>a2</sub>**) investigates *reported public service quality is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa*.

*Public Service Quality* is statistically positively significant for corruption experienced at the 10 percent level or 90 percent confidence measurement, indicating a p-value of 0.001. The test has a coefficient of 0.20 percentage points with a standard error of 0.01.

*Public Service Quality* is statistically positively significant for corruption perceived at the 10 percent level or 90 percent confidence measurement, indicating a p-value of 0.001. The test has a coefficient of 0.18 percentage points with a standard error of 0.01.

*Public Service Quality* is statistically positively significant for corruption combined at the 10 percent level or 90 percent confidence measurement, indicating a p-value of 0.001. The test has a coefficient of 0.19 percentage points with a standard error of 0.01. The level of public service quality afforded citizens is positive and does not undermine institutional trust by a standard deviation margin of 0.20 change in corruption experienced, by a standard deviation margin of 0.18 change in corruption perceived, and by a standard deviation margin of 0.19 change in corruption combined, all with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Public Service Quality*, ceteris paribus. Thus, the null hypothesis is rejected.

Alternative hypothesis 3 (**H<sub>a3</sub>**) investigates that the *interactive effect of corruption and public service quality is positively correlated with institutional trust in West Africa*.

Corruption experienced and public service interactive effect (efficient grease interaction construct) is not statistically significant. Corruption perceived and public service interactive effect (efficient grease interaction construct) is not statistically significant.

Corruption combined and public service interactive effect (efficient grease interaction construct) is statistically positively significant at the 5 percent level or 95 percent confidence measurement, indicating a p-value of 0.05. The test has a coefficient of 0.04 percentage points with a standard error of 0.02. This suggests, when combined, both actual corruption practices and perception of corruption, and public services provided have a positive conditional interaction outcome of efficient grease construct in West Africa by a 0.04 change in standard deviation margin, with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Corruption*, ceteris paribus. In other words, the positive effect of combined corruption does not undermine institutional trust. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected.

As noted above, the study makes a link between trust in political institutions and measurement of efficient grease attributes that may shape some of the policy decisions by government that impact the lives of West African citizens in every way possible. That connection is made through a multiplicative interaction process which further explores and analyzes the trust-corruption-public service quality nexus as an extended consequence of government operational red tape. This analysis is quite plausible since the efficient grease theory is essentially a conditional hypothesis (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2005) to test the interaction effect between institutional trust and corruption in government providing services to its population.

## **Conclusion**

Corruption may appear to be a ubiquitous phenomenon in government operations around the globe. Its severity, causes, types, and consequences may also be cloaked in the different ways they evolve and are manifested geographically. Warf (2017), Rose-Ackerman and Palifka (2016), Moyo (2009), Mbaku (2007) and other scholars have narrated the pervasive nature of

African corruption as the worst or most severe in the world. It is so established then that there exist general causes and consequences that structurally affect all forms of public service corruption anywhere. The purpose of this dissertation, however, is to investigate and evaluate if corruption in West African governments in particular promotes and strengthens citizens' trust in functioning institutions to meet their obligations in many aspects of governance including political, economic, cultural, and social. In other words, the research establishes a nexus of corruption and the efficient grease theory specifically targeting West Africa. The construct of corruption here is based on the framework of petty corruption from the perspective of giving physical bribes (experienced corruption) as a transactional means and community-observed habits (perceived corruption) both serving as corroborating engine that feeds the efficient grease theory. In this study, the result from testing such a theory has helped explain that manufacturing an avenue to gain privileged access to scarce institutional public service delivery is generally positively correlated with citizens' trust in their institutions in West Africa.

The fact that effects of corruption experienced, corruption perceived, corruption combined, and public service distribution positively and broadly correlate with trust in political institutions is therefore an indication corruption does not undermine citizens' overall trust in how the government is run in West Africa. Rather, it reinforces trust in these political institutions.

The multiplicative interaction of these points further proves from the study that there is a positive correlation between citizens' trust in their institutions and the level of services they receive that contributes to the workings of the efficient grease theory. That is, an unbalanced society is created in which government and its citizens operationalize corruption practices as an approved form of engaging in public and private business transactions as the most viable avenue for expediting or achieving results. Such environment incentivizes, strengthens, and increases

citizens' institutional trust in West African governments through bribe paying and clientelism that coopt access to scarce services which may not be readily and equally available to everyone.

This study's perspective findings offer credence to the acceptance of corruption as a way of life in West Africa in the capacity as a survival mechanism that reaffirms citizens' trust in their institutions. The practice is considered a useful way for the government of the region to function. Even though this research shows no diminishing trust in West African institutions, corruption might still not be a great working formula to promote in government administration and its public service persona. As clearly discussed in the literature review, this narrative is obviously differentiated from some other parts of the world as offensive, objectionable and outright dangerous to the administrative states including those found in Western Europe, certain Latin American countries, Asia and even other parts of Africa not included in this study.

Corruption conjures negative effects on political, economic, social and cultural stability. It undermines "accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs as well as socio-economic development in countries" (Olaniyan, 2004, p. 75). According to Lavallée et al. (2008) p. 4), corruption can threaten the stability and security of societies, undermine the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizes sustainable development and the rule of law.

It becomes really sobering when the World Bank (2002) emphatically states that good governance is a declaration of the absence of corruption, meaning corruption can subvert the goals of policy and undermine the legitimacy of public institutions. Such narrative underlines the obvious danger and incapacitation of institutional norms corruption can levy on governments. This leads to the section below about how efficiency is defined or described per Western standards compared to those of the region in the study.

As introduced in the literature review discussion, the definition of efficiency in this study about Western government institutions is rooted in public administration and its public policy agenda. Its core is about fair and equitable redistributive practices in an open environment not hinged on any illegal or corrupt handicapping, in effect promoting policies and programs initiated to adjust for parity.

Ripley and Franklin (1986), Stone (1997) and others refer to the underlining intention of this typology from public policy perspective as government's attempt to readjust the allocation of wealth, property, rights, security, liberty or some other consequential values among social classes or racial groups in society, for example.

The rendering of this practice can be perceived as having winners and losers because some valued items are transferred to one specified group at the expense of another. In West Africa, this is where corruption impacts on efficiency as the agent of redistributive policy takes hold because those who are able to pay for services the government should be providing to meet its public obligations in the first place now become for sale to the highest bidders. Such is the proliferation of the nexus between corruption and trust in institutions. The act and spirit of this behavior does not qualify then as promoting efficiency in the very West African political institutions that are supposed to be guardrails against malfeasance.

The dissertation indicates such environment is manifested in policy decision-making but may also create an opportunity for further study in conducive ways to mitigate some of the problems that might be deduced from the narrative of corruption and its grip on efficient grease analysis about West African governance.



## **Policy implications**

As the findings of this study suggest, an efficient grease environment exists in West Africa due to the upward channeling of the influence of corruption. The reality of this theory harbors centrality to how services are carved out, in other words, who gets what, when, how, and where. Thus, policies are set by the government on a redistributed basis under efficient grease principles, not necessarily in the public policy fashion postulated by scholars like Stone (1997), Weimer and Vining (2017), and Theodoulou and Cahn, 2013).

To that end, understanding the relationship between public policy implications and corruption in West African governance can be challenging if efficient grease attributes are tested under established Western and American scholarship. In that respect at face value, corruption itself must be considered not only as an institutional variable but as a policy variable as well when intersected with prevalence of efficient grease aspirations. As a reminder, Weimer and Vining (2017) justify redistribution policy in terms of efficiency, while Stone (1997) finds just reason for this type of policy also in efficiency, in addition to equity, security and liberty for all citizens.

Redistributive policies and programs, from Western scholarship governance perspective, are initiated to adjust for parity for already issued programs (Ripley & Franklin, 1986). It is about the reallocation of resources in an attempt to level the social, economic, and even political benefit playing field from the well-off to the disadvantaged. Ripley and Franklin (1986) refer to the underlining intention of this typology from public policy perspective as government's attempt to readjust the allocation of wealth, property, rights, or some other consequential values among social classes or racial groups in society. These scholars refer to advocacy of this practice as

having winners and losers because some valued items are transferred to one specified group at the expense of another.

The upshot is the cornerstone for applying and accounting for redistributive policies to include social, economic, political, and other attributes that concern citizens does not exactly play by the rules in the governments of West Africa (Warf, 2017). Thus, the discursive presentation of this dissertation about investigating the nexus of corruption, trust, and efficient grease hypothesis cannot wholly rest just only on the ethos of universally acceptable public administration / public policy dynamics found in the literature. Such aspiring intuition would likely fail in the region of study for many of the reasons cited in this writing about why corruption happens as methodologically spelled out in the literature review section. Most of what these theories identify usually circle back to effects of the central theme of clientelism, patrimonialism, patronage, the resource curse, tribalism, nepotism, etc., thus giving credence to the perception West African governments, by design, are unable to operate within the confines of administrative state, for example, in the image of Woodrow Wilson's politics-administration dichotomy which conjures the notion that it is possible to separate the administrative activities of governance from the activities of politics (Wilson, 1887; Spicer, 2001). Thus, the very specter of efficient grease, as the study suggests, sets the policy barometer for West African governance.

If so, such agenda would then fly in the face of the government making policy decision directly related to issues of effectiveness in governing generally and in the delivery of services (Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith, 2002), or effectuating government's role in delivering on security, equal opportunity in economic achievement and political freedom and choices that go beyond just self-interest of the few to what may benefit the masses (Theodoulou & Cahn, 2013). In other words, the study shows that West African government redistributive policy-making rests on the

pillars of efficient grease practices, but this exercise in the sane world would be unnatural if it did not encounter adverse consequences.

The negative aspects of such ad hoc governance as practiced in West African institutions, even with those under the façade of democracy, could have salient drawbacks according to Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002) when the scenario equates to “procedures lack openness and clarity, officials are not publicly accountable for their actions and therefore government is indifferent to citizen demands and the need for public goods, public investment priorities are distorted, and so on” (p. 9). Nevertheless, government institutions likely survive in this region because they can underwrite as a panacea to all this by simply ignoring every sensibility of good governance and only operating from an opportunistic posture of the efficient grease model.

In closing the policy section, the study might be implying that societal elements of corruption in West Africa need to be abrogated for the sake of progress, as this universally illegal act itself is the cog that opens up in order to feed the efficient grease trend. Its presence is the reality narrative that determines expedient execution of coveted government institutional public policy and its effectiveness which make all the negative or positive difference in the lives of citizens. Thus, this intersectionality of corruption and efficient grease formulates which frame of the population benefits and which does not when the government is supposed to handle its obligation to service.

As the data analysis indicates in the study, corruption is clearly a feature on the West African political, economic, cultural, and social landscape. As asserted by Warf (2017), the prevalence and severity of African corruption, annotated in particular for West Africa in this study’s interest, reflect a wide array of poisonous effects, which could potentially lead to widespread cynicism and distrust of the administrative state. However, as noted earlier, this

study shows that cynicism and distrust can likely be counterweighed by injection of additional corruption influence on institutions which can in turn enable applicability of expedient efficient grease practices. It does not matter even if such activities distort how public services are allocated, if they minimize the beneficial effects of foreign aid, and if they discourage or simply reduce foreign investments (Moyo, 2009) on which most of these countries critically rely on. Such would be an aberration of good governance which the World Bank (2002) notates as “the absence of corruption, which can subvert the goals of policy and undermine the legitimacy of the public institutions that support markets” (p. 99).

### **Recommendations based on limitations of the study**

Before addressing the recommendation piece of the study, a summary discussion is presented about some of the possible ways to curb the persistence of corruption in West Africa.

#### *Corruption mitigation prospect*

From the planning stages, the study was not intended to suggest remedy for West African corruption by way of recommendations as it would have left that for other scholars to contemplate in future research by perusing the abundant data sources available to process their own motives and arrive at conclusions. In that light, however, it is not just because of the data, but how the researchers would choose to analyze the data becomes the most key factor (Silberzahn, et.al., 2018). This would include settling on different hypotheses, or the use of different methods. Such varied measures may be more of the reason why two studies of the same phenomenon may reach different conclusions.

The original intent here, then, was to only attempt to explain corruption as this illicit act of government malfeasance that always has the potential to thwart societal progress in crumbling and debilitating fashion. Such a premise was based on the notion that, for the most part as

pronounced by van den Bersselaar and Decker (2011), institutional theory usually seems to advocate the explaining of the existence of pervasive corruption rather than to propose policies that would strongly support mitigation of this scourge.

A scholarly rationality put forth by North (1990) articulates this point above in that it makes more sense for the researcher to ask why some areas are developed rather than why some are underdeveloped, which naturally underlies the theme of this study where corruption and its relationship with the efficient grease theory matter. Put in a measure of reality, Teorell (2007) postulates that when people and governments are seeking solutions to the problem of corruption, it may be beneficial to evaluate societies throughout history that once did feature generalized or pervasive corruption, but no longer do or simply do not exist any longer. Just maybe, the countries in the study could learn and adopt what is good rather than what is detrimental to their own growth and sustainability.

To that end as stated above, it may sometimes appear that West African nations would want to be engaged in anti-corruption campaigns (Riley, 1998; Asongu, 2013). However, such programs usually achieve limited success in this region simply because those who run them have contemporaneous corrupt intent at the outset. This practice even extends to the mismanagement of foreign funds regardless of the donors' attempts to safeguard their interests through their own planned anti-corruption campaigns (Michael, 2004; Moyo, 2009). In fact, Moyo (2009) characterizes the foreign aid liaison as based on conditionalities which might not all be beneficial to the receiving country or could simply be constraining. These might include countries that receive aid must spend it on specific goods and services originated only from donor countries or approved supplier groups. This would also include staffing even if the host country has a consignment of qualified citizens to perform the job. Another restriction or conditionality is that

the donor would reserve the right to select the sector and/or project that the aid would support. Lastly, the aid shall only flow as long as the recipient country accepts a framework for a set of economic and political policies.

Considering how deeply corruption touches all aspects of political, economic, social and cultural relationships from high institutional bodies to street level bureaucracies in West Africa as the study suggests, anti-corruption efforts might be deemed as window dressing in this arena. Their motives can even take a much darker side when opportunistic attacks are leveled on political opponents of established regimes (Warf, 2017).

Nevertheless, there can be more meaningful steps taken to curb West African institutional corruption if all the stakeholders are willing to honor the intent. They would include pathways to what Mbaku (2007) and Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991) categorize as approaches to corruption cleanup. Elements of such approaches reflect implementing societal (defining common standard of morality to test corrupt behavior), legal (judiciary, police, and mass media must champion the fight against corruption), market (closing the loopholes that exacerbate bribe opportunities created by government regulations, for example), and political strategies (decentralization of power to deflate concentration of influence exerted by any ruling coalition that enables corrupt activities). Again, the success of these strategies would of course depend on how effectively these counteracting institutions can work together.

These focused areas for curbing corruption can then generally be broken down into, as gleaned from Mbaku's (2007) assertion, reforming existing laws and institutions, advancing literacy rate for the wider population, enhancing political stability, providing higher salaries for civil servants, advocating an independent watchdog media free of censorship, protecting

whistleblowers when they expose government malfeasance, maintaining closer controls over foreign aid receipts, and closely accounting for the revenues derived from resource exports.

A deeper dive into the literacy aspect of curtailing corruption could synthesize with the notion revealed in this study's data analysis. Though exposure to education from the primary level in the study is quite prevalent, a higher number of students need to enter and graduate from university. The more educated citizens are, the better they can contribute to their civic duties in running their country. They may even be able to deflect some of the cynicism about their government thus enabling institutions to become amenable towards producing qualified and endearing policy results.

One other area of interest the study specifically underlines is the job of the media as a critical watchdog of corrupt institutions in West Africa as mentioned above. It clearly shows that there is an inverse relationship among corruption, democracy, and the media. As reported from the regression analyses of Tables 35 and 36, both corruption and test for democracy broadly buoy citizens' trust in their institutions even when there is evidence the media is critical of such relationship. Government officials and other relevant stakeholders must heed the call to divest from satisfying their personal interests the efficient grease alliance bestows upon them and address the reality of corruption.

The final inference about how to reduce petty corruption as related to the efficient grease theory is to avoid the timidity of a conundrum of introducing and implementing policies to reduce overall corruption. Since any ideal and plural society would aspire to improve efficiency and outcomes across the political, economic, social and cultural spectrum, policymakers in West Africa as well should always be on the lookout for constructive strategies to fill that gap. However, per Olken and Pande (2012), emerging literature seems to suggest that there are more

questions to pose than concrete answers to resolving the issue of corruption as an analog for policymaking in the region covered by this study. The following recommendation section shall shed light on some areas that future research might find interesting to investigate for answers.

### Recommendations

Based on characterization of mitigation strategies of corruption noted in the last section above, some of the limitations or shortcomings of the study are themselves naturally bound to be projected into recommendations. In other words, the very core of the recommendations is predicated on limitations exposed or implied in the study. This platform can also be extended to the entire continent to investigate a broader substance of the corrosiveness of African corruption that imperils all aspects of life in the region.

The most recommended area for this study is about measurement of spatiality of citizens of West Africa and their characteristics when attempting to identify the effects of corruption that afflict them. The principal factor here is that results cannot be generalized to West Africa in its entirety without considering the peculiar characteristics of the 14 countries of the various rounds of the Afrobarometer public opinion survey data used for this study. In other words, as asserted by Warf (2017), it is quite likely that the empirical findings giving rise to corruption in West Africa do not equally impact the countries studied, or even the rest of Africa.

In that light, corruption must be understood not only geographically in spatial terms (respective of the countries studied), but also contextually because there are different factors that can be both enabling and constraining. According to Warf (2017), such factors could include, for example, effect of the resource curse, the colonial legacy of borders and tribal conflicts borne out of such errant decision, and the aggrandizement of foreign policies that not only serve the interests of foreign aid donor countries but also embolden leaders in any of those recipient



countries to behave in non-democratic fashion mirroring dictatorship or autocracy. Some of these outcomes could lead to failed states that are initially underwritten by tribal conflicts and eventually maturing into civil wars.

Thus, this study highly recommends further investigation into some of the national particularities of the West African region, some of which could spill over across the rest of the continent as alluded to above. Even when the study exhibits that general trends in behaviors among countries exist, the detailed individual characteristics of the countries can still be somewhat different. Such apparent observation is uniquely presented by the descriptive analyses in Chapter 4 about the level of trust in political institutions, level of corruption experienced or perceived, level of satisfaction with public service delivery, and level of ease of access to services. On the individual citizen level, corruption can also differ from one country to the next as well.

An additional element of this recommendation is recognition of social interactions within individual nations. According to Lavallée et al. (2008), the contexts, predominant opinions, and attitudes in a given society can further influence individual attitudes towards institutions and corruption. It would therefore be beneficial to the literature if future studies about West Africa in related areas could formulate and explain on a macro plane. For example, a deeper analysis could focus on the level of trust between individuals - that is the percentage of those who trust their fellow citizens, level of disapproval of corruption by all sectors, level of infrastructural development even with the impediment corruption exudes, and evaluation of the quality and overall performance of institutions. This dissertation is far limited in scope for delineation of these characterizations in detail.

The final element of recommendation, perhaps the most important one due to its raw visceral and deterministic attributes, is to investigate the magnitude of corruption changes realized in respect to levels of public service delivery and the ease of access to services over a studied period. Such a test could possibly explain if the changes in the situations, and not just the already known situations at hand, have some influence on attitudes towards West African institutions on aggregate. It would be contributory if emerging literature espouses some level of specificity in this area.

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## APPENDICES

This section is comprised of additional information that explains datapoints in support of conducting data analysis of the study. Appendix A provides some context to using Cronbach's alpha coefficients to determine reliability of internal consistency of summated variables on a scale. Appendix B defines variables for individual Afrobarometer Rounds 6, 7, and 8 data. It then renames the variables from the individual datasets for the rounds to create a combined single file applied in data analysis. Appendix C, Appendix D, and Appendix E contain tables and figures used to support data analysis specifics related to each of the three rounds. Appendix F analyzes corruption practices and their implications in West Africa across the eight governing institutions in the study.

## **Appendix A: Cronbach's alpha coefficient built**

All the dependent variables and select independent variables in this study are not single-item variables. Rather, they are a set or group of variables that measure the same underlying construct in this dissertation whose survey questions are predominantly based on Likert format (Likert, 1932). Acquiring Cronbach's alpha coefficients is appropriate then for this study in establishing levels of fitness of these separate variables from a Likert scale in building a single construct – dependent or independent variable.

The impacted dependent variables are *Trust in Political Institutions*, *Corruption Experienced*, *Corruption Perceived*, *Public Service Quality*, and *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services*.

The independent variables are *Corruption*, *Quality Administration Services*, *Media Exposure*, *Freedom of Speech*, and *Fair Equal Treatment*.

Cronbach's alpha is a statistical scaling method used to measure reliability of internal consistency or item interrelatedness of a scale or test (Cronbach, 1951). Reliability in this context applies to the data, and not the scale or test measure. Cho and Kim (2015) and Cortina (1993) assert that internal consistency is the extent that all items on a scale or test can contribute positively towards measuring the same construct. This makes internal consistency reliability relevant to composite scores, which is summing all items of the scale or test to gain some level of confidence of how correlated they are with each other in measuring the same thing.

The notable significance here is that Cronbach's alpha is usually reported in scales ranging from 0 to 1, with the larger values representing more reliability (Cortina, 1993), meaning there is a closer correlation among the variables for near perfect consistency in measurement. It is the same scaling practice that is fully applied in this study.

However, scholars are of different opinions as to the acceptable ranking of Cronbach's alpha coefficient which falls between 0 and 1. Cho and Kim (2015) appropriately state "One size does not fit all" (p. 218) when attempting to locate a common ground for this measurement. To that end, Lance, Butts, and Michels (2006) and Nunnally (1978) have floated the lower cutoff point to be set at 0.7 to 0.8 while others including Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010) contend that the cutoff can go as far down to 0.6. Still, Cho and Kim (2015) and Cortina (1993) suggest no arbitrary or automatic cutoff criteria should be set, but to simply apply these coefficients as guides based on how the scale is used, depending on the type of research and its intended result.

So, the general Cronbach's alpha value range associated with internal consistency extracted from this discussion goes as follows:  $\geq 0.9$  – excellent,  $\geq 0.8$  – good,  $\geq 0.7$  – acceptable,  $\geq 0.6$  – questionable,  $\geq 0.5$  – poor, and  $\leq .5$  – unacceptable. It should be noted that this dissertation's Cronbach's alpha application does not fall below the 0.6 mark.

Based on the above discussion, Appendix A, Tables 11 to 20 present below Cronbach's alpha values for each of the ten summated dependent and independent variables named in this section.

**Table 11: Trust in Political Institutions (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach's Alpha Scale)**

Test scale = mean(standardized items)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Average Interitem covariance	alpha
Trust President	49981	+	0.7426	0.6442	0.4673	0.8599
Trust Parliamt/National Assem	49981	+	0.7804	0.6932	0.4561	0.8544
Trust Electoral Commission	49981	+	0.7600	0.6660	0.4620	0.8574
Trust Ruling Party	48781	+	0.7936	0.7107	0.4525	0.8526
Trust Opposition Political Parties	48781	+	0.6681	0.5502	0.4890	0.8701
Trust Police	49981	+	0.6964	0.5850	0.4806	0.8662
Trust Courts of Law	49981	+	0.7206	0.6158	0.4736	0.8630
Trust Tax/Revenue Office	35187	+	0.7026	0.5964	0.4759	0.8640
Test scale					0.4697	0.8763

*Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 (2014 to 2021) data****Cronbach's alpha 0.9 indicates very high variable internal consistency of the data.*****Table 12: Corruption Experienced (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach's Alpha Scale)**

Test scale = mean(standardized items)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Average Interitem covariance	alpha
Pay bribe for Public Sch Services	49981	+	0.6175	0.3437	0.2045	0.5070
Pay Bribe for Medical Care	49981	+	0.5916	0.3089	0.2177	0.5268
Pay bribe for Document or Permit	49981	+	0.6100	0.3335	0.2084	0.5129
Pay Bribe for Police Assistance	49981	+	0.6176	0.3438	0.2045	0.5070
Pay Bribe to Avoid Police	49981	+	0.5966	0.3156	0.2151	0.5230
Test scale					0.2101	0.5707

*Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 (2014 to 2021) data****Cronbach's alpha 0.6 indicates an acceptable but questionable variable internal consistency of the data.***

**Table 13: Corruption Perceived (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach's Alpha Scale)**


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Test scale = mean(standardized items)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Average Interitem covariance	alpha
Office of the Presidency	49981	+	0.8506	0.7751	0.6901	0.9176
Members of Parliament	49981	+	0.8774	0.8142	0.6751	0.9122
Civil Servants	49981	+	0.8911	0.8339	0.6672	0.9093
Police	49981	+	0.8415	0.7612	0.6940	0.9189
Judges and Magistrates	49981	+	0.8518	0.7770	0.6888	0.9171
Tax Officials	35187	+	0.8445	0.7707	0.6900	0.9175
Test scale					0.6843	0.9286

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Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 (2014 to 2021) data

**Cronbach's alpha 0.9 indicates very high variable internal consistency of the data.**

**Table 14: Public Service Quality (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach's Alpha Scale)**


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Test scale = mean(standardized items)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Average Interitem covariance	alpha
Improving basic health services	49981	+	0.7866	0.6501	0.4917	0.7946
Addressing educational needs	49981	+	0.7733	0.6305	0.5003	0.8002
Providing water & sanitation serv	49981	+	0.7953	0.6631	0.4861	0.7909
Maintaining roads and bridges	49981	+	0.7591	0.6097	0.5094	0.8060
Providing reliable electric supply	49981	+	0.7576	0.6076	0.5104	0.8066
Test scale					0.4996	0.8331

---

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 (2014 to 2021) data

**Cronbach's alpha 0.8 indicates high variable internal consistency of the data.**

**Table 15: Ease of Access to Public Services (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach's Alpha Scale)**

Test scale = mean(standardized items)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Average Interitem covariance	alpha
Electricity grid	49981	+	0.5899	0.4276	0.1313	0.5762
Piped water system	49981	+	0.4780	0.2939	0.1462	0.6065
Sewage system	49981	+	0.4068	0.2127	0.1557	0.6240
Mobile phone service	49981	+	0.3356	0.1343	0.1652	0.6404
School	49981	+	0.3637	0.1649	0.1615	0.6341
Police station	49981	+	0.5671	0.3996	0.1343	0.5827
Health clinic	49981	+	0.5219	0.3454	0.1403	0.5950
Market stalls	49981	+	0.5198	0.3429	0.1406	0.5956
Bank or money services	49981	+	0.5708	0.4042	0.1338	0.5816
Paid transport	49981	+	0.4551	0.2674	0.1493	0.6123
Test scale					0.1458	0.6306

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 (2014 to 2021) data

**Cronbach's alpha 0.6 indicates an acceptable but questionable variable internal consistency of the data.**



**Table 16: Corruption (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach's Alpha Scale)**


---

Test scale = mean(standardized items)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Average Interitem covariance	alpha
Pay bribe for Public Sch Services	49981	+	0.3545	0.1934	0.2587	0.7772
Pay Bribe for Medical Care	49981	+	0.3130	0.1481	0.2644	0.7824
Pay Bribe for Document or Permit	49981	+	0.3396	0.1771	0.2606	0.7790
Pay Bribe for Police Assistance	49981	+	0.3401	0.1778	0.2606	0.7789
Pay Bribe to Avoid Police	49981	+	0.3286	0.1649	0.2623	0.7804
Office of the Presidency	49981	+	0.7229	0.6242	0.2076	0.7237
Members of Parliament	49981	+	0.7506	0.6596	0.2037	0.7190
Civil Servants	49981	+	0.7678	0.6816	0.2013	0.7159
Police	49981	+	0.7197	0.6202	0.2079	0.7241
Judges and Magistrate	49981	+	0.7342	0.6387	0.2060	0.7218
Tax Officials	35187	+	0.7258	0.6326	0.2132	0.7304
Test scale					0.2314	0.7680

---

*Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 (2014 to 2021) data*

***Cronbach's alpha 0.8 indicates high variable internal consistency of the data.***

**Table 17: Quality of Admin Services (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach's Alpha Scale)**


---

Test scale = mean(standardized items)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Average Interitem covariance	alpha
Improving basic health services	49981	+	0.4837	0.3499	0.1182	0.6524
Addressing educational needs	49981	+	0.4705	0.3350	0.1191	0.6544
Providing water & sanitation serv	49981	+	0.5356	0.4093	0.1146	0.6444
Maintaining roads and bridges	49981	+	0.5262	0.3985	0.1152	0.6458
Providing reliable electric supply	49981	+	0.5358	0.4096	0.1146	0.6443
Electricity grid	49981	+	0.5170	0.3879	0.1159	0.6473
Piped water system	49981	+	0.3994	0.2559	0.1241	0.6649
Sewage system	49981	+	0.3242	0.1743	0.1294	0.6754
Mobile phone service	49981	+	0.2678	0.1145	0.1334	0.6830
School	49981	+	0.2841	0.1317	0.1322	0.6808
Police station	49981	+	0.4315	0.2913	0.1219	0.6602
Health clinic	49981	+	0.3959	0.2520	0.1244	0.6654
Market stalls	49981	+	0.4054	0.2624	0.1237	0.6640
Bank or money services	49981	+	0.4381	0.2987	0.1214	0.6593
Paid transport	49981	+	0.3633	0.2165	0.1267	0.6700
Test scale					0.1223	0.6764

---

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 (2014 to 2021) data

**Cronbach's alpha 0.7 indicates a very acceptable variable internal consistency of the data.**

**Table 18: Media Exposure (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach's Alpha Scale)**


---

Test scale = mean(standardized items)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Average Interitem covariance	alpha
Radio news	49981	+	0.4775	0.2125	0.4881	0.7923
Television news	49981	+	0.6847	0.4796	0.3675	0.6991
Newspaper news	49981	+	0.7079	0.5125	0.3540	0.6867
Internet news	49981	+	0.8247	0.6893	0.2860	0.6158
Social media news	49981	+	0.7968	0.6453	0.3023	0.6341
Test scale					0.3596	0.7373

---

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 (2014 to 2021) data

**Cronbach's alpha 0.7 indicates a very acceptable variable internal consistency of the data.**

**Table 19: Freedom of Speech (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach's Alpha Scale)**


---

Test scale = mean(standardized items)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Average Interitem covariance	alpha
Freedom to say what you think	49981	+	0.7389	0.3496	0.3497	0.6173
Freedom to join political organ	49981	+	0.8028	0.4180	0.2635	0.5177
Freedom in voter's choice	35187	+	0.7977	0.5535	0.2554	0.5071
How free is news media	18398	+	0.5159	0.1494	0.4410	0.7029
Test scale					0.3400	0.6733

---

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 (2014 to 2021) data

**Cronbach's alpha 0.7 indicates a very acceptable variable internal consistency of the data.**

**Table 20: Fair and Equal Treatment (ROUNDS 6, 7, and 8 Cronbach's Alpha Scale)**


---

Test scale = mean(standardized items)

Item	Obs	Sign	Item-test correlation	Item-rest correlation	Average Interitem covariance	alpha
How often people treated unequally	49981	+	0.5449	0.0720	0.5832	0.8076
Unfairly treated due to economic stat	18398	+	0.7710	0.5011	0.2167	0.4536
Unfairly treated due to religion	33192	+	0.7809	0.4258	0.1643	0.3710
Unfairly treated due to ethnicity	49981	+	0.7839	0.2326	0.1568	0.3582
Test scale					0.2660	0.5918

---

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Rounds 6, 7, 8 (2014 to 2021) data

**Cronbach's alpha 0.6 indicates an acceptable but questionable variable internal consistency of the data.**

A Stata software command is used to produce the individual tables exhibiting statistical inferences from Cronbach's alpha scales. For this study that command is:

**alpha v1 v2 v3...v#**, **asis std item detail gen(new\_variable)** where **v1** to **v#** are the individual dependent or independent variables measuring the same construct to be found in the generated

**new\_variable**. The options after the comma (,) on the command line interpret to:

**asis** – the sign of each item (variable) displayed in the table taken as is (positive or negative)

**std** - standardize items (variables) in the scale to have a mean of 0 and a variance of 1

**item** - display item-test and item-rest correlations of variables in the table

**detail** - list individual interitem correlations and covariances in the table

The value of most significance for this dissertation is the alpha coefficient on the test scale line of the table. This is the indicator of reliability of internal consistency when totaling the separate variables in building the same construct. The closer that figure is to 1 (one), the greater the internal consistency.

### **Appendix B: Define variables**

Tables 21 to 24 define variables for this study. Most of the variable names describing the same items are different in each round of the Afrobarometer data in the study. Because of this mismatch in nomenclature, Appendix B displays the individual tables representing Rounds 6, 7, and 8. The variables from the three separate rounds are renamed when data from their individual datasets are combined into a single file. The renamed variables in Table 24, representing the appended file, are then exclusively invoked as the source for analysis in the dissertation.

**Table 21: Define Variables Round 6**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
<b>Dependent</b>	<b>Dependent</b>		
<i>Trust in Political Institutions</i>			
Trust_Pol_Inst	q52a	Ordinal	Trust President
	q52b	Ordinal	Trust Parliament/National Assembly
	q52c	Ordinal	Trust Electoral Commission
	q52f	Ordinal	Trust Ruling Party
	q52g	Ordinal	Trust Opposition Political Parties
	q52h	Ordinal	Trust Police
	q52j	Ordinal	Trust Courts of Law
	q52d	Ordinal	Trust Tax/Revenue Office
<i>Corruption Experienced</i>			
Corr_Experienced	q55b	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Public School Services
	q55d	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Medical Care
	q55f	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Identity Document
	q55i	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Police Assistance
	q55j	Ordinal	Pay Bribe to Avoid Police
<i>Corruption Perceived</i>			
Corr_Perceived	q53a	Ordinal	Office of the Presidency
	q53b	Ordinal	Members of Parliament/National Assembly
	q53c	Ordinal	Civil Servants
	q53e	Ordinal	Police
	q53g	Ordinal	Judges and Magistrates
	q53f	Ordinal	Tax Officials
<i>Public Service Quality</i>			
Pub_Service_Quality	q66g	Ordinal	Handling improving basic health services
	q66h	Ordinal	Handling addressing educational needs
	q66i	Ordinal	Handling providing water & sanitation services
	q66l	Ordinal	Handling maintaining roads and bridges
	q66m	Ordinal	Handling providing reliable supply of electricity
<i>Citizens' Ease of Access to Public Services</i>			
Citizen_Ease_of_Access	ea_svc_a	Ordinal	Electricity grid in the PSU/EA
	ea_svc_b	Ordinal	Piped water system in PSU/EA
	ea_svc_c	Ordinal	Sewage system in the PSU/EA
	ea_svc_d	Ordinal	Mobile phone service PSU/EA
	ea_fac_b	Ordinal	School in the PSU/EA
	ea_fac_c	Ordinal	Police station in the PSU/EA
	ea_fac_d	Ordinal	Health Clinic in the PSU/EA
	ea_fac_e	Ordinal	Market stalls in the PSU/EA
	ea_fac_f	Ordinal	Bank/money services in PSU/EA
	ea_fac_g	Ordinal	Paid transport in the PSU/EA

**Table 21: Define Variables Round 6**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
<b>Independent (Primary)</b>	<b>Independent (Primary)</b>		
Corruption	Variables for experienced and perceived corruption	Ordinal	Built from both experienced and perceived corruption variables
Quality_Admin_Services	Variables for public service quality and citizens' ease of access to public services	Ordinal	Built from both public service quality and citizens' ease of access to public services variables
Media_Exposure	q12a q12b q12c q12d q12e	Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal	Radio news Television news Newspaper news Internet news Social media news
Satisfied_With_Democracy	q41	Ordinal	How satisfied is citizen with democracy in country
Freedom_of_Speech	q15a q15b q15c	Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal	Freedom to say what you think about govt Freedom to join any political organization Freedom to choose who to vote for
Fair_Equal_Treatment	q51b q88a	Ordinal Ordinal	How often people are treated unequally Experienced unfair treatment based on ethnicity
<b>Control / Blocking</b>	<b>Control / Blocking</b>		
Urban	q115	Binary	Reside in rural (1) or urban (2) community
Age	q1	Ratio / Ordinal	How old you are
Women	q101	Binary	Gender (q101 = 2)
Country_econ_condition	q4a	Ordinal	Present economic condition of the country
Living_Conditions	q4b	Ordinal	Citizens' present living conditions
Primary High_School University	q97	Ordinal	Primary completed (q97 = 3) High school completed (q97 = 5) Has university degree (q97 = 8)

Source: "ORIGINAL VARIABLES" from Afrobarometer survey codebook and dataset covering period for 2014 and 2015 (Round 6)

**Table 22: Define Variables Round 7**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
<b>Dependent</b>	<b>Dependent</b>		
<i>Trust in Political Institutions</i>			
Trust_Pol_Inst	q43a	Ordinal	Trust President
	q43b	Ordinal	Trust Parliament/National Assembly
	q43c	Ordinal	Trust Electoral Commission
	q43e	Ordinal	Trust Ruling Party
	q43f	Ordinal	Trust Opposition Political Parties
	q43g	Ordinal	Trust Police
	q43i	Ordinal	Trust Courts of Law
<i>Corruption Experienced</i>			
Corr_Experienced	q49c	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Public School Services
	q49g	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Medical Care
	q49k	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Identity Document
	q49r	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Police Assistance
	q49t	Ordinal	Pay Bribe to Avoid Police
<i>Corruption Perceived</i>			
Corr_Perceived	q44a	Ordinal	Office of the Presidency
	q44b	Ordinal	Members of Parliament/National Assembly
	q44c	Ordinal	Civil Servants
	q44e	Ordinal	Police
	q44f	Ordinal	Judges and Magistrates
<i>Public Service Quality</i>			
Pub_Service_Quality	q56g	Ordinal	Handling improving basic health services
	q56h	Ordinal	Handling addressing educational needs
	q56i	Ordinal	Handling providing water & sanitation services
	q56l	Ordinal	Handling maintaining roads and bridges
	q56m	Ordinal	Handling providing reliable supply of electricity
<i>Citizens' Ease of Access to Public Services</i>			
Citizen_Ease_of_Access	ea_svc_a	Ordinal	Electricity grid in the PSU/EA
	ea_svc_b	Ordinal	Piped water system in PSU/EA
	ea_svc_c	Ordinal	Sewage system in the PSU/EA
	ea_svc_d	Ordinal	Mobile phone service in PSU/EA
	ea_fac_b	Ordinal	School in the PSU/EA
	ea_fac_c	Ordinal	Police station in the PSU/EA
	ea_fac_d	Ordinal	Health Clinic in the PSU/EA
	ea_fac_e	Ordinal	Market stalls in the PSU/EA
	ea_fac_f	Ordinal	Bank/money services in PSU/EA
	ea_fac_g	Ordinal	Paid transport in the PSU/EA
<b>Independent (Primary)</b>	<b>Independent (Primary)</b>		

**Table 22: Define Variables Round 7**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
Corruption	Variables for experienced and perceived corruption	Ordinal	Built from both experienced and perceived corruption variables
Quality_Admin_Services	Variables for public service quality and citizens' ease of access to public services	Ordinal	Built from both public service quality and citizens' ease of access to public services variables
Media_Exposure	q12a q12b q12c q12d q12e	Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal	Radio news Television news Newspaper news Internet news Social media news
Satisfied_With_Democracy	q36	Ordinal	How satisfied is citizen with democracy in country
Freedom_of_Speech	q14 q19b	Ordinal Ordinal	Freedom to say what you think about govt Freedom to join any political organization
Fair_Equal_Treatment	q42d q86b  q86c	Ordinal Ordinal  Ordinal	How often people are treated unequally Experienced unfair treatment based on religion Experienced unfair treatment based on ethnicity
<b>Control / Blocking</b>	<b>Control / Blocking</b>		
Urban	q115	Binary	Reside in rural (1) or urban (2) community
Age	q1	Ratio / Ordinal	How old you are
Women	q101	Binary	Gender (q101 = 2)
Country_econ_condition	q4a	Ordinal	Present economic condition of the country
Living_Conditions	q4b	Ordinal	Citizens' present living conditions
Primary High_School University	q97	Ordinal	Primary completed (q97 = 3) High school completed (q97 = 5) Has university degree (q97 = 8)

Source: "ORIGINAL VARIABLES" from Afrobarometer survey codebook and dataset covering period for 2017 and 2018, with 2016 data missing (Round 7)



**Table 23: Define Variables Round 8**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
<b>Dependent</b> <i>Trust in Political Institutions</i>	<b>Dependent</b>		
Trust_Pol_Inst	q41a	Ordinal	Trust President
	q41b	Ordinal	Trust Parliament/National Assembly
	q41c	Ordinal	Trust Electoral Commission
	q41e	Ordinal	Trust Ruling Party
	q41f	Ordinal	Trust Opposition Political Parties
	q41g	Ordinal	Trust Police
	q41i	Ordinal	Trust Courts of Law
	q41j	Ordinal	Trust Tax/Revenue Office
<i>Corruption Experienced</i>			
Corr_Experienced	q44c	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Public School Services
	q44f	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Medical Care
	q44i	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Identity Document
	q44l	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Police Assistance
	q44n	Ordinal	Pay Bribe to Avoid Police
<i>Corruption Perceived</i>			
Corr_Perceived	q42a	Ordinal	Office of the Presidency
	q42b	Ordinal	Members of Parliament/National Assembly
	q42c	Ordinal	Civil Servants
	q42e	Ordinal	Police
	q42f	Ordinal	Judges and Magistrates
	q42g	Ordinal	Tax Officials
<i>Public Service Quality</i>			
Pub_Service_Quality	q50g	Ordinal	Handling improving basic health services
	q50h	Ordinal	Handling addressing educational needs
	q50i	Ordinal	Handling providing water & sanitation services
	q50k	Ordinal	Handling maintaining roads and bridges
	q50l	Ordinal	Handling providing reliable supply of electricity
<i>Citizens' Ease of Access to Public Services</i>			
Citizen_Ease_of_Access	ea_svc_a	Ordinal	Electricity grid in PSU/EA
	ea_svc_b	Ordinal	Piped water system in PSU/EA
	ea_svc_c	Ordinal	Sewage system in PSU/EA
	ea_svc_d	Ordinal	Mobile phone service in PSU/EA
	ea_fac_b	Ordinal	School in the PSU/EA
	ea_fac_c	Ordinal	Police station in PSU/EA
	ea_fac_d	Ordinal	Health Clinic in PSU/EA
	ea_fac_e	Ordinal	Market stalls in PSU/EA

**Table 23: Define Variables Round 8**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
	ea_fac_f	Ordinal	Bank/money services in PSU/EA
	ea_fac_g	Ordinal	Paid transport in the PSU/EA
<b>Independent (Primary)</b>	<b>Independent (Primary)</b>		
Corruption	Variables for experienced and perceived corruption	Ordinal	Built from both experienced and perceived corruption variables
Quality_Admin_Services	Variables for public service quality and citizens' ease of access to public services	Ordinal	Built from both public service quality and citizens' ease of access to public services variables
Media_Exposure	q55a q55b q55c q55d q55e	Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal	Radio news Television news Newspaper news Internet news Social media news
Satisfied_With_Democracy	q37	Ordinal	How satisfied is citizen with democracy in country
Freedom_of_Speech	q10a q10b q10c q56	Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal	Freedom to say what you think about govt Freedom to join any political organization Freedom to choose who to vote for News media free from govt censorship
Fair_Equal_Treatment	q40e q84a q84b q84c	Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal	How often people are treated unequally Experienced unfair treatment based on economic status Experienced unfair treatment based on religion Experienced unfair treatment based on ethnicity
<b>Control / Blocking</b>	<b>Control / Blocking</b>		
Urban	q115	Binary	Reside in rural (1) or urban (2) community
Age	q1	Ratio / Ordinal	How old you are
Women	q101	Binary	Gender (q101 = 2)

**Table 23: Define Variables Round 8**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
Country_econ_condition	q4a	Ordinal	Present economic condition of the country
Living_Conditions	q4b	Ordinal	Citizens' present living conditions
Primary High_School University	q97	Ordinal	Primary completed (q97 = 3) High school completed (q97 = 5) Has university degree (q97 = 8)

Source: "ORIGINAL VARIABLES" from Afrobarometer survey codebook and dataset covering period from 2019 to 2021 (Round 8)

**Table 24: Define Variables in Combined Rounds (RENAMED)**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
<b>Dependent</b> <i>Trust in Political Institutions</i>	<b>Dependent</b>		
Trust_Pol_Inst	Trust_President	Ordinal	Trust President
	Trust_Parliament_National_Asmbly	Ordinal	Trust Parliament/National Assembly
	Trust_Electoral_Commission	Ordinal	Trust Electoral Commission
	Trust_Ruling_Party	Ordinal	Trust Ruling Party
	Trust_Opposition_Political_Party	Ordinal	Trust Opposition Political Parties
	Trust_Police	Ordinal	Trust Police
	Trust_Courts_of_Law	Ordinal	Trust Courts of Law
	Trust_Tax_Revenue_Office	Ordinal	Trust Tax/Revenue Office
<i>Corruption Experienced</i>			
Corr_Experienced	Pay_Bribe_for_Public_School_Serv	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Public School Services
	Pay_Bribe_for_Medical_Care	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Medical Care
	Pay_Bribe_for_Identity_Document	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Identity Document
	Pay_Bribe_for_Police_Assistance	Ordinal	Pay Bribe for Police Assistance
	Pay_Bribe_to_Avoid_Police	Ordinal	Pay Bribe to Avoid Police
<i>Corruption Perceived</i>			
Corr_Perceived	Office_of_the_Presidency	Ordinal	Office of the Presidency
	Member_of_Parliamt_Nation_Asmbly	Ordinal	Members of Parliament/National Assembly
	Civil_Servants	Ordinal	Civil Servants
	Police	Ordinal	Police
	Judges_and_Magistrates	Ordinal	Judges and Magistrates
	Tax_Officials	Ordinal	Tax Officials
<i>Public Service Quality</i>			
Pub_Service_Quality	Handle_improving_health_services	Ordinal	Handling improving basic health services
	Handle_addressing_educat_needs	Ordinal	Handling addressing educational needs
	Handle_provide_water_sanitat_ser	Ordinal	Handling providing water & sanitation services

**Table 24: Define Variables in Combined Rounds (RENAMED)**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
	Handle_maintaining_roads_bridges	Ordinal	Handling maintaining roads and bridges
	Handle_provide_reliable_electric	Ordinal	Handling providing reliable supply of electricity
<i>Citizens' Ease of Access to Public Services</i>			
Citizen_Ease_of_Access	Electricity_grid_in_the_PSU_EA	Ordinal	Electricity grid in the PSU/EA
	Piped_water_system_in_the_PSU_EA	Ordinal	Piped water system in PSU/EA
	Sewage_system_in_the_PSU_EA	Ordinal	Sewage system in the PSU/EA
	Mobile_phone_serv_in_the_PSU_EA	Ordinal	Mobile phone service in PSU/EA
	School_in_the_PSU_EA	Ordinal	School in the PSU/EA
	Police_station_in_the_PSU_EA	Ordinal	Police station in the PSU/EA
	Health_Clinic_in_the_PSU_EA	Ordinal	Health Clinic in the PSU/EA
	Market_stalls_in_the_PSU_EA	Ordinal	Market stalls in the PSU/EA
	Bank_money_service_in_the_PSU_EA	Ordinal	Bank/money services in the PSU/EA
	Paid_transport_in_the_PSU_EA	Ordinal	Paid transport in the PSU/EA
<b>Independent (Primary)</b>	<b>Independent (Primary)</b>		
Corruption	Variables for experienced and perceived corruption	Ordinal	Built from both experienced and perceived corruption variables
Quality_Admin_Services	Variables for public service quality and citizens' ease of access to public services	Ordinal	Built from both public service quality and citizens' ease of access to public services variables
Media_Exposure	Radio_news Television_news Newspaper_news Internet_news Social_media_news	Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal	Radio news Television news Newspaper news Internet news Social media news

**Table 24: Define Variables in Combined Rounds (RENAMED)**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
Satisfied_With_Democracy	How_satisfied_w_democ_in_country	Ordinal	How satisfied is citizen with democracy in country
Freedom_of_Speech	Free_to_say_what_you_think_govt	Ordinal	Freedom to say what you think about govt
	Free_to_join_political_organizat	Ordinal	Freedom to join any political organization
	Free_to_choose_who_to_vote_for	Ordinal	Freedom to choose who to vote for
	News_media_free_of_govt_censor	Ordinal	News media free from govt censorship
Fair_Equal_Treatment	How_often_people_treated_unequal	Ordinal	How often people are treated unequally
	Experienced_unfair_treat_econ_st	Ordinal	Experienced unfair treatment based on economic status
	Experienced_unfair_treat_religio	Ordinal	Experienced unfair treatment based on religion
	Experienced_unfair_treat_ethnic	Ordinal	Experienced unfair treatment based on ethnicity
<b>Control / Blocking</b>	<b>Control / Blocking</b>		
Urban	Residence_rural_or_urban	Binary	Reside in rural (1) or urban (2) community
Age	Age	Ratio / Ordinal	How old you are
Women	Gender	Binary	Gender (Gender = 2)
Country_econ_condition	Economic_condition	Ordinal	Present economic condition of the country
Living_Conditions	Citizen_present_living_condition	Ordinal	Citizens' present living conditions
Primary	Education_level	Ordinal	Primary completed (Education_level= 3)

**Table 24: Define Variables in Combined Rounds (RENAMED)**

RENAMED VARIABLES	ORIGINAL VARIABLES	TYPES	DEFINITION / MEASUREMENT
High_School			High school completed (Education_level=5)
University			Has university degree (Education_level=8)

Source: "ORIGINAL VARIABLES" from Afrobarometer survey codebook and dataset covering period from 2014 to 2021 (Rounds 6, 7, 8)

## Appendix C: Round 6 support tables and figures

Appendix C contains Tables 25 to 27 and Figures 7 to 9 used to support data analysis specific to Round 6 inclusion.

**Table 25: Percentage of population with some level of trust in these specific political institutions in West Africa (Round 6, 2014 to 2015)**

	<i>President</i>	<i>Parliament National Assembly</i>	<i>Electoral Commission</i>	<i>Ruling Party</i>	<i>Opposition Political Party</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Courts of Law</i>	<i>Tax Revenue Office</i>
<i>Benin</i>	24	24	20	20	19	26	25	21
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	34	31	30	0	0	35	27	26
<i>Cabo Verde</i>	29	23	23	19	21	28	31	19
<i>Ghana</i>	20	18	19	18	23	18	21	17
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	27	23	21	17	16	21	18	21
<i>Liberia</i>	15	15	17	13	18	11	16	13
<i>Mali</i>	35	31	34	30	22	26	22	28
<i>Niger</i>	40	35	36	35	29	43	40	36
<i>Nigeria</i>	16	13	16	15	16	11	19	14
<i>Senegal</i>	32	24	29	22	19	35	32	27
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	27	17	19	21	24	16	17	14
<i>Togo</i>	27	20	19	18	14	21	18	14
<b><i>TOTAL</i></b>	<b>27</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>21</b>

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 6, 2014 to 2015 data



**Table 26: Percentage of population with perceptions most or all of the following are involved in corruption in West Africa (Round 6, 2014 to 2015)**

	<i>Presidency</i>	<i>Parliament National Assembly</i>	<i>Civil Servants</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Judges &amp; Magistrates</i>	<i>Tax Revenue Officials</i>
<i>Benin</i>	25	23	27	27	24	
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	13	15	16	14	17	19
<i>Cabo Verde</i>	6	7	8	10	5	
<i>Ghana</i>	24	24	26	32	24	26
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	12	12	15	25	17	
<i>Liberia</i>	32	34	36	39	28	35
<i>Mali</i>	17	18	22	27	28	
<i>Niger</i>	11	12	12	13	11	14
<i>Nigeria</i>	27	31	32	37	23	
<i>Senegal</i>	11	12	12	16	12	11
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	23	25	27	29	23	
<i>Togo</i>	18	17	20	22	24	25
	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>	


Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 6, 2014 to 2015 data

**Table 27: Percentage of population with ease of access or proximity to the following services or amenities in West Africa (Round 6, 2014 to 2015)**

	<i>Electricity Grid</i>	<i>Piped Water System</i>	<i>Mobile Phone Service</i>	<i>School</i>	<i>Police Station</i>	<i>Health Clinic</i>	<i>Bank or Money Service</i>	<i>Paid Transport</i>
<i>Benin</i>			94	95	26	67	27	
	25	85	93	97	20	65	19	64
	99							
	85	69	94	89	29	52	31	80
	83							
	32	19	81	97	47	76	24	94
	31							
	26	37	86	90	21	64	21	69
	89							
	74	85	99	89	24	55	41	89
	29							
	59	55	99	99	25	67	41	91
	57							


Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 6, 2014 to 2015 data

Figure 7: Percentage of population who trusts political institutions in West Africa (Round 6, 2014 to 2015)




Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 6, 2014 to 2015 data

Figure 8: Percentage of population who paid bribes at least once or twice in the past 2 years in West Africa for service (Round 6, 2014 to 2015)



Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 6, 2014 to 2015 data

Figure 9: Percentage of population satisfied with public service delivery quality in the past 2 years in West Africa (Round 6, 2014 to 2015)



Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 6, 2014 to 2015 data

## Appendix D: Round 7 support tables and figures

Appendix D contains Tables 28 to 30 and Figures 10 to 12 used to support data analysis specific to Round 7 inclusion.

**Table 28: Percentage of population with some level of trust in these specific political institutions in West Africa (Round 7, 2017 to 2018)**

	<i>President</i>	<i>Parliament National Assembly</i>	<i>Electoral Commission</i>	<i>Ruling Party</i>	<i>Opposition Political Party</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Courts of Law</i>
<i>Benin</i>	26	26	24	23	18	26	26
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	33	32	31	29	27	37	32
<i>Cabo Verde</i>	25	20	22	20	16	27	28
<i>Ghana</i>	35	28	27	31	21	20	28
<i>Guinea</i>	23	19	18	19	17	21	17
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	30	25	24	23	17	27	26
<i>Mali</i>	28	24	25	23	19	26	19
<i>Niger</i>	29	26	27	25	22	38	34
<i>Nigeria</i>	22	12	17	17	12	13	20
<i>Senegal</i>	36	23	22	22	20	43	32
<i>Togo</i>	19	15	14	15	17	22	18
<b><i>TOTAL</i></b>	<b>28</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>25</b>

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 7, 2017 to 2018 data

**Table 29: Percentage of population with perceptions most or all of the following are involved in corruption in West Africa (Round 7, 2017 to 2018)**

	<i>Presidency</i>	<i>Parliament National Assembly</i>	<i>Civil Servants</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Judges &amp; Magistrates</i>
<i>Benin</i>	21	21	22	27	
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	12	14	16	14	15
<i>Cabo Verde</i>	8	8	8	11	
<i>Ghana</i>	13	16	17	29	19
<i>Guinea</i>	24	22	26	28	
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	14	15	17	24	15
<i>Mali</i>	24	24	25	27	
<i>Niger</i>	14	15	16	16	13
<i>Nigeria</i>	21	30	27	34	
<i>Senegal</i>	11	12	13	14	12
<i>Togo</i>	26	25	27	28	
	<b>17</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>20</b>

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 7, 2017 to 2018 data


**Table 30: Percentage of population with ease of access or proximity to the following services or amenities in West Africa (Round 7, 2017 to 2018)**

	<i>Electricity Grid</i>	<i>Piped Water System</i>	<i>Mobile Phone Service</i>	<i>School</i>	<i>Police Station</i>	<i>Health Clinic</i>	<i>Bank or Money Service</i>	<i>Paid Transport</i>
<i>Benin</i>			94	93	30	66	19	
	31	31	76	91	22	55	17	46
	99							
	91	84	94	91	33	57	37	79
	32							
	64	47	79	78	13	47	11	71
	31							
	34	51	84	87	21	56	13	73
	83							
	76	77	98	91	35	68	40	74
	67							
	<b>60</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>74</b>

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 7, 2017 to 2018 data




Figure 10: Percentage of population who trusts political institutions in West Africa (Round 7, 2017 to 2018)




Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 7, 2017 to 2018 data

Figure 11: Percentage of population who paid bribes at least once or twice in the past 2 years in West Africa for service (Round 7, 2017 to 2018)



Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 7, 2017 to 2018 data

Figure 12: Percentage of population satisfied with public service delivery quality in the past 2 years in West Africa (Round 7, 2017 to 2018)



Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 7, 2017 to 2018 data

## Appendix E: Round 8 support tables and figures

Appendix E contains Tables 31 to 33 and Figures 13 to 15 used to support data analysis specific to Round 8 inclusion.

**Table 31: Percentage of population with some level of trust in these specific political institutions in West Africa (Round 8, 2019 to 2021)**

	<i>President</i>	<i>Parliament National Assembly</i>	<i>Electoral Commission</i>	<i>Ruling Party</i>	<i>Opposition Political Party</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Courts of Law</i>	<i>Tax Revenue Office</i>
<i>Benin</i>	27	21	24	20	19	31	26	20
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	30	26	28	24	20	39	26	24
<i>Cabo Verde</i>	25	17	21	16	15	24	25	18
<i>Gambia</i>	23	22	24	21	20	29	25	21
<i>Ghana</i>	29	21	27	24	18	19	24	20
<i>Guinea</i>	25	19	22	20	15	20	17	16
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	25	20	19	20	18	22	21	21
<i>Liberia</i>	20	11	18	14	11	13	17	15
<i>Mali</i>	23	19	24	20	19	28	18	24
<i>Niger</i>	30	27	31	28	27	40	34	30
<i>Nigeria</i>	20	13	15	14	12	12	16	12
<i>Senegal</i>	25	16	20	17	18	38	26	23
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	28	17	25	26	22	13	19	19
<i>Togo</i>	25	19	19	22	11	25	20	18
<b><i>TOTAL</i></b>	<b>25</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>20</b>

Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 8, 2019 to 2021 data

**Table 32: Percentage of population with perceptions most or all of the following are involved in corruption in West Africa (Round 8, 2019 to 2021)**

	<i>Presidency</i>	<i>Parliament National Assembly</i>	<i>Civil Servants</i>	<i>Police</i>	<i>Judges &amp; Magistrates</i>	<i>Tax Revenue Officials</i>
<i>Benin</i>	20	24	19	23	24	
<i>Burkina Faso</i>	14	16	18	15	17	18
<i>Cabo Verde</i>	4	7	7	11	6	
<i>Gambia</i>	21	16	17	24	20	22
<i>Ghana</i>	16	18	17	29	20	
<i>Guinea</i>	24	22	23	25	28	26
<i>Ivory Coast</i>	18	17	17	29	22	
<i>Liberia</i>	25	32	21	33	24	24
<i>Mali</i>	26	26	26	26	30	
<i>Niger</i>	10	12	13	14	11	11
<i>Nigeria</i>	19	22	16	31	20	
<i>Senegal</i>	17	17	16	23	17	18
<i>Sierra Leone</i>	19	21	15	31	18	
<i>Togo</i>	23	23	19	26	27	26
	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>	


Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 8, 2019 to 2021 data

**Table 33: Percentage of population with ease of access or proximity to the following services or amenities in West Africa (Round 8, 2019 to 2021)**

	<i>Electricity Grid</i>	<i>Piped Water System</i>	<i>Mobile Phone Service</i>	<i>School</i>	<i>Police Station</i>	<i>Health Clinic</i>	<i>Bank or Money Service</i>	<i>Paid Transport</i>
<i>Benin</i>			88	91	41	66	58	
	31	24	75	86	24	50	53	53
	97							
	73	81	81	71	27	39	27	62
	91							
	42	24	87	90	39	76	49	86
	78							
	40	29	89	79	38	64	39	91
	36							
	35	46	75	94	21	69	29	66
	67							
	81	83	97	93	38	69	72	85
	36							
	67	50	82	81	23	47	53	77
	<b>60</b>							


Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 8, 2019 to 2021 data

Figure 13: Percentage of population who trusts political institutions in West Africa (Round 8, 2019 to 2021)



Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 8, 2019 to 2021 data


Figure 14: Percentage of population who paid bribes at least once or twice in the past 3 years in West Africa for service (Round 8, 2019 to 2021)



Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 8, 2019 to 2021 data



Figure 15: Percentage of population satisfied with public service delivery quality in the past 3 years in West Africa (Round 8, 2019 to 2021)



Source: Author's calculations using Afrobarometer Survey Round 8, 2019 to 2021 data

## **Appendix F: Corruption and service impacts on individual institutions**

Appendix F analyzes corruption practices and their implications in West Africa across the individual separate eight governing institutions in the study. Table 37A and Table 37B below report the statistical outcomes. It uses Cronbach's alpha standards as well in its measurement.

The study's overarching findings show that corruption, as bribe paying mechanism for West African citizens to gain easier access to public services, does generally support the notion of trust in institutions as a reward based on efficient grease theory.

Ancillary to that hypothesis, findings revealed in Table 37A and Table 37B below only focus on corruption practices in each of the eight individual governing institutions in the study. These activities are not directly linked to the efficient grease hypothesis that would likely enable citizens to attain easier access to public services on a trust basis. Rather, the intuition here is not to uncover if corruption in these eighth institutions studied have a quid pro quo residual between citizens and bureaucrats but to simply validate if corrupt practices can be construed as unavoidable, ingrained necessities in West African institutional governing operations.

The interpretive data from the regressions give a much clearer narrative of how corruption and public service factors separately affect individual institutions. These institutions are the presidency, parliament/national assembly, electoral commission, ruling party, opposition political party, police, courts of law, and tax/revenue office. The results from the regressions exhibit support for a corruption-public service nexus to institutions becoming enabling arbiters for who gets what at what price. It should be noted that both exogenous and endogenous factors may be delineated as probable rationale at the individual institutional level, and may not necessarily be controlled by the umbrella of a trust relationship. External pressure on those in power could warrant a conflation of loyalty to their ethnicity or tribal alignment, for example, to

fulfill favors using government funds and services as the lowest common denominator. This practice would easily fall under the two publics theory, tribalism, nepotism spectrum espoused by scholars like Ekeh's (1975), Azelama (2002), and Ijewereme (2015) in the literature review. Internal factors for committing corruption could simply be grounded in greed for self-enrichment as outlined throughout the study when it comes to petty corruption.

For analysis in these tables, the study only concentrates on the models for president, police, courts of law, and tax/revenue office which may well be areas of more noticeable and salient impacts than the others in the collective consciousness of the livelihood of ordinary West African citizens. It is also noted here that details of some of the descriptive statistics are not pursued in these tables because the spirit of such statistical explanations was carefully divulged earlier in discussion of trust in institutions in Table 35.

The variables of interest in Table 37A and Table 37B are *Corruption Experienced*, *Corruption Perceived*, *Public Service Quality*, and *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services*.

**Table 37A: Corruption and Service Impacts on Individual Institutions  
in West Africa (2014 to 2021) Part A**

	President (1)	Parliament National Assembly (2)	Electoral Commission (3)	Ruling Party (4)	Opposition Political Party (5)
Corruption Experienced	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.04)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Corruption Perceived	0.13*** (0.02)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.05)	0.25*** (0.04)	0.37*** (0.05)
Public Service Quality	0.36*** (0.03)	0.35*** (0.03)	0.34*** (0.03)	0.39*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.02)
Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services	-0.10** (0.03)	-0.12*** (0.03)	-0.14* (0.05)	-0.15** (0.04)	-0.11** (0.03)
Media Exposure	-0.09* (0.03)	-0.12** (0.04)	-0.15** (0.04)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Satisfied With Democracy	0.15*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.01)
Freedom of Speech	0.16*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.01)
Fair Equal Treatment	-0.05* (0.02)	0.05 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
Urban	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
Age	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Women	-0.02* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Country Economy	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.04* (0.02)
Living Conditions	0.05*** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Primary	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
High School	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03* (0.01)
University	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.87*** (0.10)	0.71*** (0.12)	0.99*** (0.15)	0.78*** (0.11)	1.28*** (0.14)
Observations	49981	49981	49981	48781	48781
R-squared (Within)	0.1403	0.1359	0.1382	0.1441	0.0787
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

**Table 37B: Corruption and Service Impacts on Individual Institutions in West Africa (2014 to 2021) Part B**

	Police	Courts of Law	Tax Revenue Office
	(6)	(7)	(8)
Corruption Experienced	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Corruption Perceived	0.15** (0.04)	0.35*** (0.06)	0.52*** (0.08)
Public Service Quality	0.27*** (0.03)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.33*** (0.04)
Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services	-0.13*** (0.03)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.11 (0.06)
Media Exposure	-0.07** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.03)
Satisfied With Democracy	0.10*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.02)
Freedom of Speech	0.11*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.03)
Fair Equal Treatment	0.04 (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.07 (0.05)
Urban	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.05)
Age	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Women	0.01 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Country Economy	0.08*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.02)
Living Conditions	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Primary	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
High School	-0.03** (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.00)	-0.02* (0.01)
University	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)
Constant	1.16*** (0.10)	1.14*** (0.09)	1.18*** (0.09)
Observations	49981	49981	35187
R-squared (Within)	0.0916	0.1206	0.1177
Country FE	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

In Table 37A and Table 37B above, the variable *Corruption Experienced* is not statistically significant for president, police, courts of law, and tax/revenue office.

*Corruption Perceived* is statistically significant for president, police, courts of law, and tax/revenue office.

The coefficient for president is 0.13 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.02, *ceteris paribus*, meaning citizens believe there is a 0.13 change association the presidency can be infiltrated to take bribes for services with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Corruption Perceived*.

The coefficient for police is 0.15 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.04, *ceteris paribus*, meaning citizens' perception of infiltration level of corruption within the police branch has a 0.15 change association with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Corruption Perceived*.

The coefficient for courts of law is 0.35 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.06, *ceteris paribus*, meaning citizens' perception of infiltration level of corruption within the judicial system is about 0.35 change association with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Corruption Perceived*.

The coefficient for the tax/revenue office is 0.52 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.08, *ceteris paribus*, meaning citizens' perception of infiltration level of corruption within the tax collection apparatus is about 0.52 change association with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Corruption Perceived*.

The variable *Public Service Quality* is statistically significant for president, police, courts of law, and the tax/revenue office.

The coefficient for president is 0.36 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.03, *ceteris paribus*. The window of opportunity is 0.36 change factor that a president could be bribed to consider providing quality public services to witting citizens in a corrupt governing environment with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Public Service Quality*.

The coefficient for police is 0.27 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.03, *ceteris paribus*. The window of opportunity is 0.27 change factor the police could be bribed to consider providing public services to witting citizens in a corrupt governing environment with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Public Service Quality*.

The coefficient for courts of law is 0.30 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.02, *ceteris paribus*. The window of opportunity is 0.30 change factor that the judiciary could be bribed to consider providing quality public services to witting citizens in a corrupt governing environment with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Public Service Quality*.

The coefficient for the tax/revenue office is 0.33 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.04, *ceteris paribus*. The window of opportunity is 0.33 change factor that tax collecting officials could be bribed to consider providing quality public services to witting citizens in a corrupt governing environment with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Public Service Quality*.

The variable *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services* is statistically significant for president, police and courts of law. It is not statistically significant for the tax/revenue office.

The coefficient for president is -0.10 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.03, *ceteris paribus*. The window of opportunity is --0.10 change factor that a president would unlikely consider taking a bribe to grant witting citizens easier access to services in a corrupt governing environment with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services*.

The coefficient for police is -0.13 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.03, *ceteris paribus*. The window of opportunity is -0.13 change factor the police would unlikely consider taking a bribe to grant witting citizen easier access to services in a corrupt governing environment with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services*.

The coefficient for courts of law is -0.12 percentage point in the standard deviation with a standard error of 0.05, *ceteris paribus*. The window of opportunity is -0.12 change factor that the judiciary would unlikely consider taking a bribe to grant witting citizen easier access to services in a corrupt governing environment with a Cronbach's alpha change of one standard deviation in *Citizen Ease of Access to Public Services*.