Incentivizing International Negotiations: A Case Study of the Camp David Talks
Abstract
When exploring the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, scholars typically look at the individual actions of each side and present them as reasons why compromise is not reached. However, in this thesis I argue that the US is partially responsible for the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000. To craft the basis for this argument, I first explore the work of other international scholars and theorists in an attempt to lay the groundwork for the US’s role in the Camp David summit. I then delve into the day-to-day affairs as they occurred at Camp David and the actions the US took when interacting with the Israelis and Palestinians. Through this examination, I have determined that the Israelis and Palestinians willingly compromised, yet it was ultimately the US that drove the two sides apart. As a result, even though the Camp David talks were considered a failure, there is still much the US can learn for the future.