Incentivizing International Negotiations: A Case Study of the Camp David Talks

Date of Award


Document Type

Honors Thesis


Political Science

First Advisor

Dr. Timothy Schorn

Second Advisor

Dr. Thomas Horton

Third Advisor

Dr. Eric Jepsen


Israel, Palestine, US, Incentives, Israeli/Palestinian conflict

Subject Categories

International Relations | Political Science


When exploring the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, scholars typically look at the individual actions of each side and present them as reasons why compromise is not reached. However, in this thesis I argue that the US is partially responsible for the failure of the Camp David talks in 2000. To craft the basis for this argument, I first explore the work of other international scholars and theorists in an attempt to lay the groundwork for the US’s role in the Camp David summit. I then delve into the day-to-day affairs as they occurred at Camp David and the actions the US took when interacting with the Israelis and Palestinians. Through this examination, I have determined that the Israelis and Palestinians willingly compromised, yet it was ultimately the US that drove the two sides apart. As a result, even though the Camp David talks were considered a failure, there is still much the US can learn for the future.

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